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The prevalence of obesity and obesity-related non-communicable diseases has 
increased significantly over recent decades, and South Africa is currently 
experiencing an obesity epidemic. In addition to causing millions of deaths globally, 
these health issues impose a large burden on public healthcare in low- and middle-
income countries particularly, and reduce overall productivity. The World Health 
Organisation (“WHO”) has recognized the need for government intervention in this 
context, and has identified fiscal measures as a potentially useful tool in obesity-
prevention efforts. There are a number of factors that contribute to the relevant 
health concerns, including the increased affordability of unhealthy foods and 
beverages. The rationale for taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages or other 
unhealthy foods is that they lead to increased costs and thereby make unhealthy 
diets less affordable, which could lead to health improvements. In this context, a tax 
on certain sugar-sweetened beverages has been implemented in South Africa since 
1 April 2018, titled the “Health Promotion Levy” (“HPL”). 
While the link between dietary risk factors and particularly excessive sugar 
consumption has been well-established, the extent to which such fiscal measures 
effectively reduce sugar consumption and lead to health outcomes is less evident. 
Further, the WHO has stressed that fiscal measures need to form part of a broader 
policy framework in order to emphasize health outcomes. This thesis briefly 
discusses a number of these other interventions in the broader policy framework, 
and comments on the development of such interventions in South Africa.  Although a 
number of jurisdictions have implemented fiscal measures to pursue health 
objectives, the appropriateness of taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages has been 
criticised. While taxes are predominantly used for revenue generation, they could 
also be used specifically to discourage certain behaviour, to enhance economic 
growth, and for the redistribution of wealth.  
With reference to various criticisms of fiscal interventions, this thesis compares the 
formulation of the HPL with those of similar taxes implemented in Denmark, 
Hungary, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. With 
reference to this comparative study, it is critically considered whether the current 
formulation of the HPL is consistent with its stated objectives. The success of fiscal 
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measures to reduce consumption is considered alongside their potentially 
undesirable effects on overall dietary quality as well as other policy objectives of 
economic growth and redistributive goals. Lastly, this thesis offers suggestions on 
how the formulation of the HPL could be amended, and how the development of 
other interventions should be used to ensure sustainability for the HPL, and to 




Die voorkoms van vetsug en vetsugverwante nie-oordraagbare siektes het die 
afgelope dekades aansienlik toegeneem. Suid-Afrika ervaar tans 'n vetsug-epidemie. 
Hierdie gesondheidskwessies veroorsaak jaarliks wêreldwyd miljoene sterftes. 
Hierdie gesondheidskwessies lê veral 'n groot las op openbare gesondheidsorg in 
lande met lae en middelinkomste, en verminder produktiwiteit. Die 
Wêreldgesondheidsorganisasie het erken dat die regering se ingryping nodig is om 
hierdie gesondheidskwessies aan te spreek. In hierdie konteks is fiskale maatreëls 
geïdentifiseer as 'n potensieel nuttige hulpmiddel in die regering se pogings om die 
voorkoms van vetsug en vetsugverwante nie-oordraagbare siektes te verminder. 
Daar is 'n aantal faktore wat bydra tot die betrokke gesondheidskwessies, insluitend 
die verhoogde bekostigbaarheid van ongesonde kosprodukte en 
suikerversooetekoeldranke. Die rede vir belasting op suiker-versoete drankies en 
ander ongesonde voedselprodukte is dat dit die koste sal verhoog en sodoende 
ongesonde diëte minder bekostigbaar sal maak. Op hierdie manier word dit 
gerasionaliseer dat fiskale maatreëls die voedingsgehalte verbeter en tot 
gesondheidsverbeterings lei. In hierdie konteks word 'n belasting op sekere suiker-
versoete drank sedert 1 April 2018 in Suid-Afrika geïmplementeer, met die titel 
"Belasting op Suikerversoetekoeldranke.” 
Die verband tussen ongesonde diëte en oormatige suikerverbruik is vasgestel, maar 
die mate waarin fiskale maatreëls die suikerverbruik verminder en die 
gesondheidsuitkomste verbeter, is minder duidelik. Die 
Wêreldgesondheidsorganisasie het verder benadruk dat sulke belastings gepaard 
moet gaan met ander ingrypings om gesondheidsverbeterings te bevorder. Hierdie 
tesis bespreek kortliks 'n aantal van hierdie ander intervensies en lewer kommentaar 
op die ontwikkeling van hierdie intervensies in Suid-Afrika. ‘n Aantal jurisdiksies het 
fiskale maatreëls ingestel om gesondheidsdoelwitte na te streef, maar dit is 
gekritiseer. Belasting word hoofsaaklik gebruik vir inkomstegenerering, maar dit kan 
ook gebruik word om sekere gedrag te ontmoedig, ekonomiese groei te bevorder en 
om die verdeling van welvaart te bevorder. 
Hierdie tesis vergelyk die formulering van die Belasting op Suikerversoetekoeldranke 
met dié van soortgelyke belasting wat in Denemarke, Hongarye, Mexiko, die 
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Verenigde Koninkryk en die Verenigde State van Amerika geïmplementeer is. Met 
verwysing na hierdie vergelykende studie, word in hierdie tesis krities gekyk of die 
huidige formulering van die Belasting op Suikerversoetekoeldranke in 
ooreenstemming is met die gestelde doelstellings. Die sukses van fiskale maatreëls 
om verbruik te verminder, word beskou sowel as die moontlike ongewenste 
uitwerking op die algehele dieetkwaliteit, en ander beleidsdoelstellings vir 
ekonomiese groei en herverdelingsdoelwitte. Laastens bied hierdie tesis voorstelle 
oor hoe die formulering van die Belasting op Suikerversoetekoeldranke gewysig kan 
word, en hoe die ontwikkeling van ander intervensies aangewend moet word om 
beide die volhoubaarheid van die Belasting op Suikerversoetekoeldranke te verseker 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Problem identification  
1 1 1 Increasing burden of obesity and non-communicable diseases 
The World Health Organisation (“WHO”) reports that obesity has almost tripled 
worldwide since 1975, and it is estimated that around 50% of the world’s adult 
population will be overweight or obese by the year 2030.1 Obesity is increasingly 
becoming an issue for low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”), and South Africa 
is currently experiencing an obesity epidemic.2 Studies have shown that, in 2003, 
27,4% of South African females and 7,5% of South African males were obese.3 
According to statistics from 2014, South Africa’s obesity prevalence has increased to 
13% for adult males, and to 42% for adult females.4 South Africa is presently 
considered to be the most obese nation in sub-Saharan Africa, with over 50% of the 
adult population being overweight.5 Of further concern is the increasing prevalence 
of childhood obesity, as research indicates that obese children are likely to remain 
obese throughout their lives. In addition to early onset obesity, poor dietary habits in 
childhood could lead to various obesity-related diseases. These medical issues 
require chronic care over the span of these children’s lifetimes, and increase long-
term public healthcare costs.6  
Obesity and overweight are defined as medical conditions involving the excessive 
or abnormal accumulation of body fat.7 The degrees of these conditions are 
                                            
1 WHO “Obesity and Overweight” (01-02-2018) WHO 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/> (accessed 12-02-2018); T Kelly, W Yang, 
CS Chen, J Reynolds & J He “Global burden of obesity in 2005 and projections to 2030” (2008) 32 
IJO 1431 1435. Kelly et al project that the prevalence of overweight and obesity could be as high 
as 57,8% of the world’s adult population by 2030, chompared to the 33,0% recorded in 2005. 
2 WHO “Obesity and Overweight” WHO; N Stacey, A Tugendhaft & K Hofman “Sugary beverage 
taxation in South Africa: Household expenditure, demand system elasticities, and policy 
implications” (2017) 105 Prev. Med. S26 S26. 
3 RSA NDOH, Medical Research Council, OrcMacro South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 
2003 (2007) 276-277. 
4 M Ng, T Fleming, M Robinson, B Thomson, N Graetz & E Gakidou “Global, regional and national 
prevalence of overweight and obesity in children and adults 1980-2013: A systematic analysis” 
(2014) 384 Lancet 766 766. 
5 797. 
6 RSA National Treasury Taxation of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Policy Paper (2016) 6-8; WHO 
“Obesity and Overweight” WHO. 
7 Mayo Clinic “Obesity” (10-06-2015) Mayo Clinic <https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-





measured in terms of the Body Mass Index (“BMI”), which is defined as a ratio of an 
individual’s weight in kilograms, to the square of their height in metres (“kg/m2”).8 
The classifications for BMI for adults are as follows: a “normal” weight BMI value is 
between 18,5 and 24,9kg/m2; an “overweight” BMI value is between 25 and 
29,9kg/m2; and an “obese” BMI value is over 30kg/m2.9 There is a positive 
relationship between BMI levels and the risk of developing certain non-
communicable diseases (“NCDs”), including: type 2 diabetes mellitus (“T2DM”); 
osteoarthritis; gall bladder disease; stroke; gout; chronic kidney disease; and a 
number of heart diseases, including coronary heart disease, heart failure, and atrial 
fibrillation.10 The prevalence of these NCDs is increasing along with obesity 
prevalence, and it has been estimated that the number of deaths attributable to high 
BMIs almost doubled during the period 1990 to 2017.11 NCDs are responsible for 
around 36 million deaths each year, which represents around 63% of all annual 
deaths.12  
Around 86% of these NCD-related deaths occur in LMICs, where: the prevalence 
of malnutrition and infectious diseases is also high; and the increasing prevalence of 
                                            
8 RSA NDOH Strategy for Prevention and Control of Obesity in South Africa 2015 – 2020 (2015) 15. 
Apart from BMI, abdominal obesity is an indicator of body fat and the risk of developing obesity-
related NCDs. There is a high risk for developing obesity-related NCDs where waist circumference 
exceeds 88cm for women and 102cm for men, and a moderate risk where waist circumference 
exceeds 80cm for women and 94cm for men. 
9 G Bray “Obesity in adults: etiology and natural history” (08-02-2018) UpToDate <https://www-
uptodate-com.ez.sun.ac.za/contents/obesity-in-adults-etiology-and-natural-
history?search=bray%20obesity%20adults&source=search_result&selectedTitle=7~150&usage_ty
pe=default&display_rank=7> (accessed 21-05-2018); NIH NHLBI Clinical Guidelines on the 
Identification, Evaluation and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults: The Evidence 
Report NIH Publication No. 98-4083 (1998) xi; WHO “Obesity and Overweight” WHO. Different 
guidelines are used for children, where age and the WHO Child Growth Standards median are 
taken into consideration. 
10 A Must, J Spadano, E Coakley, A Field, G Colditz & W Dietz “The Disease Burden Associated with 
Overweight and Obesity” (1999) 282 JAMA 1523 1523-1526; H Kramer, A Luke, A Bidani, G Cao, 
R Cooper & D McGee “Obesity and Prevalent and Incident CKD: The Hypertension Detection and 
Follow-Up Program” (2005) 46 AJKD 587 591; L Perreault “Overweight and obesity in adults: 
Health consequences” (13-02-2018) UpToDate <https://www-uptodate-
com.ez.sun.ac.za/contents/overweight-and-obesity-in-adults-health-
consequences?topicRef=5375&source=see_link> (accessed 28-05-2018). Overweight and obese 
individuals have also been shown to be at a relatively higher risk for numerous types of cancers, 
and a number of medical conditions, including hypertension, venous thrombosis and reproductive 
problems. 
11 Ng et al (2014) Lancet 767; GBD Compare Viz Hub “All causes Both sexes, All ages” (19-11-2017) 
Viz Hub <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/> (accessed 19-05-2019); GBD Compare Viz 
Hub “High body-mass index Both sexes, All ages” (19-11-2017) Viz Hub 
<https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/> (accessed 19-05-2019). 





obesity has been described as a pandemic.13 These issues place a large amount of 
strain on healthcare systems, and have been described as the “double burden” of 
disease.14 For example, South Africa’s healthcare system is already constrained by 
the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the chronic nature of certain NCDs places 
further strain on this system.15 Along with decreased life expectancy and direct costs 
of government healthcare expenditure, these health concerns decrease overall 
productivity, because obese individuals are likely to use more sick days and to retire 
at younger ages.16 This is an impediment to social and economic development, 
particularly in LMICs. Further, because obesity is more prevalent among lower socio-
economic groups, the rapid rise in obesity exacerbates existing social inequalities.17 
  NCDs are most frequently caused by modifiable behavioural risk factors, such as 
smoking, alcohol consumption, unhealthy diets and physical inactivity. Certain 
dietary risk factors and obesity are both separate risk factors for developing certain 
NCDs, and certain dietary risk factors are risk factors for obesity itself.18 It has been 
established by medical research that the cause of weight gain is the consumption of 
energy that exceeds the expenditure of energy.19 Weight loss and thus the 
maintenance of a normal BMI can be achieved by: increasing physical activity; and 
reducing energy consumption through following a healthy diet.20 While the 
consensus on the “healthiness” of certain foods is constantly shifting, medical 
research indicates that a healthy diet generally comprises of a balance of: 
                                            
13 B Popkin, L Adair & S Ng “Now and Then: The Global Nutrition Transition: The Pandemic of 
Obesity in Developing Countries” (2012) 70 Nutr Rev. 3 3; WHO Global Action Plan 1. 
14 FAO The double burden of malnutrition: Case studies from six developing countries FAO Food and 
Nutrition Paper 84 (2006) 1. The “double burden” of disease is described as where: there is 
already a high prevalence of communicable diseases; and the prevalence of NCDs is increasing. 
15 Stacey et al (2017) Prev. Med. S26. 
16 WHO Global Action Plan 10; K Van Nuys, D Globe, D Ng-Mak, H Cheung, J Sullivan & D Goldman 
“The Association between Employee Obesity and Employer Costs: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. 
Employers” (2014) 28 AJHP 277 278; RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 4. 
17 Popkin et al (2012) Nutr Rev. 3; WHO Global Action Plan 1. 
18 GBD 2017 Risk Factor Collaborators “Global, regional, and national comparative risk assessment 
of 84 behavioural, environmental and occupational, and metabolic risks or clusters of risks for 195 
countries and territories, 1990-2017: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 
2017” (2018) 392 Lancet 1923 1948-1954; WHO Guideline: Sugars intake for adults and children 
(2015) 1. 
19 Bray “Obesity in adults: etiology and natural history” UpToDate; T Heise, S Katikireddi, F Pega, G 
Gartlehner, C Fenton, U Griebler, I Sommer, M Pfinder & S Lhachimi “Taxation of sugar-
sweetened beverages for reducing their consumption and preventing obesity or other adverse 
health outcomes (Protocol)” (2016) CDSR 1 2. Although there are a number of factors that 
contribute to weight gain, excessive energy consumption and inadequate physical activity have 
been identified as the two largest drivers for the global increase in the prevalence of obesity. 
20 G Colditz “Healthy diet in adults” (16-07-2018) UpToDate 




macronutrients, which are carbohydrates, proteins and fats; and micronutrients, 
which are various vitamins and minerals.21 More specifically, a healthy diet has been 
shown to be relatively high in whole grains, nuts, fruits, vegetables and legumes, and 
relatively low in sodium, saturated fat, trans fatty acids (“TFAs”) and free sugars.22  
The WHO describes “free sugars” as mono and disaccharides “added to foods 
and drinks by the manufacturer, cook or consumer.”23 Intrinsic or natural sugars are 
described as the sugars that “form an integral part of certain unprocessed foodstuffs, 
the most important being whole fruit and vegetables, that are enclosed in the cell... 
and... are always accompanied by other nutrients.”24 In addition to mono and 
disaccharides, the “sugars naturally present in honey, syrups, fruit juices and fruit 
juice concentrates” are considered “added sugars,” when they are added to foods 
and beverages.25 If free sugars comprise a large portion of an individual’s diet, it 
becomes more difficult for individuals to meet their macronutrient and micronutrient 
needs, without exceeding their total energy requirements and thereby gaining 
weight.26 
1 1 2 Rationale for government intervention to address health concerns 
Sugar-sweetened beverage (“SSB”) consumption has been “identified as a major 
contributing factor” to free sugar consumption and the relevant health issues. The 
health rationale for government interventions targeting SSB consumption specifically 
are summarized as follows: 
                                            
21 WHO “Healthy diet” (14-09-2015) WHO <http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/healthy-diet> (accessed 05-06-2018); Colditz “Healthy diet in adults” UpToDate. 
22 Colditz “Healthy diet in adults” UpToDate; WHO Guideline: Sugars intake 3. According to the WHO, 
a healthy diet comprises less than 30% of total energy intake from fat, and less than 10% has 
been shown to reduce the risk of developing a number of NCDs. Further, the consumption of 
unsaturated fats is preferable to saturated fats, and the consumption of TFAs should be limited to 
less than 1% of total energy intake. In order to reduce the risk of certain heart diseases and stroke, 
a healthy diet should include at least 3,5g potassium per day, and no more than 2000mg sodium 
per day. Lastly, individuals should consume a minimum of 5 servings of fruits or vegetables each 
day, because there is an inverse relationship between the consumption of fruits and vegetables, 
and the risk of certain preventable diseases. 
23 WHO Taxes on sugary drinks: Why do it? (2017) 1. Monosaccharides include glucose and fructose, 
and disaccharides include “sucrose or table sugar.” 
24 Reg 1 of GN R 146 in GG 32975 of 01-03-2010. 
25 WHO Taxes on sugary drinks 1; Reg 1 of GN R 146 in GG 32975 of 01-03-2010. In terms of South 
African regulations, “added sugars” are defined as sugars “added to foods during processing,” 
including “honey, molasses, sucrose with added molasses, coloured sugar, fruit juice concentrate, 
deflavoured and/or dionised fruit juice and concentrates thereof, high-fructose corn syrup and malt 
or any other syrup of various origins.” 
26 D Mozaffarian, T Hao, E Rimm, W Willet & F Hu “Changes in Diet and Lifestyle and Long-Term 




 “Increased consumption of free sugars, particularly in the form of sugary beverages, is 
associated with weight gain in both children and adults. Liquid sugar is absorbed 
quickly by the body and sugary beverages have no nutritional value. After consumption 
of a sugary drink, the blood sugar spikes and mass insulin is secreted to drop sugar 
levels which fall rapidly, and sugar gets converted into fat in the liver. Sugary 
beverages are linked to obesity and the onset of type 2 diabetes and metabolic 
syndrome... Volumes of sugary beverages consumed are high and on the rise, and do 
not provide the same feeling of fullness that solid food provides. There is extensive 
scientific evidence supporting the contribution of sugary beverages to obesity, NCDs 
and oral health... The World Health Organization... has recommended the intake of 
free sugars to less than 10 per cent of total energy intake... for weight management 
and other health benefits including dental caries. It also indicated that a further 
reduction to less than 5 per cent of total energy intake may further minimize the risk of 
dental caries throughout the life course... Evidence suggests that reducing sugar 
intake, especially in the form of sugary beverages, may help maintain a healthy body 
weight and possibly reduce the risk of overweight and obesity in adults.”27 
A number of factors contribute to poor diets, but the increased affordability of 
unhealthy foods and beverages is arguably one of the most significant causes.28 The 
dietary changes responsible for the increasing prevalence of obesity and NCDs are 
largely induced by societal and environmental changes, to which there has been 
inadequate government reaction. In order to halt the growth of these health 
concerns, the WHO provides: that policy action may be required in a number of 
sectors; and that a “whole of society” life course approach is required, which includes 
the introduction of a comprehensive range of carefully-formulated policy measures.29 
Among other publications, the WHO describes certain prevention and control policies 
in the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (“Global 
Strategy”),30 the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases 2013-2020 (“Global Action Plan”),31 and the Report of 
the Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity (“Commission on Ending Childhood 
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Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Bill – Health Promotion Levy (2017) 5; WHO 
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28 WHO Report of the Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity (2016) 17; EU Igumbor, D Sanders, 
TR Puoane, L Tsolekile, C Schwarz, C Purdy, R Swart, S Durao & C Hawkes “”Big Food,” the 
Consumer Food Environment, Health, and the Policy Response in South Africa” (2012) 9 PLoS 
Med 1 1. 
29 WHO “Obesity and Overweight” WHO; WHO Global Action Plan 66; WHO Commission on Ending 
Childhood Obesity 10 & 14. The relevant sectors include health, environment, agriculture, food 
processing, food distribution, education and marketing. 
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Obesity”).32 The measures recommended by the WHO can be classified into two, 
broad categories: measures aimed at modifying the market environment; and 
measures aimed at encouraging informed choices.33  
The consumer food environment comprises of: the food information environment, 
in which interventions are aimed at equipping consumers with the necessary 
knowledge and skills to make informed, healthy dietary choices; and the food market 
environment, in which interventions are aimed at encouraging or compelling various 
actors in the food industry to limit the acceptability, affordability and availability of 
unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages.34 Government interventions in the 
consumer food environment are thus aimed at decreasing the acceptability, 
affordability and availability of unhealthy foods and beverages, with the ultimate 
objective of reducing dietary risk factors for obesity and obesity-related NCDs. The 
WHO provides that the starting point for interventions aimed at improving the 
consumer food environment should be the advancement of nutritional information in 
the form of evidence-based dietary guidelines.35 Further recommended measures 
include: nutrition education policies; nutrition labelling regulations; public marketing 
campaigns; marketing regulations; and fiscal policies, including taxes on sugary 
drinks.36 The WHO defines “sugary drinks” as “beverages containing free sugars,” 
including “carbonated or non-carbonated soft drinks, fruit/vegetable juices... liquid 
and powder concentrates, flavoured water, energy and sports drinks, ready-to-drink 
tea, ready-to-drink coffee, and flavoured milk drinks.”37 Among others, a tax on SSBs 
is an example of an intervention aimed at influencing the food market environment 
through decreasing the affordability of the targeted unhealthy products. Alemanno 
and Carreño describe a tax on unhealthy food as: 
“... a tax or surcharge placed upon fattening foods or beverages on individuals with the 
aim to decrease consumption of foods that are linked to obesity and other health-
related risks... some theorists, starting with Arthur Pigou, a 20th-century English 
economist... have long presented the arguments for imposing special taxes on goods 
and services whose prices do not reflect the true social cost of their consumption. 
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34 C Hawkes & F Sassi “Improving the quality of nutrition” in D McDaid, F Sassi & S Merkur (eds) 
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35 WHO Population-based approaches to Childhood Obesity Prevention (2012) 27. 
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Examples of Pigouvian taxes are duties on cigarettes, alcohol, gambling and 
environmental emissions.”38 
Externalities arise where an individual or entity engages in an activity that has 
consequences on other parties, and those consequences are not reflected in the 
market price of the activity. In terms of Pigouvian theory, taxes should be imposed 
on market activities that cause externalities, and these taxes should be set at the 
rate of the relevant external costs.39 Consumers should have the freedom to make 
their own consumption decisions, but government intervention may be justified 
where a market failure exists.40 Market failures manifest as externalities or 
information failures.41 Information failures occur where consumers do not fully 
appreciate the costs associated with their consumption. It is therefore rationalised 
that government intervention is justified where: unhealthy diets have become more 
affordable, and the prices of obesity-causing foods do not account for the 
environmental and social costs of obesity and obesity-related NCDs; and consumers 
lack awareness on these costs associated with the consumption certain foods.42  
Additionally, by imposing a tax on an unhealthy item, the relative price of healthy 
food options will be decreased in comparison to the price of unhealthy options. In 
this way, it is rationalised that healthier diets become relatively more affordable than 
unhealthy diets.43 It has further been reasoned that the revenue generated from 
these taxes could reinforce health outcomes by funding certain health promotion 
programmes.44 
                                            
38 A Alemanno & I Carreño “’Fat taxes’ in Europe – A Legal and Policy Analysis under EU and WTO 
Law” (2013) 2 EFFL 97 97. 
39 R Mann “Controlling the environmental costs of obesity” (2017) 47 Environmental Law 695 718. 
40 W Viscusi “Principles of Cigarette Taxation” in S Cnossen (ed) Excise Tax Policy and 
Administration in Southern African Countries (2006) 61 77. If consumers believe that the 
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consumers are aware of the costs associated with their consumption. 
41 S Cnossen “Introduction” in S Cnossen (ed) Excise Tax Policy and Administration in Southern 
African Countries 1 15. 
42 J Benade & MF Essop “Introduction of “Sugar Tax” in South Africa: Placebo or panacea to curb the 
onset of cardio-metabolic diseases?” (2017) 14 SA Heart 148 148; K Brownell, T Farley, W Willet, 
B Popkin, F Chaloupka, J Thompson & D Ludwig “The Public Health and Economic Benefits of 
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages” (2009) 361 NEJM 1599 1601. 
43 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 10. 
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Children’s Body Mass Index” (2010) 29 Health Aff 10521057; MW Long, SL Gortmaker, ZJ Ward, 
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1 1 3 Government intervention in South Africa 
1 1 3 1 Policy context and formulation of the Health Promotion Levy 
The National Department of Health (“NDOH”) has recognised the negative effects 
of obesity and NCDs, and has identified certain prevention strategies in the Strategic 
Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (“Strategic 
Plan”)45 and the Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Obesity in South Africa 
(“Strategy”).46 The Strategy is aligned with the WHO’s Global Strategy, and has set a 
target of reducing the rate of obesity in South Africa by 10% by the year 2020.47 
Following assessments done by OECD and WHO, the Strategy observed that fiscal 
measures will be the most cost-effective intervention to deal with obesity and NCDs 
in South Africa.48 During the 2016 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance 
announced that a tax on SSBs would be introduced, and this was confirmed in 
February 2017.49 The Health Promotion Levy (“HPL”) was inserted into the Customs 
and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (“Customs and Excise Act”)50 in terms of the Rates and 
Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act 14 of 2017 (“Rates and 
Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act”). This amendment was 
assented to and signed by the President on 14 December 2017, and the HPL came 
into effect on 1 April 2018.51 The Customs and Excise Act provides for the HPL in 
Part 7A of Schedule 1.52  
The HPL is payable on a list of specified products (“HPL products”), including: 
chocolate and cocoa beverages; syrups and concentrates for making beverages; 
drinking straws that contain flavouring preparations; waters that contain added sugar 
or other sweetening matter; and certain non-alcoholic beers.53 HPL is levied at the 
rate of 2,21 cents per gram of sugar in these products above a tax-free sugar 
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49 RSA National Treasury 2017 Budget Speech: Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance (2017) 12-16. 
50 S1(1)(d) of the Customs and Excise Act.  
51 S14(1)-(2) of the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act. 
52 S17. 
53 Part 7A of Schedule No. 1 of the Customs and Excise Act Kindly refer to Annex A of this thesis 




content threshold of 4 grams per 100 millilitres.54 The Duty-At-Source (“DAS”) 
principle is applicable to the HPL: imported HPL products are subject to the levy 
once they have been cleared for home consumption; and locally-manufactured HPL 
products are subject to the levy at the source of manufacture. It was expected that 
manufacturers and importers would readjust their prices in line with the tax, and 
thereby pass through the tax burden to consumers. Such a response would be in line 
with the objective of reducing excessive sugar consumption, obesity, T2DM and 
other related diseases, through reducing consumers’ demand as a result of 
increased prices.55  
By taxing these beverages according to their sugar content, it provides incentive 
for consumers to substitute consumption of SSBs towards less sugary beverages, 
because their prices should become relatively cheaper as a result of the tax. Further, 
it has been rationalised that the use of the tax-free threshold provides incentive for 
producers to reformulate their products to contain less sugar, which is in line with the 
overall health objectives. If HPL products are reformulated to contain less sugar and 
are not subject to the tax, then the consumption of these beverages might not 
decrease as anticipated, but the decreased sugar content would result in reduced 
energy intake.56 The Taxation of Sugar Sweetened Beverages Policy Paper (“Policy 
Paper”)57 provides that beverages containing only intrinsic sugars should be 
excluded from the HPL, because it is the added sugars in SSBs that have negative 
health effects.58 Accordingly, 100% fruit and vegetable juices and unsweetened milk 
and milk products are not subject to the HPL.59 However, the “sugar” content for 
purposes of the HPL means the total sugar content, including intrinsic sugar, added 
sugar and “other sweetening matter.”60 Therefore, where sugar is added to any of 
the would-be exempt products, and the total sugar content in the final product 
exceeds the tax-free threshold, these products are taxed according to their total 
sugar content, and no distinction is made between their intrinsic sugar and added 
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was levied at the rate of 2,1c/g sugar exceeding 4g/100ml in HPL products. 
55 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 15; SARS “FAQs For Sugary Beverages Levy” (01-04-2018) 
SARS <https://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Customs-Excise/Excise/Pages/FAQs-for-Sugary-
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56 RSA National Treasury & SARS Final Response Document 8; Stacey et al (2017) Prev. Med. S29. 
57 RSA National Treasury Taxation of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Policy Paper (2016) 1-19. 
58 3. 
59 RSA National Treasury & SARS Final Response Document 6. 




sugar contents.61 This provision is similar to the description used for purposes of the 
WHO Regional Office for Europe Nutrient Profile Model,62 which provides that the 
“total sugar content” of the relevant products is comprised of: 
 “...intrinsic sugars incorporated within the structure of intact fruit and vegetables; 
sugars from milk (lactose and galactose); and all additional monosaccharides and 
disaccharides added to foods by the manufacturer, cook or consumer, plus sugars 
naturally present in honey, syrups and fruit juices.”63 
In the case of “ready-to-drink” HPL products, the sugar content is calculated 
according to “the sugar content as certified on a test report obtained and retained 
from a testing laboratory accredited with and using methodology recognised by the 
South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) or the International 
Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC).”64 Sugar content for syrups and 
concentrates is also calculated according to such a test report, according to the “total 
volume of the prepared beverage when mixed or diluted according to the 
manufacturer’s product specifications; and the average sugar content as certified on 
such a test report of the sugar content for all the prepared beverage options when 
mixed or diluted according to the manufacturer’s multiple product specifications.”65 In 
the absence of a satisfactory label or report, the sugar content is deemed to be 20 
grams per 100 millilitres for: ready-to-drink HPL products; and syrups and 
concentrates, calculated according to a dilution “ratio of one to nine parts water.”66 
This provision for deemed sugar content is intended to provide an incentive to 
manufacturers to comply with labelling guidelines, because 20 grams of sugar per 
100 millilitres is above the average sugar content in ready-to-drink SSBs.67 
1 1 3 2 Criticisms of taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages 
The Policy Paper provides: that SSB taxes are globally recognised as appropriate, 
cost-effective measures to address the issues of obesity and NCDs; and that 
Denmark, Hungary, Mexico, Finland, France, Ireland, Mauritius and Norway have 
implemented successful SSB taxes to reduce consumption and pursue health 
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outcomes.68 As of May 2019, 42 countries and eight local jurisdictions within the 
United States of America (“USA”) had implemented sugary drinks taxes.69 However, 
these taxes are controversial, and their success in other jurisdictions is not 
uncontested. Further, because the majority of SSB taxes adopted in other 
jurisdictions have been implemented relatively recently, it is difficult to ascertain the 
efficacy of this type of intervention.70 Nevertheless, the controversial nature of these 
taxes and the debate prompted by their introduction raises a number of interesting 
arguments that merit further consideration.  
While proponents advocate that an SSB tax is an essential measure in 
governments’ efforts to curb obesity, 71 others are of the opinion that these taxes: will 
neither improve health issues nor generate additional revenue for public healthcare; 
are regressive in nature; and have considerable economic consequences, including 
job losses and reduced Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).72 Some argue that the 
HPL will not be effective, because such fiscal measures have failed to adequately 
change consumption in other jurisdictions.73 Importantly for this thesis, some authors 
argue that a number of aspects of formulation of these taxes will determine their 
success in achieving health objectives.74 Many taxpayers are sceptical of the policy 
objectives provided for HPL, and doubt exists as to whether this tax has been 
appropriately formulated in order to achieve these policy objectives. On 15 
                                            
68 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 3. 
69 Global Food Research Programme University of North Carolina Sugary drink taxes around the 
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December 2017, the National Treasury and the South African Revenue Service 
(“SARS”) published the Final Response Document on the 2017 Rates and Monetary 
Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Bill – Health Promotion Levy (“Final 
Response Document”),75 responding to public comments and criticisms of the HPL.76  
Some of the criticisms regarding the formulation of the HPL to achieve health 
objectives are that sugar is not the only harmful nutrient that contributes to obesity 
and NCDs, and that SSBs are not the only products that contain added sugars.77 
Jeffery describes the HPL as a “stealth tax,” with the “supposed rationale” of obesity 
reduction, and argues that: it is rather a means of generating additional government 
revenue; and more effective measures exist for obesity reduction goals.78 Some 
argue that, even if the HPL could successfully achieve its health objective and 
reduce external economic costs, the imposition of the HPL does not justify the 
regressive impact of such a tax, and its potential to cause job losses.79 According to 
studies done by National Treasury and SARS, there is a potential for 5000 to 7000 
job losses as a result of the HPL.80 However, Oxford Economics, Econex and KPMG 
have all modelled the potential impact of the HPL and have similar reports that differ 
from these estimates. For example, KPMG has estimated that the total job losses will 
be between 41 700 and 72 000, with 28 000 to 44 000 direct job losses. Due to 
conflicting interests, however, it may prove difficult to predict the total job losses.81 
Another criticism of SSB taxes is that they are not well-targeted, and that other 
interventions might be more suitable for reducing obesity.82  SSBs taxes have also 
been criticised for being unfair, because they affect individuals with a normal BMI, 
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and those who consume low volumes of SSBs.83 However, because their 
consumption is low, these individuals will probably not be affected to a large extent.  
1 1 3 3 Multiple-intervention approach 
Although it is not entirely impossible, it would be very difficult to implement a 
measure that targets overweight and obese individuals exclusively. Further, it is 
impossible for any single intervention to eliminate the burden of obesity entirely, and 
certain interventions may be more suitable for preventing or reducing the prevalence 
of obesity. It is therefore necessary to use multiple interventions, even if each 
individual intervention does not directly target obese consumers.84 In this regard, 
Backholer et al submit that taxes on unhealthy foods are not a “silver bullet” for 
preventing and decreasing the prevalence of obesity.85 Further, Smed and Jensen 
provide that fiscal measures: 
“... cannot solve the problems with regard to nutrition and obesity for all groups of 
consumers. However, this does not exclude the possibility of using such instruments in 
combination with other regulations... e.g. information campaigns or rule-based 
regulation. Thus, it may be considered whether information can contribute to enhance 
the effectiveness of economic instruments – and vice versa, so that price changes can 
induce consumers’ increased attention about the nutritional aspects of the foods 
consumed... a combined regulation utilising both tax/subsidy instruments and other 
types of regulation might be a proper way to go.”86 
Accordingly, the Strategy has acknowledged the need for a “multiple-intervention 
approach... rather than individual interventions” in order to achieve “substantially 
larger health gains.”87 In addition to fiscal measures, the Strategic Plan provides for 
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the following interventions to target unhealthy diets: food advertising regulations; 
food labelling measures; worksite interventions; mass media campaigns; school-
based interventions; and physician counselling.88 This multiple-intervention approach 
was emphasized in the Final Response Document, which provides that: 
 “To target the entire population, fiscal measures such as taxes are identified as cost-
effective to address diet related NCD’s... tax is not the only intervention being 
implemented but rather complements other interventions such as promoting overall 
healthy eating in various settings and consumer education... The implementation of the 
tax on sugary beverages is part of a comprehensive package of measures outlined in 
the Strategy and has not been put forward as the single policy response that will 
achieve the desired health outcomes.”89 
Therefore, although taxes on certain unhealthy food and non-alcoholic beverage 
products are the focus of this thesis, these measures should not be considered in 
isolation, because they are influenced by the existing policy framework. Interventions 
aimed at influencing the affordability of certain foods could be complemented by 
others aimed at influencing their availability and acceptability, and vice versa. 
1 2 Research questions and hypotheses  
The main research question is whether, in the light of the comparative study, the 
HPL has been effectively formulated in order to achieve its policy objectives. In order 
to answer this question, and drawing on the experiences of other jurisdictions, it is 
first necessary to address the overarching questions: whether it is possible for SSB 
taxes to change consumption patterns and reduce the prevalence of obesity and 
NCDs; and if so, which aspects of formulation of SSB taxes affect their success. 
Further, in order to contextualize SSB taxes and assess their impact on broader 
policy objectives, the following questions are also considered: whether SSB taxes 
have been used to pursue policy objectives other than health promotion; whether 
certain aspects of formulation influence how SSB taxes pursue these objectives; 
whether SSB taxes have potentially negative effects on other policy objectives; 
whether any other policy interventions have been used successfully in South Africa 
and the comparative jurisdictions; and whether the use of other interventions in 
conjunction with SSB taxes could simultaneously improve health outcomes and 
                                                                                                                                      
years old; communicating with, educating and mobilising communities; and establishing a 
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mitigate negative effects on other policy objectives. It is firstly hypothesized that: 
SSB taxes have not achieved meaningful reductions in obesity and NCDs in the 
comparative jurisdictions; and other interventions are more effective, or may achieve 
the objective with fewer negative consequences. However, if the comparative study 
indicates that it is possible for SSB taxes to meaningfully reduce the prevalence of 
obesity and NCDs, it is hypothesized that the current formulation of HPL is not 
optimal to achieve these objectives. 
1 3 Methodology 
This thesis is a critical comparative study on food excise taxes. In order to discuss 
these taxes in the context of other policy interventions, reference is made to 
legislation, government policies and evaluation studies on these interventions used 
in various jurisdictions. After this background is discussed, certain aspects of SSB 
taxes are explored. This portion of the study discusses SSB tax legislation in other 
jurisdictions, and establishes the relevant aspects of formulation that affect the 
success of these taxes. In order to determine the significance of these aspects, 
reference is made to various types of research, including peer-reviewed empirical 
studies where these are available. Jurisdictions for the comparative study were 
selected, considering: the prevalence of the relevant health issues in these 
jurisdictions; the popularity and sustainability of the taxes in these jurisdictions; 
comments made about these taxes in the Policy Paper; and whether these 
jurisdictions offer useful illustrations of the relevant aspects of formulation that 
influence the effectiveness of these taxes.  
A number of food excise taxes in Denmark, Hungary, Mexico, the UK and the 
USA are examined, and the recurring criticisms of these taxes are identified. 
Consideration is first given to the status of the relevant health issues in each of these 
jurisdictions, and the existence of other policy interventions aimed at similar health 
outcomes. The relevant policy documents are considered, and the actual tax 
legislation is analysed. Where the legislation is not available in English, these 
sources are translated using Google Translate and dictionaries as necessary.90 
Through these case studies, the discussion on the relevant aspects of formulation is 
expanded, and exceptions to the general guidelines are considered. In the light of 
                                            





the lessons from the comparative study, HPL is analysed in the South African 
context. Following a similar framework for discussion used for the comparative 
jurisdictions, the potential for HPL to achieve its policy objective is considered, with 
reference to the relevant legislation, policy documents and any existing empirical 
studies. 
1 4 Scope and limitations 
This thesis aims to: critically compare the formulation of various food excise taxes 
in terms of their policy objectives; evaluate a number of aspects of the formulation of 
the HPL in the light of emerging evidence from the selected comparative jurisdictions 
as well as South Africa; suggest whether adapting the HPL in the light of emerging 
evidence might achieve greater health improvements and mitigate a number of its 
potentially regressive effects; and consider whether further developments in the 
multiple-intervention approach could complement these outcomes. However, this 
thesis does not seek to establish a causal relationship between any food excise tax 
and its effects in terms of its policy objective. According to the report by Ecorys Food 
taxes and their impact on competitiveness in the agri-food sector (“Ecorys Report”)91 
and its Annexes (“Ecorys Report Annexes”),92 observations on the effectiveness of 
these taxes need to be recorded for a minimum of 10 years before the tax, and a 
minimum of 10 years after implementation of a tax.93 Further, during this observation 
period, there should be no changes to the tax. However, most food excise taxes 
have been introduced after 2011 and have been subject to changes. Few food 
excise taxes have been in place for this minimum period, and there are very limited 
analyses on these tax’s effects.94  
The debate surrounding SSB taxes has mostly been concerned with: the 
economic impact of these taxes; their potentially regressive effects; their paternalistic 
nature; the extent of their ability to influence consumption and improve health; and 
their efficacy, relative to other available interventions. Central to many of these 
criticisms is that there is a lack of evidence on how consumers and the food industry 
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respond to these taxes, and how any consumption changes translate to health 
improvements.95 There is a large research gap in terms of the health impacts of 
consumption changes, but academic analyses have attempted to estimate the effect 
of food excise taxes on health objectives, using modelling and simulation studies.96 
However, the findings from these studies are inconclusive. Modelling studies 
typically do the following: simulate a food tax; predict consumption changes, while 
making assumptions about substitution effects; translate these consumption changes 
to dietary changes, and calculate the total calorie and nutrient intake changes for 
consumers; and then translate these calorie and nutrient intake changes into 
changes in BMI and obesity and NCD prevalence. These studies rely on a number of 
complex variables, and the quality of the data used affects the credibility of these 
calculations. However, the quality of these data used and the robustness of these 
methodologies are debateable. Further, regardless of the limited evidence, there are 
many factors that could influence the effects of a food excise tax, such as the 
industry response, substitution effects, inflation, and other health interventions.97 
However, because it is not possible to accurately establish the exact impact of a food 
excise tax on its policy objective, this thesis relies on the available research, and 
comments on the limitations of these studies as necessary. 
1 5 Overview of chapters 
This introductory chapter establishes the need for government intervention in 
order to address the growing issues of obesity and NCDs. The policy framework is 
discussed, and it is explained that both market-based and non-market-based 
interventions are necessary in order to reduce dietary risks and improve health 
outcomes. Chapter 2 “Non-Market-Based Interventions” discusses a number of non-
market-based interventions in terms of the WHO’s recommendations and the 
“multiple-intervention approach.” Focusing on the selected comparative jurisdictions, 
a number of examples of these non-market-based interventions in other jurisdictions 
are discussed, and comments are made on the current position of these 
interventions in South Africa. Various aspects of taxes in general are then explained 
                                            
95 F Schneider “Health Levy or Sugar Tax: Is the Pain Worth the Gain?” (08-05-2019) South African 
Institute of Tax Professionals <https://www.thesait.org.za/news/450529/Sugar-Tax.htm> (accessed 
27-09-2019). 
96 Thiele & Roosen “Obesity, Fat Taxes and Their Effects” in Regulating and Managing Food Safety 
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in Chapter 3 “Considerations for Market-Based Interventions,” and the HPL is 
contextualised within the broader tax system. It is explained that taxes in general are 
used to pursue a number of objectives, but the focus for this discussion is on how 
taxes could be used to pursue health objectives. In the context of health objectives 
specifically, it is considered how these taxes could translate to dietary and other 
health improvements through a number of channels, and how these objectives were 
framed in the selected comparative jurisdictions. The various factors that could 
influence how these taxes ultimately translate to dietary improvements and health 
outcomes are then considered, and comment is made on how certain aspects of 
formulation could affect this. While Chapter 3 shifts the focus towards market-based 
interventions, it is still considered how non-market-based interventions could be used 
to complement market-based interventions and mitigate potentially negative effects 
on other policy objectives.  
In the light of the considerations highlighted in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 “Formulation 
of Market-Based Interventions” then discusses the relevant aspects of formulation 
that could influence how these taxes translate to dietary improvements and health 
outcomes. In addition to discussing the formulation of the HPL and SSB taxes in the 
selected comparative jurisdictions, a number of other types of market-based 
interventions are discussed in order to compare and contrast the relevant aspects of 
formulation. Comments are then made on the relevant advantages and challenges 
presented by certain aspects of formulation, and suggestions are made about which 
types of formulation might be more suitable for certain policy objectives and their 
channels for health improvement. Chapter 5 “Impact on Obesity and Other 
Objectives” then discusses the impact that these taxes have had in the comparative 
jurisdictions.  With reference to certain aspects of formulation and the relevant 
considerations highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, the potential impact that these taxes 
have had on health as well as other policy objectives is considered. The effects of 
the HPL are then considered, and comments are made on whether changes to 
certain aspects of this tax’s formulation could result in improved health outcomes. 
The discussion on the potential for health improvements is then expanded with 
reference to the discussion on the “multiple-intervention approach,” and comments 
are made about the development of certain non-market-based interventions as 




concluding discussion in Chapter 6 summarizes the relevant arguments made 




CHAPTER 2: NON-MARKET-BASED INTERVENTIONS 
2 1 Introduction 
As discussed above, government interventions in the consumer food environment 
are aimed at decreasing the acceptability, affordability and availability of unhealthy 
foods and beverages, with the ultimate objective of reducing dietary risk factors for 
obesity and obesity-related non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”).1 The consumer 
food environment comprises of: the food information environment, in which 
interventions are aimed at equipping consumers with the necessary knowledge and 
skills to make informed, healthy dietary choices; and the food market environment, in 
which interventions are aimed at encouraging or compelling various actors in the 
food industry to limit the acceptability, affordability and availability of unhealthy foods 
and non-alcoholic beverages.2 The discussion in this chapter is therefore split into 
headings “2 Interventions in the food information environment,” and “3 Interventions 
in the food market environment.” 
The World Health Organisation (“WHO”) provides that the starting point for 
interventions aimed at improving the consumer food environment should be the 
advancement of nutritional information in the form of evidence-based dietary 
guidelines.3 After such guidelines have been formulated, they could be 
communicated to the public through public awareness campaigns and labelling and 
marketing regulations. In addition to these measures aimed at improving the food 
information environment, market-based and other non-market-based interventions 
could be used to advance these guidelines in the broader consumer environment. 
Other non-market-based interventions include regulations on the availability of 
certain foods and non-alcoholic beverages, and food reformulation regulations.4 The 
following discussion on these non-market-based interventions merely provides a 
brief overview of a selected number of these measures used in South Africa and 
other jurisdictions to pursue health objectives, and is by no means exhaustive. 
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2 2 Interventions in the food information environment 
2 2 1 Dietary guidelines, awareness campaigns and nutrition education 
South Africa’s Food-Based Dietary Guidelines (“FBDGs”) provide as follows: 
“enjoy a variety of foods;” “be active;” “make starchy foods part of most meals;” “eat 
plenty of vegetables and fruit everyday;” “eat dry beans, split peas, lentils and soya 
regularly;” “have milk, maas or yogurt every day;” “fish, chicken, lean meat or eggs 
can be eaten daily;” “drink lots of clean, safe water;” “use fats sparingly” (“Choose 
vegetable oils, rather than hard fats”); “use sugar and foods and drinks high in sugar 
sparingly;” and “use salt and food high in salt sparingly.”5 While FBDGs are an 
important tool for promoting healthier diets generally, the use of a nutrient profiling 
model (“NPM”) could also be useful for a number of interventions aimed at educating 
the population and helping consumers to choose healthier foods. NPMs are a type of 
system used to categorize the “healthiness” of certain foods and non-alcoholic 
beverages, according to their overall nutritional composition.6 NPMs are particularly 
useful where they consider the type of product, and do not single out only one 
nutrient, but take into account other healthy qualities such as fruit and vegetable 
content.7 NPMs are easily reproducible, and could thus have numerous applications 
for nutrition and obesity interventions.8 For example, a NPM was developed for 
proposed regulations in South Africa in order to classify foods as “healthy” or 
“unhealthy” for the purposes of both labelling and marketing regulations.9 
Following the formulation of evidence-based dietary guidelines, it is important to 
foster public awareness of these guidelines.10 Although it is difficult to measure their 
actual impact on consumer behaviour, the WHO provides that nutrition education 
                                            
5 HH Vorster, JB Badham & CS Venter “An introduction to the revised food-based dietary guidelines 
for South Africa” (2013) 26 SAJCN S5 S7.  
6 RSA NDOH “Nutrient Profile Model” (02-11-2012) RSA NDOH 
<http://www.health.gov.za/phocadownload/FoodInfor/NPC_NWU.html> (accessed 30-05-2019). 
7 L Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child when Marketing Food to Children: An Analysis of 
the South African Regulatory Framework LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2016) 268. 
8 T Poon, M Labonté, C Mulligan, M Ahmed, KM Dickinson & MR L’Abbé “Comparison of nutrient 
profiling models for assessing the nutritional quality of foods: a validation study” (2018) 120 BJN 
567 567. 
9 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 240. 
10 WCRF International “NOURISHING database” (09-05-2019) WCRF International 
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and public awareness campaigns could effectively improve dietary behaviour.11 In 
order to optimise their effects on consumption, these campaigns should be on-going 
and used across various media.12 Public awareness campaigns could be conducted 
through mass media, at national or community levels, or in specific settings, such as 
nutrition education in schools and worksites.13 Nutrition education forms part of the 
Life Orientation curriculum in South African schools.14 Further, National Nutrition 
Week (“NNW”) is celebrated annually in South Africa to advance certain nutrition 
messages.15 The themes for NNW campaigns have sometimes been designed 
around the FBDGs. For example, the 2016 NNW theme was “Love your beans,” and 
the 2017 theme was “Rethink your drink – choose water.”16 
Public awareness campaigns could also include social marketing initiatives, which 
are likely to be more effective if they target both nutrition and physical activity.17 For 
example, mass media campaigns were used in France to discourage the 
consumption of foods containing added sugars, and to encourage physical activity 
and increased consumption of fruits, vegetables and wholegrain-rich foods.18 In 
conjunction with taxes on unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages, certain food 
                                            
11 WHO Global Strategy para 40(1); WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF; WHO Interventions on 
Diet and Physical Activity: What Works Summary (2009) 13, 15-16 & 21-22. Public awareness 
campaigns should be evidence-informed, and comprise of clear, consistent and coherent 
messages conveyed by the food industry, grass-roots organisations, government experts and 
NGOs. High intensity school based interventions focused on diet and or physical activity that are 
comprehensive and have multiple components are regarded as effective interventions by the 
WHO. Although few clinical outcomes have been measured, the following interventions showed 
positive psychological and behavioural changes: the CATCH programme and Pathways 
programme in the USA included in the school curriculum physical activity and healthy meals in 
schools, with a family-based/parental component; and the Know Your Body programme in Crete, 
which further reported substantive reductions in fat intake. School-based interventions may also be 
cost effective and sustainable, because they are implemented by teachers. Nutrition education 
could also be used in primary healthcare settings. Nutrition education in primary healthcare 
settings is particularly important for individuals with elevated NCD risk factors, but is also important 
for prevention in low-risk individuals. 
12 WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF. 
13 Hawkes & Sassi “Improving the quality of nutrition” in Promoting Health, Preventing Disease 143; 
WCRF International NOURISHING framework: Give nutrition education and skills (2019) 3; WHO 
Interventions on Diet and Physical Activity 19-20. Community-based interventions could include 
dietary education, community development campaigns and group-based physical activity. 
14 WCRF Give nutrition education 3. 
15 South African Government “Basic Education celebrates National Nutrition Week, 11 to 14 Oct” (07-
10-2016) South African Government <https://www.gov.za/speeches/national-nutrition-week-7-oct-
2016-0000> (accessed 30-09-2019). 
16 RSA NDOH National Nutrition Week 2017: “Rethink your drink – choose water!” (2017) 1; South 
African Government “Basic Education celebrates National Nutrition Week” South African 
Government. 
17 WHO Global Action Plan 67; WHO Population-based approaches 33-34. 
18 WCRF International Curbing global sugar consumption: Effective food policy actions to help 




information campaigns could be used to: inform the population that the government 
plans to introduce such taxes; explain the rationale behind these taxes; increase 
awareness on the relevant health concerns related to unhealthy diets; and explain 
how consumers could change their consumption in line with these health objectives. 
For example, the successful implementation of sugar-sweetened beverage (“SSB”) 
taxes in Mexico and Berkeley has largely been credited to public awareness 
campaigns by civil society organisations which increased public and political support 
for these taxes in the face of strong industry opposition.19 
2 2 2 Labelling regulations 
Evidence has shown that: consumers who want to eat healthily make use of 
nutrient lists and interpretive labels; and health claims and nutrient content claims 
can change consumers’ perception of the relevant food and non-alcoholic beverage 
products. The WHO provides that “consumers require accurate, standardized and 
comprehensible information on the content of food items in order to make healthy 
choices.”20 In order to enhance healthier decision-making, it is therefore important to 
implement labelling regulations to increase consumer information and prevent 
misleading labelling practices.21 Labelling regulations could include rules relating to: 
ingredients lists on pre-packaged food and non-alcoholic beverage products; nutrient 
lists on pre-packaged foods and beverages, or on menus in restaurants; health 
claims and nutrient content claims; and interpretive or warning labels on food 
products themselves, on shelves in shops, or on menus in restaurants and other 
food service establishments.22  
The WHO provides that labelling rules are a cost-effective intervention that could 
effectively increase consumer awareness, and assist consumers in making informed 
choices.23 There is limited research on the effectiveness of labelling regulations to 
improve diets, but it has generally been recognized that consumers should be 
provided with information on the food that they consume.24 In terms of European 
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Union (“EU”) Regulations, all pre-packaged food and beverage products marketed in 
the EU need to apply a label, containing certain mandatory information.25 Among 
other particulars, these labels need to provide a list of ingredients and a nutritional 
declaration.26 A number of jurisdictions have similar legislative provisions requiring 
food manufacturers to provide a nutritional information declaration on pre-packaged 
food labels, including Australia, Canada, India, Mexico and the United States of 
America (“USA”).27 
While the provision of such information is important for consumer protection, 
evidence suggests that higher-income consumers probably benefit more from 
labelling regulations than lower-income consumers. In order to minimise health 
inequalities, labelling regulations should therefore be accompanied by some 
educational component.28 While the interpretation of nutrition labels is an important 
aspect of nutrition education curricula, food product labels that contain too much 
information may still be overwhelming and difficult for children or other vulnerable 
consumers to interpret.29 Interpretive, front-of-package (“FOP”) labels may be easier 
to understand, and assist these consumers in making healthier food choices. These 
FOP labels could be based on calories, guideline daily amounts (“GDAs”) of certain 
nutrients, or the integration of various nutrient contents into one score, based on a 
NPM.30 In addition to informing consumers, the use of such a labelling system might 
encourage food manufacturers to improve their products’ nutritional value in order to 
comply with the relevant NPM’s “healthy” requirements.31 The simplest form of these 
labels is one, consistent FOP symbol that indicates whether the product complies 
with certain nutritional requirements. For example, the “Keyhole" symbol used in 
Nordic countries may only be printed on food products that are certified to contain 
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comparably less sugar, fat and salt, and more fibre than other food products in its 
category.32 
The “traffic light” FOP labelling system used in the United Kingdom (“UK”) has 
been commended as an effective FOP interpretive labelling system.33 This system 
uses a colour-coded nutritional display on the front of food products, stipulating the 
fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt content as a proportion of the relevant GDAs. These 
nutritional contents are each coloured in green, amber or red, depending on whether 
they have relatively low, medium or high levels of these nutrients. This use of colours 
is easily recognisable and attracts consumers’ attention, and the use of a simple 
format across a broad range of products makes it easier for consumers to compare 
and make healthier decisions.34 However, this “traffic light” system still requires a 
relatively higher level of consumer education, because certain food products could 
have a “green” content of saturated fat, but a “red” content of sugar. Further, this 
system does not take into account any redeeming nutritional characteristics of the 
food product, such as protein, fibre and fruit and vegetable content.35 The “Nutri-
Score” FOP labelling system used in France has components of both the “Keyhole” 
system and the “traffic light” system: in terms of a NPM, the overall nutritional 
composition of a food product is valued, and assigned a score from -15 (healthiest) 
to +40 (least healthy); and this score is represented as a grade from a dark green “A” 
(healthiest) to a red “E” (least healthy) on a scale. Unlike the “traffic light” system in 
the UK, this NPM does take into consideration the product’s content of protein, fibre 
and fruits and vegetables.36 
Food labelling in South Africa is currently regulated in terms of the Regulations 
Relating to the Labelling and Advertising of Foodstuffs published in Government 
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Notice No. R 146 (“Regulations 146”),37 of the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and 
Disinfectants Act 54 of 1972 (“Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act”). In 
terms of these regulations, pre-packaged foodstuffs are required to carry a label, 
containing the following information: the name of the foodstuff; the name and 
address of the seller, manufacturer or importer of the foodstuff; the product’s 
ingredients, listed in descending order of the total mass of the final product; the net 
contents in the packaging in terms of International System of Units (“SI-units”); 
directions for using the foodstuff, where it would otherwise be difficult to 
appropriately use the foodstuff without directions; and any special storage conditions 
that might be applicable.38 These regulations also have a number of provisions to 
prevent misleading or false nutritional claims. For example, Regulation 22(a) of 
Regulations 146 provides that the names used for ingredients should be the same 
name that would be used if that ingredient was sold independently as a foodstuff.39 
This provision could limit misleading ingredient labels that use less common words, 
such as “sucrose” to describe sugar.  
However, labels on pre-packaged foodstuffs in South Africa are currently only 
required to provide nutritional information where certain claims are made about the 
nutritional value of the product. These include claims that the particular foodstuff is a 
“source of,” “high in,” “low,” “very low” or “virtually free” or “free” from the following 
nutrients: energy; fat; omega-3 fatty acids; polyunsaturated fatty acids; 
monounsaturated fatty acids; cholesterol; protein; cartenoids; alcohol; 
carbohydrates; mono- and disaccharides; dietary fibre; sodium; and vitamins and 
minerals.40 Where such claims are made, the following nutritional information needs 
to be printed in tabular form on the label titled “Typical Nutritional Information,” 
displaying the content per 100 grams or 100 millilitres, and per single serving: 
energy, in kilojoules; protein, in grams; glycaemic carbohydrate, in grams, of which 
total sugar, in grams; total fat, in grams; of which Saturated fat, in grams; dietary 
fibre, in grams; and total sodium, in milligrams. The provision of nutrient reference 
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values “is optional” and where no claims are made, the provision of nutritional 
information is voluntary.41  
The current position is unsatisfactory and arguably inconsistent with other 
measures in the multiple-intervention approach. While Regulations 146 serve an 
important consumer protection function in terms of requiring ingredients lists and 
preventing misleading claims, the provision of nutritional information should be 
mandatory. Where the provision of this information is not mandatory, it could 
undermine the health impact of other interventions. For example, if school children 
are taught about nutrition and how to interpret food labels in Life Orientation, the 
desired outcome is that these children take nutrition into account when making 
purchasing decisions. Where nutritional information is not available on the relevant 
products at the point-of-purchase however, the desired outcome of healthier 
consumption decisions is largely diluted.  
The difficulties presented by the lack of mandatory requirements are highlighted in 
the case of the Health Promotion Levy (“HPL”). Although the HPL aims to target the 
sugar content in certain SSBs, the total sugar content cannot be determined where 
nutritional information is not supplied, and the only indicator that the product should 
be subject to HPL is that sugar is listed as an ingredient.42 According to the Policy 
Paper, mandatory “minimum nutritional information labelling... will go a long way in 
assisting the implementation of the tax on SSBs however it is currently not an 
impediment.”43 However, it could be argued that, while the lack of mandatory 
labelling regulations in this regard is not an “impediment” to implementation, it does 
not support the objective of reducing sugar consumption. Because legislators have 
resorted to applying punitive higher rates for HPL products that do not supply 
nutritional information, these products are not really taxed according to their sugar 
content: certain un-labelled HPL products might contain less sugar than their labelled 
counterparts, but the extent to which their prices increase is such that consumers are 
more likely to substitute away from these products; and it is also possible that certain 
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un-labelled HPL products contain more than 20 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres, 
and thus their price increases according to sugar content are relatively lower than 
their labelled counterparts. This unequal treatment might present an opportunity for 
tax avoidance or other responses by actors in the food industry that frustrate the 
health objective.  
It is submitted that, even though labelling regulations may not be the most “cost-
effective” intervention “to address obesity,” mandatory provision of nutritional 
information is an important starting point to complement other interventions.44 Draft 
Regulations Relating to the Labelling and Advertising of Foods published in 
Government Notice No. R 429 (“Draft Regulations 429”) to the Foodstuffs, 
Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act for public comment in May 2014.45 Among other 
amendments, Draft Regulations 429 provide for the mandatory labelling of nutritional 
information on pre-packaged foodstuffs, regardless of whether or not claims are 
made.46 Further, Draft Regulations 429 provide for much stricter criteria where 
claims can be made. Among other requirements, the relevant foodstuff would need 
to comply with the nutritional criteria under the NPM provided on the National 
Department of Health’s (“NDOH”) website.47 While these provisions could improve 
the food information environment in line with health objectives, Draft Regulations 429 
have been criticised for various reasons and have not yet been implemented. 
Another criticism of the current food labelling regulations in South Africa is that, 
where the provision of nutritional information is required, it needs to be provided “in 
English and where possible, at least one other official language of the Republic of 
South Africa.”48 (Emphasis added). Due to administrative costs and limited space on 
labels, it would probably not be possible or practical to provide this information in 
additional languages. Without the use of an effective FOP labelling system in 
addition to the standard nutritional information, Draft Regulations 429 would not 
improve this position. These regulations provide that the information “shall be in 
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English, and may be in at least one other official language of the Republic of South 
Africa.”49 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) 
recognises the following eleven official languages in South Africa: isiZulu, isiXhosa, 
English, Afrikaans, isiNdebele, Setswana, Sesotho, Xitsonga, Tshivenda and 
siSwati.50 English is only spoken by 8,1% of the population inside the home, and by 
16,6% outside the home. In 2018, English was only the sixth-most spoken language 
inside the home, and the second-most spoken language outside the home, next to 
IsiZulu with 25,3% inside the home and 25,1% outside the home.51 These statistics 
do not even consider the proportion of the population with a sufficient level of literacy 
to read English and interpret the nutritional information, where it is provided. It might 
therefore be necessary to introduce a mandatory FOP labelling system in addition to 
mandatory regulations on the provision of nutrition information, particularly where a 
large number of consumers cannot understand English.  
The need for such an FOP labelling system is recognised under Objective 2.4 of 
the Strategy, which provides that it will be necessary to “investigate, test and 
establish an appropriate educational tool for front-of-pack labels and meals in 
restaurants considering low literacy populations,” and that a “user-friendly food 
labelling education tool” should be implemented within the time frame from 2015/16 
to 2016/17.52 Although a voluntary FOP labelling system has been proposed under 
Draft Regulations 429, such a system has not yet been implemented in South Africa. 
This voluntary FOP labelling system provided for in terms of Draft Regulations 429 is 
similar to the “traffic light” system in the UK. In terms of these draft regulations, 
certain nutritional information could be provided on the main panel of pre-packaged 
foodstuffs, but only in addition to the mandatory nutritional information, and 
according to the prescribed format.53 Similarly to the “traffic light” system in the UK, 
only the contents of energy, fat, saturated fat, sugar and sodium are stipulated in 
terms of this proposed FOP labelling system in Draft Regulations 429. However, 
there are a number of differences between these two systems, including that the 
                                            
49 Reg 10(1)(a) of GN R 429 in GG 37695 of 29-05-2014. 
50 S6 of the Constitution. 
51 Stats SA General Household Survey Statistical Release P0318 (2018) 9. English was preceded by 
the following languages, as the second-most spoken language inside the home in 2018: IsiZulu 
with 25,3%; IsiXhosa with 14,8%; Afrikaans with 12,2%; Sepedi with 10,1%; and Setswana with 
9,1% 
52 RSA NDOH Strategy 27. 




threshold values for classifying foods as red, green and yellow or amber are much 
lower under Draft Regulations 429 than under the “traffic light” system.54 Along with 
these proposed amendments to labelling regulations, the Draft Regulations R429 
also provide for much stricter marketing regulations with respect to children.55 
2 2 3 Marketing regulations 
Evidence has shown that marketing has an impact on food preferences, and 
thereby influences the acceptability of unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages. 
The food and beverage industry spends large amounts of money on marketing, 
because it has been proven to be an effective means to increase sales and profits.56 
Marketing practices are no longer limited to traditional media such as television 
(“TV”), radio and print media, and these food corporations are continually inventing 
new, innovative ways to market unhealthy food and beverage products.57 These new 
marketing techniques concentrate on branding and forging customer relationships, 
and include the following: online marketing; product placement; sponsorship; point-
of-sale displays; promotion through philanthropic endeavours; “viral marketing” 
communications; and the use of promotions and endorsements by celebrities, brand 
mascots and popular children’s characters.58 Children are particularly vulnerable to 
marketing practices, which are pervasive in many parts of their lives, including 
school environments, sports and other entertainment activities.59 The WHO 
recognised the need for protection in this regard in 2004 in the Global Strategy, and 
subsequently published a Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and 
                                            
54 UK DH Guide to creating a front of pack (FoP) nutrition label 19-20; Reg 53(9)(c)-(d) and Table 2 of 
GN R 429 in GG 37695 of 29-05-2014. For example, the fat content for purposes of the “traffic 
light” system is green for solid foods below a 3g/100g threshold, and 1,5g/100ml threshold for 
liquids. Under Draft Regulations 429, only solid foods and liquids below a 0,5g/100g or 0,5g/100ml 
threshold are classified as “green,” while any solid foods above 3g/100g threshold, and any liquids 
above a 1,5g/100ml threshold are classified as “red.” The “red” classification for purposes of the 
“traffic light” system is 17,5g/100g for solid foods, and 8,75g/100ml for liquids. Similarly for 
saturated fats, the classification for the “red” threshold for purposes of Draft Regulations 429 is the 
same as that for the “green” threshold for purposes of the “traffic light” system: 1,5g/100g for solid 
foods; and 0,75g/100ml for liquids. Further, the energy content is printed against a white 
background under the “traffic light” system, while Draft Regulations 429 provide that this value 
should also be printed against a red, yellow or green background. 
55 Reg 65 of GN R 429 in GG 37695 of 29-05-2014. 
56 WHO Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to 
Children (2010) 7. 
57 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 295. 
58 WHO Set of Recommendations 7. 




Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children (“Set of Recommendations”)60 and A 
Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations.61  
Research indicates that marketing restrictions could successfully reduce children’s 
exposure to marketing, but the criteria of these restrictions will influence their 
effectiveness.62 In terms of its Set of Recommendations, the WHO provides that 
governments should develop policies to reduce the impact of marketing unhealthy 
foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, considering: any country-specific 
challenges; the nature, extent and effects of existing food marketing practices; and 
the available resources and potentially positive and negative effects of such a policy 
on all stakeholders.63 Unhealthy foods are described in the Set of Recommendations 
as foods and non-alcoholic beverages that are high in free sugars, saturated fats, 
trans-fatty acids (“TFAs”) or salt. Places where children gather, such as schools, 
should be free from all marketing media of these foods.64 There are various 
implementation approaches for these policies, including statutory regulation, 
voluntary industry initiatives, industry self-regulation and co-regulation.65 Statutory 
regulations have taken a number of forms, including: restrictions on TV, radio, 
magazine and online food advertisements to children; restrictions on purchasing 
incentives such as “free toys” with meals; restrictions on the use of celebrities, 
animations or cartoon characters in food advertisements to children; and 
requirements that certain food advertisements are accompanied by health messages 
or warnings. Among others, Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, South 
Korea, the UK, and the USA have used various forms of these marketing 
regulations.66 
South Korea prohibits certain forms of marketing of certain energy-dense, 
nutrient-poor foods (“EDNPs”) between 17:00 and 19:00, and during children’s 
                                            
60 WHO Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to 
Children (2010) 1; WHO Global Strategy para 40(3). 
61 WHO A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children (2012) 1. 
62 WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF. 
63 WHO Set of Recommendations 8-12.; WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF.  
64 WHO Set of Recommendations 8-9. 
65 10. 
66 WCRF International NOURISHING framework: Restrict food advertising and other forms of 
commercial promotion (2019) 9-11; D Studdert, J Flanders & M Mello “Searching for Public Health 
Law’s Sweet Spot: The Regulation of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages” (2015) 12 PLoS Med 1 3. 
Since 2014, Brazil prohibits all forms of marketing communications to children under 12, including 





programmes.67 Further, the marketing of EDNPs is prohibited: through channels that 
use non-food purchase incentives, such as toys, to encourage consumption by 
children; and by schools and businesses within 200 metres of schools. EDNPs 
include certain processed and prepared foods, such as confectionery, hamburgers 
and non-alcoholic beverages, and are classified in terms of a NPM according to their 
total energy, sugar, saturated fat, sodium and protein content.68 The UK Code of 
Broadcast Advertising (“BCAP Code”) also prohibits television and radio 
advertisements and product placement of certain high saturated fat, sugar or sodium 
(“HFSS”) food products to children under the age of 16.69 HFSS products are also 
classified in terms of a NPM, which operates as follows: products are first scored 
according to the total energy, saturated fat, sugar and sodium (“unhealthy 
components”) content per 100 grams; points are awarded for the content of protein, 
fibre, fruit, vegetable and nuts (“healthy components”); the points for the healthy 
components are subtracted from the points for the unhealthy components; and then 
products are classified as “healthy” or “unhealthy” according to the number of points 
scored.70  
While the focus of most of these regulations is to reduce children’s exposure to 
marketing of unhealthy foods, some regulations have a broader scope of application. 
The WHO provides that, because children are dependent on their parents and 
caregivers, it may be necessary to consider how these parents and caregivers are 
                                            
67 WCRF Restrict food advertising 3; USDA The Special Act on Children’s Dietary Life Safety 
Management Global Agricultural Information Network Report KS9020 (2009) 2. These forms of 
marketing include TV, internet and radio marketing. Article 2 of the Special Act on the Safety 
Management of Children’s Dietary Life defines “children” as below the age of 18. 
68 USDA The Special Act on Children’s Dietary Life Safety Management 3-6. 
69 Rule 32.5.1 of the UK ASA The UK Code of Broadcast Advertising v 1.2.15 (2010); Brambila-
Macias et al (2011) FNB 367; WCRF Restrict food advertising 2. Ireland also prohibits marketing of 
foods that do not comply with its NPM: these regulations prohibit advertisements, product 
placement, sponsorships and teleshopping for foods high in sugar, fats and salt during TV and 
radio programmes when over 50% of the audience is comprised of children under the age of 18. 
The use of nutrient or health claims in advertisements targeting children under the age of 13 is 
also prohibited, and there is a limit on advertising time for foods high in sugar, fats and salt: 
advertisements for these foods are limited to 1 in 4 advertisements, or 25% of total sold advertising 
time. 
70 UK DH Nutrient Profiling Technical Guidance (2011) 5; UK DH Guide to creating a front of pack 
(FoP) nutrition label 6-7. HFSS products are classified as food products with more than 4 points, 
and beverages with more than 1 point. This NPM used to determine HFSS foods for advertising 
purposes is different from the one used for purposes of the “traffic light” labelling system. While 
both of these NPMs consider the energy, saturated fat, sugar and sodium content, there are a 
number of differences: the “traffic light” system also considers the total fat content; and the NPM 
used for marketing regulations also take into account healthy components that are not considered 




influenced by marketing techniques.71 In terms of French regulations for example, 
nutritional messages need to accompany food advertisements for certain processed 
foods and drinks containing added sweeteners, fat and sodium. These regulations 
apply to all TV advertisements, targeting both children and adults. The nutritional 
messages are based on the National Institute of Health Education’s principles of 
nutrition education, and include messages such as: “For your health, avoid eating 
too many foods that are high in fat, sugar or salt;” and “For your health, exercise 
regularly.”72 While very strict marketing regulations may face strong opposition from 
the food and non-alcoholic beverage industry, it is submitted that this approach used 
in France may be less restrictive. Such an approach also emphasizes consistency 
with the relevant nutritional messages and may also serve to educate vulnerable 
adult consumers. 
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of marketing regulations, but modelling 
studies indicate that these restrictions may have positive outcomes on dietary 
attitudes.73 Lee et al provide that South Korea’s regulations encouraged 
manufacturers to reformulate their products to escape the EDNP classifications, 
which has a positive impact on children’s food environments.74 Further, food 
companies reduced their advertising budget by 31% during the first four months of 
these regulations, and the number of advertisement placements decreased by 
58%.75 Silva et al provide that self-regulation does not appear to reduce marketing, 
but estimated that there was a 9,7% reduction in total advertising expenditure after 
the introduction of the co-regulatory framework in the UK, and a 19,4% reduction in 
TV advertising expenditure.76 However, because these regulations only target a 
                                            
71 WHO Set of Recommendations 8-12.; WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF.  
72 WCRF Restrict food advertising 12; Studdert et al (2015) PLoS Med 3. 
73 WCRF Restrict food advertising 6; SY Chou, I Rashad & M Grossman “Fast-food restaurant 
advertising on television and its influence on childhood obesity” (2008) 51 J L & Econ 599 599; T 
Dhar & K Baylis “Fast-Food consumption and the Ban on Advertising Targeting Children: The 
Quebec Experience” (2011) 48 Journal of Marketing Research 799 810. For example, research 
has shown that, as a result of the prohibition of all advertisements to children under the age of 13 
in Quebec, there was a decreased probability of families in Quebec to purchase junk food, when 
compared to families in the neighbouring province Ontario. This prohibition in Quebec applies not 
only to food marketing in general, but to all commercial advertising to these children on television, 
internet, mobile phones, print, radio and signage. These regulations have been implemented since 
1978, and also prohibit commercial advertisements using promotional items. 
74 Y Lee, J Yoon, S Chung, S Lee, H Kim & S Kim “Effect of TV food advertising restriction on food 
environment for children in South Korea” (2017) 32 Health Promot Int. 25 26. 
75 25. 
76 A Silva, LM Higgins & M Hussein “An Evaluation of the Effect of Child-Directed Television Food 




limited range of marketing channels, some food manufacturers were able to 
circumvent the regulations and use other marketing media.77 Food advertisers may 
have re-allocated expenditure to other media, but the reduction in advertising may 
lead to some change in demand. Although the exact impact that these regulations 
have on demand and behavioural patterns is unclear, it is generally agreed that 
marketing practices promoting unhealthy diets are in conflict with the WHO’s 
endeavour to reduce children’s exposure to these messages, and should be 
restricted.78 
Along with labelling regulations, the legislative framework for food advertising in 
South Africa is provided in terms of Regulations 146. To an extent, these regulations 
aim to prevent misleading or false claims in certain forms of food advertising.79 For 
example, labels may not contain certain prohibited statements, which include: claims 
that the product provides balanced nutrition; the words “health,” “healthy,” 
“wholesome” or “nutritious;” medicinal claims or the word “cure;” or endorsements on 
the nutritional quality of foodstuffs, or other visual representations that create the 
impression of an endorsement by health practitioners, manufacturers, certain 
organisations, etc.80 Labels and advertisements may also not contain a pictorial 
representation “that is false, misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an 
erroneous impression regarding the contents... character, origin, composition, 
quality, nutritive value” or nature of a foodstuff.81 Apart from Regulations 146, there 
are limited legislative restrictions on food advertising.82 The Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008 seeks to protect consumers’ interests.83 Among other areas of consumer 
                                                                                                                                      
advertising restrictions Final Review (2010) 10. However, the UK Office of Communications 
(“Ofcom”) found that 4-9 year olds and 10-15 year olds viewed 39% and 28% less advertising 
during the period of industry self-regulation in 2005-2007. In terms of this voluntary self regulation, 
food companies claimed to have reduced their advertising of unhealthy foods. Prior to 2004, the 
UK food industry was not subject to any marketing regulations, and since 2008, a co-regulation 
framework has been implemented between Ofcom and the ASA.  
77 Lee et al (2017) Health Promot Int. 20 & 25; HM Government Introducing further advertising 
restrictions on TV and online for products high in fat, sugar and salt (HFSS) (2019) 13. Because of 
loopholes such as this, stricter regulations are under consideration in the UK. 
78 Brambila-Macias et al (2011) FNB 367; Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 295. 
79 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 264. 
80 Regs 1 and 13 of GN R 146 in GG 32975 of 01-03-2010. “Claim” is defined as “any written, 
pictorial, visual, descriptive or verbal statement, communication, representation or reference 
brought to the attention of the public in any manner including a trade name or brand name and 
referring to the characteristics of a product, in particular to its nature, identity, nutritional properties, 
composition, quality, durability, origin or method of manufacture or production.” 
81 Reg 33. 
82 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 264. 




protection, this Act seeks to prevent false and misleading marketing practices.84 
However, the marketing of food is mostly guided by the self-regulatory provisions of 
the Advertising Code of the South African Advertising Standards Authority (“ASA 
Code”).85 Although the ASA Code makes certain provisions for the marketing of food 
to children, this protection is limited.86  
The regulation of marketing food and non-alcoholic beverages to children would 
be much stricter in terms of Draft Regulations 429, which provide that “no food or 
non-alcoholic beverage shall be marketed to children unless it complies with all the 
criteria in Guideline 14.”87 Among these criteria in terms of the Draft Guidelines 
applicable to the Draft Regulations Relating the Labelling and Advertising of Foods 
(“Draft Guidelines”),88 the relevant foods and non-alcoholic beverages to be 
marketed to children: need to “pass the screening criteria of the” NPM available on 
the NDOH’s website; may not contain added non-nutritive sweeteners, fructose, 
added aluminium or added fluoride; and may not contain more than 5 grams “total 
sugars,” 3 grams of fat, 1,5 grams of saturated fat or 120 milligrams of sodium per 
100 grams in solid foods, or more than 2,5 grams total sugars, 1,5 grams of fat, 0,75 
grams of saturated fat or 120 milligrams of sodium per 100 millilitres in liquid foods 
and beverages.89 One important criticism of the criteria provided in the Draft 
Guidelines is that the threshold contents for the relevant nutrients are so strict that 
they exclude a number of healthy foods such as eggs, unsalted almonds and 
cashew nuts, 100% fruit juices and certain fruits and dairy products. This is in conflict 
with health objectives, and particularly the objective of promoting a healthy diet as 
envisioned in terms of the FBDGs.90 Mills provides that the current regulation of 
marketing of foodstuffs to children in South Africa “fails to meet the proposals by the 
WHO and other international standards,” but also criticises the proposals in terms of 
Draft Regulations 429 and the Draft Guidelines for various reasons. For example, 
Mills criticises the strict proposed nutritional criteria for these regulations, because 
                                            
84 S29(a). 
85 ASASA “Advertising Code of Practice” (30-05-2006) The Advertising Standards Authority of South 
Africa <http://www.asasa.org.za/codes/advertising-code-of-practice> (accessed 27-09-2018). 
86 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 251. 
87 Reg 65 of GN R 146 in GG 32975 of 01-03-2010. 
88 RSA NDOH Draft Guidelines applicable to the Draft Regulations Relating the Labelling and 
Advertising of Foods (R429 of 29 May 2014), for compliance purposes (2014). 
89 Clause 6(2) of Guideline 14 of the RSA NDOH Draft Guidelines. 




even “foods commonly considered as healthy and promoted by the” FBDGs would 
not comply, which would “lead to absurd results.”91  
2 3 Interventions in the food market environment 
2 3 1 Regulations on the availability of certain foods and beverages 
2 3 1 1 Overview of guidelines and regulations in comparative jurisdictions 
In order to discourage the consumption of unhealthy foods and beverages, a 
number of jurisdictions have implemented regulations to restrict their availability in 
certain settings, including Australia, Brazil, Finland, Hungary, Mexico and the UK.92 
Since 2005 for example, all vending machines containing foods and drinks have 
been prohibited in schools in France.93 As a result, it was observed in 2006 that 
there had been a reduction in consumption of total energy, free sugars, fats and 
sodium during morning recesses.94 In January 2017, France also introduced a 
prohibition on the sale or offer of free “bottomless” or unlimited SSBs or artificially-
sweetened beverages (“ASBs”) in restaurants, schools and other facilities used to 
accommodate, educate or receive children.95 Similar regulations could find 
application in various settings other than schools. For example, dietary behaviour 
could be influenced by introducing voluntary and mandatory regulations that limit the 
availability of unhealthy foods in certain health facilities, religious institutions, 
workplaces, educational environments and food and service establishments.96 In 
terms of a voluntary policy in Thailand, for example, sugar sachets exceeding 6 
grams and 8 grams were removed from hotels in 2015, and replaced with 4 gram 
packets.97 Such restrictions could influence consumption by limiting the convenience 
of consuming unhealthy foods, relative to healthier foods. Although the majority of 
the interventions discussed target energy, fats, sugar and sodium, a number of 
                                            
91 265 & 268-269. 
92 WCRF Offer healthy food 4-12 & 14-15; WCRF Curbing global sugar consumption 8. 
93 WCRF Offer healthy food 9.  
94 WCRF Curbing global sugar consumption 9. Compared to consumption in 1998, there had been a 
10-12g reduction in consumption of free sugars, and between 90-115 kcal reduction in energy 
intake. Before the vending machine restriction, vending machines were present in: 39,3% of public 
schools for children aged 11-13; and 89,4% of public schools for children aged 14-17. 
95 Art L.3232-9 Code de la santé publique (Version consolidée au 1 juin 2019) [“French Public Health 
Code”]. “Children” refers to children under the age of 18.  
96 WHO Global Strategy para 40(1). 





jurisdictions have also targeted other unhealthy ingredients. For example, Latvia and 
Lithuania prohibit the sale of energy drinks to children.98  
Regulations on the availability of certain foods and beverages could be an 
extension of marketing restrictions aimed at protecting children. For example, in 
addition to prohibiting the marketing of EDNPs, South Korea also prohibits the sale 
of these same foods in schools and by businesses within 200 metres of schools.99 A 
number of States in the USA have imposed regulations restricting the sale of certain 
food and drink products in primary and secondary schools, including: restrictions on 
the sale of unhealthy foods and beverages through vending machines in various 
States and localities; restrictions and prohibitions on the sale of most SSBs in 
elementary schools in California since 2004; and restrictions on the foods that may 
be served to school children in Arkansas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma 
and Oregon.100 Evidence suggests that food standards restricting the availability of 
unhealthy foods decrease their availability and may reduce their consumption, but it 
is unclear whether this has an impact on daily SSB and energy consumption.101  
A number of factors might limit the effectiveness of these policies, including: 
where these policies only target a limited range of SSBs; where children consume 
SSBs at home; or where children are not restricted from bringing SSBs to school.102 
These policies will therefore not be effective at addressing excessive SSB 
consumption alone, but it may be an effective tool when used along with other 
measures.103 For example, in order to complement the sales ban on energy drinks to 
children, both Latvia and Lithuania have also implemented marketing restrictions and 
other information initiatives. In Latvia, energy drinks may not be sold or advertised in 
educational institutions, and these drinks may not be offered freely to children for 
                                            
98 12. “Children” are defined as persons under the age of 18. Although the WCRF describes these 
interventions as “limits on the availability of high-sugar food products and beverages,” it could be 
argued that this is a misnomer, as these interventions actually target caffeine, with no reference to 
sugar. These prohibitions apply to energy drinks that contain an excess of 150mg /l caffeine, and 
in the case of Latvia, at least one other stimulant, such as taurine. 
99 WCRF International NOURISHING framework: Offer healthy food and set standards in public 
institutions and other specific settings (2019) 14; USDA The Special Act on Children’s Dietary Life 
Safety Management 2-6. 
100 Mann (2017) Environmental Law 713; WCRF Offer healthy food 19 & 26. 
101 BM Popkin & C Hawkes “Sweetening of the global diet, particularly beverages: patterns, trends 
and policy responses” (2016) 4 Lancet Diabetes Endocrinol. 178 181; WCRF “NOURISHING 
database” WCRF. 
102 DR Taber, JF Chriqui, R Vuillaume & FJ Chaloupka “How State Taxes and Policies Targeting 
Soda Consumption Modify the Association between School Vending Machines and Student 
Dietary Behaviors: A Cross-Sectional Analysis” (2014) 9 PLoS One e98249 1 7. 




promotional purposes. Further, Latvian regulations require that warning signs be 
displayed at the point of sale, that read “High caffeine content. Not recommended for 
children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.”104 
Similar regulations could also be used to increase the availability of healthy foods 
in these environments, including: initiatives that promote the availability of healthy 
foods in stores and public institutions; fruit and vegetable initiatives in schools; and 
regulations or incentives for healthier food and drinks to be offered as the default 
option in restaurants and other food service outlets.105 For example, in terms of 
Norway’s School Fruit Programme, schools were required to provide students in 
grades 1 to 10 with one piece of fruit or vegetable every school day.106 Research has 
shown that students in these schools increased their consumption of fruits and 
vegetables and decreased frequent consumption of unhealthy snacks such as SSBs 
and potato crisps.107 To optimise health effects from these initiatives, they should be 
accompanied by information and education strategies and collaboration with the 
stakeholders involved with the supply of food to schools.108 While the National 
School Nutrition Programme aims to ensure South African school children are fed 
nutritious meals in order to secure school attendance, there are currently no 
mandatory regulations restricting the sale and marketing of unhealthy food and non-
alcoholic beverage products at schools.109  
Further, the WHO provides that multi-component workplace interventions could be 
effective, particularly where these include both the provision of healthy foods and 
space for physical activity.110 In addition to certain educational aspects, the South 
                                            
104 WCRF Restrict food advertising 10. Further, energy drink advertisements in Latvia: are required to 
include a warning on their negative health effects, which represents a minimum of 10% of the 
advertisement; may not indicate that these drinks quench thirst, be associated with sporting 
activities, or imply that they could be consumed with alcohol; and may not be broadcasted before, 
during or after TV programmes aimed at children, or in print media aimed at children. 
105 WCRF International NOURISHING framework: Set incentives and rules to create a healthy retail 
and food service environment (2019) 2-6; WHO Global Action Plan 32; WCRF Offer healthy food 
14. 
106 WCRF Set incentives and rules 3. 
107 WCRF Curbing global sugar consumption 12. For students with parents that had a lower 
educational status, the reduction in frequency of consumption of unhealthy snacks was more 
apparent. Further, there was a certain amount of earmarked revenue for this initiative for each 
municipality. Information on this amount of revenue was available to the public, which increased 
the transparency of the programme. 
108 WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF. 
109 Mills Considering the Best Interests of the Child 245. 




African NDOH’s National Guide for Healthy Meal Provisioning in the Workplace111 
provides voluntary guidelines for foods sold through vending machines at workplaces 
and meals served at work functions and at work cafeterias, etc. Among others, these 
recommendations include: only serving water, coffee and tea at work functions; that 
vending machines and kiosks should not offer carbonated soft drinks, energy drinks 
or sweetened fruit juice drinks, but only water, 100% fruit juice and diet soft drinks; 
and that “each vending machine must display the total energy content for each item 
sold.”112 This guide does not expressly encourage physical activity inside or outside 
the workplace, and only makes one reference to obesity, which reads: “Remember: 
eating too much energy per day is linked to overweight and obesity.”113 
2 3 1 2 Portion Cap Rule in New York City 
The USA has the highest prevalence of obesity among the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) countries, where around 39,8% 
of adults and 18,5% of children were obese during the period 2015 to 2016.114 
Although the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) have implemented a number of interventions to address 
obesity, political lobbying has largely prevented the progress of these interventions 
at the Federal level, so the majority of measures have been implemented at the state 
and local government levels.115 Not unlike the rest of the USA, “people in New 
York... are fat, getting fatter:”116 in 2010 in New York, around 23,4% of adults and 
20,7% of elementary school children were obese.117 Over the last 30 years, 
Americans’ energy and sugar consumption have increased drastically: energy 
consumption has increased by around 200 to 300 calories; and SSBs represent the 
                                            
111 RSA NDOH National Guide for healthy meal provisioning in the workplace (2016) 1-31. 
112 18-20. 
113 12. 
114 CM Hales, MD Carrol, CD Fryar & CL Ogden Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults and Youth: 
United States, 2015-2016 NCHS Data Brief (2011) 1; GA Roth, F Abd-Allah, KH Abate & K Alam 
“The Burden of Cardiovascular Diseases Among US States, 1990-2016” (2018) JAMA Cardiol. E1 
E2 & E8. 
115 SA Roache, C Platkin, LO Gostin & C Kaplan “Big Food and Soda Versus Public Health: Industry 
Litigation Against Local Government Regulations to Promote Healthy Diets” (2018) XLV FULJ 
1051 1057. For example, a number of states have adopted regulations on health and fitness 
screenings, and education on physical activity and nutrition. Further, a number of states have 
implemented regulations restricting the overcrowding of fast food restaurants.  
116 C Neistat “NYC Soda Ban explained, sort of (New York Times Op-Doc Video)” (16-09-2012) 
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dIfhwkPMvpc> (accessed 19-07-2019) 3:48 – 4:04. 
117 NYC Obesity Task Force Reversing the Epidemic: The New York City Obesity Task Force Plan to 
Prevent and Control Obesity (2012) 4. Further, 58% of adults in NYC were overweight or obese, 




largest portion of this increase, as well as 43% of all added dietary sugar 
consumption. Along with high levels of SSB consumption and increasing levels of 
overweight and obesity, the portion sizes for SSBs have increased over recent 
decades. For example, while the only available serving size for Coca-Cola in 1955 
was around 207 millilitres, many restaurants in New York currently offer Coca-Cola 
in serving cups of up to 946 millilitres.118  
The “Portion Cap Rule” or “Soda Ban” was a health initiative that formed part of a 
broader health strategy in New York City (“NYC”), The NYC Obesity Task Force Plan 
to Prevent and Control Obesity (“NYC Obesity Task Force Plan”).119 The NYC 
Obesity Task Force Plan comprised of various initiatives aimed at addressing 
childhood obesity, encouraging healthier diets, and promoting physical activity.120  
This rule was a planned regulation by the NYC Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene Board of Health (“NYC Board of Health”), aimed at discouraging excessive 
soda consumption. It was proposed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in May 2012, and 
was approved by the NYC Board of Health in September of the same year.121 It was 
rationalized that the availability of such large SSB portion sizes encouraged 
excessive SSB consumption, and that setting maximum serving sizes would reduce 
sugar consumption. The NYC Board of Health provided that: 
 “People tend to consume more calories at meals that include large beverage sizes. Its 
intent is to address the supersize trend and reacquaint New Yorkers with smaller 
                                            
118 13. The only available serving size for Coca-Cola in 1955 was 7 oz (around 207ml), and in 2010, 
the serving sizes for Coca-Cola at McDonalds ranged from 12 oz (around 355ml) to 32 oz (around 
946ml); Convertunits “Convert oz to ml – Conversion of Measurement Units” (21-01-2019) 
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foods and non-alcoholic beverages through vending machines; regulations on the provision of 
calorie information on menu boards in chain restaurants; and “health bucks” initiatives for 
purchases made at farmers’ markets with food stamps. 
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public education campaigns and improved nutritional quality of foods supplied in hospitals could 




portion sizes, leading to a reduction in consumption of sugary drinks among New York 
City residents.”122 
In terms of the proposed regulation in the NYC Health Code, Food Service 
Establishments (“FSEs”) would not have been allowed to: sell or provide “sugary 
drinks” in containers exceeding 16 fluid ounces (around 473 millilitres); nor offer, sell 
or provide such self-service cups to customers.123 To illustrate the Portion Cap Rule 
in practice, most restaurants have varying portion sizes for small, medium, large and 
“children’s”-sized drinks.124 “Small” (473 millilitre) drinks from McDonalds and 
Dunkin’ Donuts would have been acceptable in terms of the Portion Cap Rule, while 
“medium” (621 millilitre) and “large” (946 millilitre) drinks would not.125 Because a 
large serving of Coca-Cola from these restaurants contains more than 104 grams of 
sugar (415 calories), the reduction in consumption of these larger servings would 
have been desirable from a public health perspective. If this rule influenced 
customers who usually purchased large servings of Coca-Cola from McDonalds to 
simply replace these with the small servings, then energy consumption from SSBs 
could potentially be reduced by 50%.126 Certain studies have indicated that this 
Portion Cap Rule could have reduced SSB consumption and led to health 
improvements.127 While it could be argued that such interventions restricting portion 
sizes are well-targeted because they limit excessive SSB consumption, the overall 
impact on health would depend on a number of complicated factors. 
The definition of FSEs is also limited to places were “food is prepared and 
intended for individual portion service,” and excluded food retail stores, food 
processing establishments and private homes.128 While the Portion Cap Rule would 
have applied to restaurants, movie theatres and sports venues, supermarkets and 
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Coca-Cola. 
127 Mann (2017) Environmental Law 714. 




convenience stores would not have been required to restrict their portion sizes for 
sugary drinks.129 This rule would therefore have affected certain establishments 
differently, which would have limited its effectiveness. For example, while restaurants 
such as McDonalds would have needed to remove offerings for medium- (621 
millilitre) and large-sized sugary beverages from their menus, convenience stores 
such as 7-Eleven could have still sold the same beverages in 1 479 millilitre “Double 
Gulp” containers.130 Further, the Portion Cap Rule would not have restricted the 
portion sizes of the relevant SSBs available at these supermarkets and convenience 
stores.131 Although this would have been less convenient than purchasing larger 
serving portions from the FSEs where customers purchased meals, it would still 
have been possible for these customers to purchase even larger quantities from 
nearby convenience stores. Such an outcome would clearly undermine any health 
objective.132  
The Portion Cap Rule was criticised for various other reasons, a number of which 
are further discussed below.133 For instance, this rule did not make provisions to 
prevent consumers from simply purchasing more than one serving of the targeted 
beverages.134 Further, without additional rules prohibiting “bottomless” soda specials 
or unlimited refills, the Portion Cap Rule would do little to limit this form of excessive 
SSB consumption. The then-mayor of NYC, Michael Bloomberg acknowledged some 
of these shortcomings of the Portion Cap Rule’s formulation during an interview, but 
emphasized that this rule also had the potential to improve health outcomes through 
educating or informing consumers: 
 “And the idea here is... you tend to eat all the food in the container in front of you. If 
it’s a bigger container, you would eat more; if it’s a smaller... container... you would eat 
less... We’re gonna have more deaths from obesity than from smoking... If you want to 
order two cups at the same time, that’s fine, it’s your choice. We’re not taking away 
anybody’s right to do things, we’re simply forcing you to understand that you have to 
make the conscious decision to go from one cup to another cup... All we’re trying to do 
is to remind you that this is something that... is detrimental to your health, and to do 
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something about this national epidemic. It’s not perfect, it’s not the only answer, it’s not 
the only cause of people being overweight, but we’ve got to do something.”135 
2 3 2 Food and beverage reformulation regulations 
Voluntary and mandatory regulations aimed at encouraging manufacturers and 
food service outlets to change recipes and reduce portion sizes have also been used 
to improve dietary quality. Voluntary reformulation initiatives have been used in a 
number of jurisdictions to reduce the sodium content in certain foods. These include 
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and the USA.136 Among others, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and the USA have introduced mandatory regulations that 
restrict the content of sodium or TFAs in certain foods.137 In response to the burden 
of NCDs caused by excessive sodium consumption, mandatory sodium regulations 
were passed in South Africa in 2013, in terms of the Regulations Relating to the 
Reduction of Sodium in Certain Foodstuffs published in Government Notice No. R. 
214 (“Regulations 214”)138 of the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act. In 
terms of these regulations, food manufacturers are required to reduce the sodium 
content in a number of categories of food products, including: bread; breakfast 
cereals and porridges; butter and other spreads such as margarine; certain savoury 
snacks; certain flavoured potato crisps; and cured processed meats. The required 
maximum sodium contents are stipulated for each category, and were introduced in 
two phases, with deadlines in 2016 and 2019.139 These regulations are believed to 
be an important step in decreasing the burden of NCDs in South Africa.140 Estimates 
have shown that the reduction of sodium consumption in the case of bread could 
potentially prevent 7 400 deaths from cardiovascular diseases (“CVD”). Further, the 
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reduction of sodium content in bread could also prevent 4 300 non-fatal strokes per 
year, which could save R350 million in healthcare spending.141  
In March 2003, Denmark became the first country in the world to implement 
regulations on the maximum content of TFAs in oils and fats.142 In terms of these 
regulations, industrially-produced fats and oils may not contain more than 2 grams of 
TFAs per 100 grams.143 This regulation applies to fats, oils, and foods produced with 
or containing these fats and oils. Any person who sells food products containing an 
excess of 2 grams of TFAs per 100 grams, is liable to a fine.144 Restrepo and Rieger 
provide that these regulations effectively reduced the TFA content in certain foods, 
which has led to decreased mortality rates from CVD.145 Most jurisdictions that 
restrict the TFA content food products set this limit to 2 grams of TFAs per 100 
grams of total fat.146 A similar regulation has been implemented in South Africa since 
2011: in terms of the Regulations Relating to Trans-Fat in Foodstuffs published in 
Government Notice No. R 127,147 it is prohibited to sell, manufacture or import any 
oils or fats that contain an excess of 2 grams of TFAs per 100 grams of oil or fat. 
This regulation applies to oils and fats, or processed foods containing oils or fats 
intended for human consumption.148  
Saturated fat has also been targeted by certain interventions.149 For example, in 
1987 in Mauritius, regulations were introduced that supported the reformulation of 
staple foods as part of a health intervention programme. Because soya bean oil 
contains less saturated fat than palm oil, the content of palm oil in general cooking oil 
was limited, and replaced with soya bean oil. The WHO regards this as an effective 
intervention: after five years of implementation, cholesterol levels had decreased 
significantly, and saturated fat consumption had decreased by around 3,5% of total 
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energy consumption.150 Other jurisdictions have used interventions to limit saturated 
fat consumption from certain meat products: the sale of certain meat products with 
high fat and low meat contents has been prohibited in Fiji and Samoa; while the sale 
of certain meats that do not comply with maximum fat standards has been prohibited 
in Ghana.151 
Similar regulations could also be used to reduce the content of added sugars in 
foods and non-alcoholic beverages, but there are currently no mandatory regulations 
in this regard; mandatory reformulation and portion size regulations mostly target 
sodium and TFAs.152 Rather, product reformulation to reduce sugar content has 
usually been an indirect result of market-based interventions that increase the prices 
of more sugary products, relative to less sugary products. For example, in order to 
encourage reformulation, Hungary introduced a tax on certain salty food products 
that contain an excess of a certain quantity of salt.153 Certain sugar-sweetened food 
and beverage products that contain an excess of a certain quantity of sugar are also 
taxed in Hungary in terms of this same legislation.154 Taxes formulated in this way 
could be viewed as a type of “voluntary” reformulation regulation, because they 
incentivise manufacturers to reformulate their products to escape or limit their tax 
liability. 
 The Ecorys Report provides that: 
“Method and cost of reformulation differ greatly from product to product. In certain 
cases the change is very easy and cheap (e.g. less salt is added to the product). In 
other cases it requires the execution of a comprehensive research and development 
program, and/or the extension of the existing technology or even the installation of a 
new one. These might be costly and might take several years.”155 
Apart from such market-based interventions that encourage product reformulation, 
a number of jurisdictions have voluntary agreements to reduce sugar content in 
foods, and it appears that these might be effective. For example, Coca-Cola reduced 
the calories in their carbonated drinks portfolio by 5,3% as a result of the challenge 
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by the UK government to the food industry “to reduce overall sugar across a range of 
products that contribute most to children’s sugar intakes by at least 20% by 2020, 
including a 5% reduction in the first year of the programme.”156 Further, voluntary 
commitment charters were introduced in France in 2006, in terms of which French 
companies pledged to: reduce their products’ content of sugar, fat and salt; reduce 
their portion sizes; and comply with marketing requirements. To date, more than 35 
companies have pledged to these charters.157 These voluntary commitments have 
been commended for leading to product reformulation, particularly in the case of 
sugar: during the period 2008 to 2010, there was a reduction in sugar in the French 
food market of between 11 700 to 13 000 tonnes, as a result of reformulation efforts 
by the first fifteen companies signed to these charters; and over the period 2008 to 
2011, there was a 10% reduction in the sugar content in breakfast cereals.158  
Voluntary agreements and industry self-regulation in the context of obesity 
prevention and reduction in general has been criticised. These arguments are not 
considered in detail, but industry engagement may be necessary. Particularly in the 
case of product reformulation, industry insights about how consumers might respond 
to new formulations are invaluable for policymakers. For example, following the 
introduction of the Public Health Product Tax (“PHPT”)159 in Hungary, Nestlé 
Hungary submitted that product reformulation should not occur suddenly or in 
isolation, especially where taste is an important factor for consumers. If only one 
product is reformulated in such a manner, consumers are likely to reject the 
reformulated product and instead purchase other, competitive products that meet 
their taste preference. Therefore, product reformulation should aim to gradually 
change consumers’ taste expectations, and should be a co-ordinated effort by 
manufacturers and the government health authority.160 
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2 4 Conclusion 
The advancement of information and nutrition education is an important 
component of a “multiple-intervention approach” aimed at improving consumption 
and minimizing dietary risk factors for NCDs. The starting point for interventions 
aimed at improving both the food information environment and the food market 
environment should be the formulation of evidence-based dietary guidelines.161 It is 
important to have clear and consistent messages regarding health and nutrition, and 
FBDGs provide a foundation for other interventions. For example, public awareness 
is fostered through the use of specific FBDGs as central themes for the NNW in 
South Africa.162 Marketing and labelling regulations are also used to improve the 
food information environment. However, because evidence suggests that higher-
income consumers are likely to benefit more from labelling regulations, it is important 
for these to be accompanied by some educational component.163 An interpretive, 
FOP labelling system might be particularly useful for consumers who have limited 
nutrition education or literacy level in the language in which the nutritional 
information is provided on pre-packaged food labels. In addition to being easier to 
understand, the use of a simple format for an FOP labelling system across a broad 
range of products assists consumers in comparing and making healthier food 
choices.164  
Where these FOP labelling systems are based on a NPM, they could further 
provide incentive to food manufacturers to improve the nutritional content of their 
products, in order to comply with the NPM’s “healthy” requirements.165 In this 
context, both mandatory and voluntary food product reformulation regulations have 
been used in order to improve the consumer food environment. For example, 
mandatory food product reformulation regulations have been implemented in South 
Africa, which set maximum levels for the content of sodium and TFAs in certain food 
products.166 Other measures aimed at improving the consumer food environment 
include: regulations restricting the sale of certain foods and beverages in schools 
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and other settings; and regulations to increase the availability of healthy foods in 
certain settings.167 The National School Nutrition Programme in South Africa is an 
endeavour to secure children’s attendance at schools by providing nutritious meals. 
However, there are currently no mandatory regulations restricting the sale or 
marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages in South African schools.168 
Regulations 146 and the ASA Code offer very limited protection to children from 
marketing of foodstuffs in various settings in South Africa. Mills argues that the 
current position does not comply with the WHO’s call to restrict marketing practices 
promoting unhealthy diets to children.169  
Further, while Regulations 146 serve an important consumer protection function 
by preventing misleading claims, it is submitted that the current level of information 
required by these regulations is insufficient.170 Nutrition education forms part of the 
Life Orientation curriculum in South African schools, but learners might not always 
be able to apply this knowledge in making healthier choices because of the lack of 
mandatory labelling regulations on the provision of nutritional information on all pre-
packaged foods. Draft Regulations 429 provide for the mandatory labelling of 
nutritional information on pre-packaged foodstuffs, regardless of whether or not 
claims are made.171 Further, Draft Regulations 429 provide for much stricter criteria 
for the marketing of foods and beverages to children.172 Among other requirements, 
the relevant foodstuffs would need to comply with the screening criteria of the NPM 
provided on the NDOH’s website in order to be marketed to children and for claims 
to be made on the product’s label.173  
Draft Regulations 429 have been criticised for various reasons and have not been 
implemented.174 However, it is arguable that the mandatory provision of nutritional 
information on all pre-packaged foodstuffs would have been a positive development, 
and that such information serves as an important foundation for other non-market-
based interventions. The lack of mandatory labelling regulations requiring the 
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provision of nutritional information could also undermine the health objective of 
market-based interventions. For example, while the HPL aims to cause relatively 
larger price increases for more sugary beverages, the provision for assumed sugar 
content where SSB manufacturers do not provide nutritional information could result 
in arbitrary price increases. The lack of such mandatory regulations could further 
result in wasted time and resources, as legislators need to revise the provisions for 
the HPL products that do not provide nutritional information. The implementation of 
such labelling regulations would therefore support the health objective and reduce 
administrative complications for market-based interventions. 
As was established in Chapter 1 above, the HPL is not a “silver bullet” to 
addressing obesity and obesity-related NCDs.175 It is difficult to compare the 
effectiveness of these various types of market-based and non-market-based 
interventions, and it is acknowledged that not one these interventions will be 
effective in isolation. Instead of focusing on one type of intervention, these 
interventions should be used to complement and reinforce each other.176 The 
Strategy provides that labelling regulations are not the most “cost-effective” 
intervention in the “multiple-intervention approach” to address the relevant health 
issues.177 However, it is submitted that mandatory labelling regulations requiring the 
provision of nutritional information on all pre-packaged foods is an indispensible tool, 
and provides a foundation for other interventions to ensure consistency with the 
health objective. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARKET-BASED INTERVENTIONS 
3 1 Introduction 
While Chapter 2 focused on non-market-based interventions and the need for 
multiple interventions to reinforce the health impact, this chapter focuses on market-
based interventions, and specifically on taxes. This chapter explains various aspects 
of taxes in general, and contextualises the Health Promotion Levy (“HPL”) within the 
broader tax system. It is explained that taxes in general are used to pursue a number 
of objectives, but the focus for this discussion is on how taxes could be used to 
pursue health objectives. In the context of health objectives specifically, it is 
considered how these taxes could translate to dietary and other health 
improvements through a number of channels, and how these objectives were framed 
in the selected comparative jurisdictions. The various factors that could influence 
how these taxes ultimately translate to dietary improvements and health outcomes 
are then considered, and comment is made on how certain aspects of formulation 
could affect this. While the arguments from Chapter 2 are still considered, the focus 
is shifted specifically to how non-market-based interventions could be used to 
complement market-based interventions in particular and mitigate potentially 
negative effects on other policy objectives. 
3 2 Classification of taxes 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) defines 
taxes as “compulsory, unrequited payments to general government.”1 In an attempt 
to describe the characteristics of a tax, the Constitutional Court in South African 
Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another (“Shuttleworth”)2 referred to 
other cases which stated that: taxes constitute monies that are paid to a general 
revenue fund for general purposes, and no particular service is received in return for 
payment;3 a punitive tax can constitute a tax if it is subject to the standard 
administration procedures for assessment and collection;4 and it is required that a 
tax be imposed on the population as a whole, or a significant portion of the 
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population.5 HPL forms part of the Customs and Excise Act, which the Constitutional 
Court has described as a fiscal piece of legislation: despite the extra-fiscal “important 
public purpose” of “customs and excise controls,”6 the charges imposed by the 
Customs and Excise Act constitute taxes.7 
There are various types of taxes which can be classified in a number of ways, 
including according to: the incidence of the tax, as either direct or indirect; the nature 
of the tax base, as income, consumption, or wealth; and the method used to 
calculate the amount of tax payable, as proportional, progressive or regressive. 
Direct taxes are charged on the taxpayers themselves, while indirect taxes are 
imposed on specific commodities and transactions. In the case of direct taxes, the 
entity that bears the legal burden of the tax also bears the economic burden of the 
tax. However, in the case of indirect taxes, the entity that bears the legal burden of 
the tax does not bear the economic burden of the tax; the tax is levied against one 
entity, but is ultimately paid by another.8 Direct taxes include: Capital Gains Tax, 
“normal” income tax and donations tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; 
and estate duty in terms of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955. Indirect taxes include 
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value-added tax (“VAT”) in terms of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (“VAT Act”) 
and customs and excise taxes in terms of the Customs and Excise Act.9 
Taxes based on the consumption of goods or services are defined as all taxes 
levied on: the production, sale, delivery, transfer, extraction or leasing of goods, and 
the performance of services; and the use of goods, the permission to use goods, and 
the permission to conduct certain activities. The OECD distinguishes between 
general taxes on goods and services and taxes on specific goods and services.10 
General taxes on goods and services are general consumption taxes which are 
levied at one or more of the stages of production or distribution, and include: VATs or 
Taxes on Goods and Services (“GSTs”), general sales taxes, and multi-stage 
cumulative taxes.11 Proportional taxes are levied at a fixed rate against an amount of 
income, and progressive taxes have different tax rates, which increase as the 
taxable amount increases.12 Regressive taxes have a tax rate that effectively 
decreases as the taxable amount increases. General taxes on goods and services 
are usually regressive in nature, because the rate paid on these products remains 
the same, and people with a lower income level spend proportionally more on these 
products than those with a higher income level.13  The effect of these regressive 
taxes is that the poor suffer larger welfare losses than wealthier consumers.14 It is 
important to minimise the impact of regressive taxes in developing countries where 
poverty is widespread.  
In order to improve the progressivity of the tax system, many general goods and 
services tax systems apply “zero-ratings” or exemptions on certain foods.15 Where 
such zero-ratings are used for healthy foods, it could be argued that the consumption 
                                            
9 Cnossen “Introduction” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 1; Corporate Finance Institute 
“Indirect Taxes” Corporate Finance Institute. 
10 OECD Revenue Statistics Annex A.5 para 55-76. 
11 OECD Revenue Statistics Annex A.5 paras 60-62; J Mirrlees, S Adam, T Besley, R Blundell, S 
Bond, R Chote, M Gammie, P Johnson, G Myles & J Poterba Tax by Design (2011) 168; Cnossen 
“Introduction” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 1. In terms of VATs, the tax is levied on the 
value added at various stages, and deductions for inputs are available for taxpayers at each stage, 
except for the final consumer. Thus, under a VAT system, only the final consumption is taxed. In 
terms of general sales taxes, the tax is only levied at one stage. Other examples of general sales 
taxes include turnover taxes, manufacturer’s sales taxes and retail sales taxes. 
12 Venter et al A Student’s Approach 3; Schedule No. 1 para 1 of the Income Tax Act. South Africa 
has a progressive income tax structure, in terms of which the Income Tax Act provides for different 
tax rates for different tax brackets: those individuals earning an income within a higher tax bracket 
pay a progressively higher rate of income tax than those who earn in lower income brackets. 
13 Cnossen “Introduction” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 16. 
14 C Snowdon The Proof of the Pudding, Denmark’s Fat Tax Fiasco Institute of Economic Affairs 
Current Controversies Paper No. 42 (2013) 22. 




of these healthy foods is effectively being subsidized. In the context of interventions 
aimed at encouraging healthier diets, a subsidy is essentially a financial benefit 
allocated by a government to certain consumers, businesses or producers to 
incentivise healthier consumption.16 Similarly to the rationale that unhealthy food 
taxes decrease their consumption, subsidies that decrease the prices of healthy 
foods, will improve their affordability and thereby increase their consumption.17 The 
following foods are zero-rated for VAT purposes in South Africa: brown bread; maize 
meal; samp; mealie rice; dried mealies; dried beans and lentils; pilchards; milk 
powder and dairy powder blends; rice; unprocessed fruits and vegetables; vegetable 
oils, except olive oil; milk; cultured milk; brown wheaten bread; eggs; legumes; cake 
wheat flour; and white bread flour. The rate of VAT increased from 14% to 15% in 
2018.18 The zero-rating is used to mitigate the regressive impact of VAT. After this 
VAT increasein 2018, a panel of experts was appointed to review these food items 
covered by the zero-rating.19 While it is generally recognised that the zero-rated food 
items have health benefits, the main purpose for the zero-rating is not to promote 
healthy eating, but rather to alleviate the regressive impact of VAT because these 
foods are generally perceived to be consumed by poorer people.20 The effect of 
these lower prices of certain healthy foodstuffs is that the regressive impact of VAT 
is mitigated, and the consumption of healthier foods is supported. 
                                            
16 M Parkin Microeconomics 10 ed (2012) 383. These financial benefits can take a number of forms, 
including: grants; tax concessions, such as exemptions; and food vouchers to consumers. 
17 WCRF Use economic tools 15; R An “Effectiveness of subsidies in promoting healthy food 
purchases and consumption: a review of field experiments” (2012) 16 PHN 1215 1219 & 1225; 
WCRF “NOURISHING database” WCRF. Healthy food subsidies have been used in a number of 
jurisdictions, including France, Germany, the UK and the USA; Research has shown that food 
prices influence demand. Particularly for lower-income groups, it has been shown that targeted 
subsidies on healthy foods could encourage these consumers to choose healthier options. 
18 S11(1)(j) and Part B of Schedule No. 2 of the VAT Act. 
19 Independent Panel of Experts for the Review of the Zero Rating in South Africa Recommendations 
on Zero Ratings in the Value-Added Tax System (2018) 7-8. Following these recommendations, 
the zero-rating was extended to cover white bread, white flour and cake flour. Among other 
recommendations, this panel of experts recommended that baby formula should not be subject to 
the zero-rating “based on public health recommendations.” 
20 E Muller A Framework for Wealth Transfer Taxation in South Africa LLD thesis, University of 
Pretoria (2010) 33; RSA National Treasury Budget Review (2018) 42. South Africa has 
implemented VAT since 1991, which is charged on most goods supplied and services rendered in 
South Africa, with certain exemptions and zero-rated goods and services. VAT is charged as a 
proportion of the price of the relevant goods and services. Until 1 April 2018, the rate of VAT was 
14%, but it has since been increased to 15%. VAT is charged in addition to any excise tax on a 




3 3 Policy objectives and principles of taxation 
3 3 1 Health Promotion Levy in terms of tax policy objectives 
The first step in designing an effective food excise tax is providing a clear 
objective, as this influences other aspects of formulation as well as the public and 
political response to the tax.21 The most important purpose of taxation is revenue 
collection, as taxes are an important means of financing government activities.22 
However, in addition to revenue generation, taxes can also be used to pursue other 
socio-economic and political objectives, including: economic growth; reprising; and 
the redistribution of resources.23 Hernández-Quevedo and Weatherly provide that 
there are the two primary objectives of food excise taxes in terms of reprising or 
health promotion: the direct primary objective is reducing consumption through 
increased prices; and the indirect primary objective is incentivising manufacturers to 
reformulate unhealthy products to minimize the increased costs of production or to 
avoid the tax’s application.24 Hernández-Quevedo and Weatherly further provide that 
the secondary objective of these taxes is to fund other health prevention initiatives, 
through the revenues collected from the tax.25 Food excise taxes are therefore 
typically framed in terms of revenue generation, health promotion, or both.26 There 
are limited examples of food excise taxes implemented specifically to pursue 
economic growth objectives, but the effect that these taxes have on other socio-
economic objectives is an important consideration.27  
The Constitutional Court in Gaertner provided that the primary or dominant 
purpose of excise taxes is ensuring “a constant stream of revenue for the State, with 
a secondary function of discouraging consumption of certain products that are 
                                            
21 WCRF Building momentum 10. 
22 Muller A Framework 40; SARS “Excise Duties and Levies” SARS. For example, SARS has reported 
that the revenue generated by excise duties represents approximately 10% of the total revenue 
collected by SARS. 
23 R Bird & S Wallace “Taxing Alcohol: Reflections from International Experience” in S Cnossen (ed) 
Excise Tax Policy and Administration in Southern African Countries (2006) 21 22; Muller A 
Framework 37. 
24 C Hernández-Quevedo & H Weatherly “Health promotion, disease prevention and health 
inequalities” in D McDaid, F Sassi & S Merkur (eds) Promoting Health, Preventing Disease The 
Economic Case (2015) 259 261. 
25 261. 
26 WCRF Building momentum 16. 
27 Bird & Wallace “Taxing Alcohol” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 22; Muller A Framework 
38-40. In terms of redistributive objectives, the living standards of lower socio-economic groups 
should be improved, so that economic opportunities can be pursued equally. Particularly in South 
Africa, where poverty is widespread, it is important to consider: the redistributive effects of taxes; 




harmful to health or the environment.”28 However, when the plan to introduce a tax 
on SSBs in South Africa was first announced in 2016, it was specifically framed in 
terms of health promotion. Although the implementation of an SSB tax was 
discussed in the context of additional revenue, this aspect was not emphasized in 
the 2016 Budget Review: 
“Obesity stemming from overconsumption of sugar is a global concern. Over the past 
30 years the problem has grown in South Africa, which has the worst obesity ranking 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and led to greater risk of heart disease, diabetes and cancer... 
Fiscal interventions such as taxes are increasingly recognised as complementary tools 
to help tackle this epidemic... Government proposes to introduce such a tax on sugar-
sweetened beverages... to help reduce excessive sugar intake.”29 
The Policy Paper provides that the objective of HPL is to decrease excessive 
sugar consumption, and thereby support the National Department of Health’s 
(“NDOH”) goal of reducing the prevalence of obesity and non-communicable 
diseases (“NCDs”).30 It is further explained that the HPL will assist in both: reducing 
negative health consequences to individuals as a result of excessive sugar 
consumption; and correcting a market failure, because some of the external costs 
from increased public healthcare expenditure will be reduced.31 Therefore, despite 
the potential for HPL to generate revenue, its stated policy objective is health 
promotion and obesity reduction.  
Section 27 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that “the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of...” the rights “to have access to health care services...” 
and “sufficient food and water.”32 However, it has been argued that SSB taxes are 
actually detrimental to these socio-economic rights, because food expenditure 
represents a larger share of income for poorer consumers. To illustrate this 
argument: lower socio-economic groups spend a larger portion of their income on 
energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods (“EDNPs”) than wealthier groups; so unless the 
tax is on a product that is consumed disproportionately by wealthier socio-economic 
groups, such a food tax is potentially regressive. In response to these criticisms on 
regressivity, a number of authors have argued that any regressive impact will be 
offset by the relatively larger benefits that poorer consumers gain in the long term, 
                                            
28 Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others 2013 ZACC 38 (CC) para 54. 
29 RSA National Treasury Budget Review (2016) 10 & 52. 
30 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 2. 
31 10. 




because these consumers are disproportionately affected by obesity and NCDs.33 
This argument is not convincing, because certain healthcare services are free for 
many of these poor consumers, and it is unlikely that the increased prices of SSBs 
are equally offset in this context.34 However, because the health issues related to 
overweight and obesity increase the burden on the health system, the imposition of a 
tax to reduce consumption and these health concerns will increase the proportion of 
healthcare funds to treat other health issues, such as communicable diseases.35  
Another channel through which food excise taxes could promote health is in terms 
of the strong message it sends to both consumers and manufacturers about the 
negative health consequences of consuming certain foods or nutrients.36 In this 
regard, the Policy Paper provides that HPL will also serve an important price-
signalling function, which will assist consumers in making more informed decisions 
regarding the harm of excessive sugar consumption from SSBs.37 Manyema et al 
provide that this signalling effect could emphasize the impact on consumption 
changes, “where changes in purchasing are due to a signal that SSBs are unhealthy 
and are therefore being taxed rather than the price change itself.”38 However, it could 
be argued that, where taxes only lead to slight price increases, many consumers 
might not even notice, and this signalling effect is largely diluted. Awareness 
campaigns could potentially be used to reinforce the signalling effect, through 
informing consumers that the tax will be introduced, and clearly explaining the 
reasoning behind the tax. 
                                            
33 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 10.  
34 SECTION27 Submission on the Taxation of Sugar Sweetened Beverages Policy Paper (2016) 11; 
SECTION27 “Home” (31-10-2019) SECTION27 <http://section27.org.za/> (accessed 12-11-2019). 
“SECTION27 is a public interest law centre that seeks to achieve substantive equality and social 
justice in South Africa. Guided by the principles and values in the Constitution, SECTION27 uses 
law, advocacy, legal literacy, research and community mobilisation to achieve access to 
healthcare services and basic education. SECTION27 aims to achieve structural change and 
accountability to ensure the dignity and equality of everyone.” 
35 SECTION27 Submission on the Taxation of Sugar Sweetened Beverages Policy Paper 2-5; 
Ss24(a) and 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. In this regard, SECTION27 provides that HPL is a 
legislative measure to progressively achieve the realisation of section 27 rights. It is further 
submitted that taxes on unhealthy foods support other socio-economic rights in the Constitution, 
including: the section 28 right of children “to basic nutrition” and healthcare services; and the 
section 24 right “to an environment that is not harmful to... health or wellbeing,” because of the 
influence these taxes have on obesogenic food environments. 
36 Backholer et al (2016) PHN 3057. 
37 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 9. 
38 M Manyema, LJ Veerman, L Chola, A Tugendhaft, B Sartorius, D Labadarios & K Hofman “The 
Potential Impact of a 20% Tax on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages on Obesity in South African 




3 3 2 Tax policy objectives in comparative jurisdictions 
3 3 2 1 Saturated Fat Tax and other taxes on sugary products in Denmark 
Denmark implemented taxes on soft drinks since the 1930s (“Soda Tax”), on 
certain ice cream products (“Ice Cream Tax”) since 1948, and on certain chocolate 
and confectionery products since 1968 (“Chocolate and Confectionery Tax”).39 
These taxes were not implemented for health objectives, and were predominantly 
concerned with revenue generation. According to self-reported OECD data, the 
prevalence of overweight adults in Denmark increased from 32,3% in 2000 to 33,3% 
in 2013. Further, self-reported data indicate that the prevalence of obese adults 
increased from 5,5% in 1987 to 14,2% in 2013.40 While the prevalence of adult 
overweight and obesity has increased, these rates are relatively low, and survey 
data indicate that the prevalence of overweight and obese Danish children has 
decreased.41 However, in 2005, the average life expectancy at birth in Denmark was 
77,9 years. Although this was an increase from 72,4 years in 1960, the average 
across OECD countries had increased from 68,5 years to 78,6 years during the 
same period. The Danish life expectancy at birth was therefore lower and increasing 
at a slower rate than the OECD average. In 2008, the Danish government set a goal 
to increase the average life expectancy by three years over the period 2008 to 
2018.42  
As a result, the Forebyggelseskommissionen (“Prevention Commission”) was 
established in 2008, and was tasked with analysing and recommending measures to 
address certain health concerns, in line with the government’s goal. Among various 
                                            
39 DK Forebyggelseskommissionen Vi kan leve længere og sundere– Forebyggelseskommissionens 
anbefalinger til en styrket forebyggende indsats (2009) [“We Can Live Longer and Healthier - The 
Danish Prevention Commission's recommendations for strengthened prevention efforts”]131. 
40 OECD.Stat “Non-Medical Determinants of Health” (08-11-2018) OECD.Stat 
<https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=HEALTH_LVNG&lang=en> (accessed 18-01-
2019); OECD Health at a Glance: Europe (2016) 99. 
41 OECD Health at a Glance (2015) 75; DK Forebyggelseskommissionen Vi kan leve længere og 
sundere 44; OECD/EU Health at a Glance: Europe 2018: State of Health in the EU Cycle (2018) 
25. In 2002, it was estimated that the prevalence of overweight and obesity was around 12% for 
11- and 15- year olds, and around 9% for 13-year-olds. In 2006, it was estimated that this had 
decreased to around 10% for 11- and 15- year olds, and to around 8% for 13-year-olds. It has 
been estimated that only around 1% of 13- and 15-year-old Danish children were obese in 2006. 
With the exception of 15-year-olds, Denmark had one of the lowest rates of overweight and obese 
children in 2006, compared to other European countries. Further, only around 5% of Danish 
children aged 7-8 were obese in 2007. This was also low compared to the European average of 
around 13%. 
42  OECD Health at a Glance (2007) 21-23; OECD.Stat “Non-Medical Determinants of Health” 




findings, the Prevention Commission estimated that around 4 400 annual deaths 
were attributable to excessive consumption of saturated fat, and insufficient 
consumption of fruits and vegetables. In April 2009, the Prevention Commission 
published recommendations to strengthen preventive efforts against these health 
concerns (“Prevention Commission’s Recommendations”).43 The Prevention 
Commission’ Recommendations included measures to reduce the prevalence of 
overweight and obesity and other diet-related health concerns.44 Among others, the 
Prevention Commission’s Recommendations included that: the existing provisions 
for taxes on sugary products should be reformulated to have a larger effect on 
consumption; and that a tax on saturated fat could be implemented to discourage 
excessive consumption of saturated fat.45 It was also considered in 2008 whether 
reduced VAT rates should be used to encourage the consumption of healthy foods.46 
As is explained below however, these reduced rates were not adopted for various 
reasons.47 
Along with amendments to the existing taxes on soft drinks, ice cream and 
chocolate and confectionery, a tax on saturated fat (“Saturated Fat Tax”) was 
implemented in 2011.48 The official primary objective of this tax was to improve 
health, and the secondary objective was to finance other tax cuts.49 However, it was 
widely believed that the primary objective of this tax was to generate revenue to fund 
                                            
43 DK Forebyggelseskommissionen Vi kan leve længere og sundere– Forebyggelseskommissionens 
anbefalinger til en styrket forebyggende indsats (2009) [“We Can Live Longer and Healthier - The 
Danish Prevention Commission's recommendations for strengthened prevention efforts”]. 
44 5 & 395.  
45  Skat.dk “E.A Punktafgifter” (21-01-2018) Skat.dk 
<https://www.skat.dk/skat.aspx?oid=1921338&vid=214955&ik_navn=breadcrum> (accessed 17-
07-2018) [“E.A Excise Duties”]; Forebyggelseskommissionen Vi kan leve længere og sundere 94-
225. For example, the Prevention Commission recommended that: the rates should be increased 
for existing food excise taxes on soft drinks, ice cream, chocolate and confectionery; and that the 
existing tobacco and alcohol taxes should be increased, and stricter rules should be imposed for 
smoke-free environments. 
46 Skatteministeriet “Nedsat moms på sunde fødevarer” (31-01-2008) Skatteministeriet 
<http://www.skm.dk/skattetal/analyser-og-rapporter/notater/2008/januar/nedsat-moms-paa-sunde-
foedevarer> (accessed 19-06-2018) [Reduced VAT on healthy foods]. 
47 Discussed below under headings “3 5 2 1 Manufacturer and retailer behaviour” in Chapter 3 and “4 
3 2 Differentiated Value-Added Tax rates in the United Kingdom” in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
48 Lov nr. 247 af 30.03.2011 om afgift af mættet fedt i visse fødevarer (fedtafgiftsloven) [Act on the 
taxation of saturated fat in certain foods] § 26. 
49 DK Skatteministere (TL Poulsen) Lovbemærkninger i Forslag til Lov om afgift af mættet fedt i visse 
fødevarer (Fedtafgiftsloven), fremsat den 19. januar 2011 af skatteministeren (2011) [Notes on the 




other tax cuts in the Forårspakke 2.0 (“Spring Package 2.0”).50 The Spring Package 
2.0 was an extensive fiscal reform, with two main objectives: increasing the incentive 
to work; and improving health and green initiatives. This package contained a 
number of tax changes to pursue these objectives, but these two main objectives 
would essentially be achieved by: lowering the tax on labour income; and financing 
these tax cuts by increasing existing excise tax rates and introducing new excise 
taxes. It was believed that these measures would boost the economy, increase the 
labour supply by over 19 000 full-time employees, and improve fiscal stability and 
health.51  
3 3 2 2 Public Health Product Tax in Hungary 
Hungary had one of the poorest health statuses among OECD countries in 2009, 
with very high levels of avoidable mortality.52 In terms of self-reported data, the 
prevalence of obese Hungarian adults increased from around 18% in 2000, to 
around 20% in 2008. However, measured data indicate that the prevalence of adult 
obesity was higher than this, and was recorded to be around 28,5% in 2006.53 In 
terms of measured data for children between the ages of 5 and 17 in 2011, 25,9% of 
females and 25,5% of males were obese.54 Further, in comparison to other OECD 
countries in 2011, Hungary had the highest cancer mortality rates, and the second 
highest ischemic heart disease (“IHD”) mortality rates.55 Along with tobacco and 
alcohol consumption, unhealthy diets contribute strongly to these issues, and survey 
data from the period 2007 to 2009 indicate that the average Hungarian diet was high 
in energy, saturated fat and salt.56  
                                            
50 DK Finanministeriet Aftale mellem regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti om Forårspakke 2.0 – Vækst, 
klima, lavere skat (2009) [“Agreement between the Danish Government and the Danish People's 
Party on the Spring Package 2.0 - Growth, climate, lower tax”]; Ecorys Report Annexes 178; DK 
Forebyggelseskommissionen Vi kan leve længere og sundere 380.  The expected increase in life 
expectancy of 2,92 – 11,31 days is very small, compared to other measures in the Prevention 
Commission’s Recommendations. For example, it was estimated that doubling the tax on tobacco 
would lead to a 3 month increase in life expectancy, and introducing stricter smoke-free 
environment regulations would increase life expectancy by around 6 months. 
51 DK Finanministeriet Forårspakke 2.0 3. 
52 OECD Health at a Glance (2009) 16, 23, 25, 35, 53, 55 & 57. 
53 OECD/EU Health at a Glance: Europe 2018 127; OECD Health at a Glance: Europe (2010) 65. 
54 OECD Health at a Glance (2011) 57. 
55 OECD Health at a Glance (2013) 29 & 32. Although the mortality rates from cancer had decreased 
by 12% in Hungary since 1990, the average cancer mortality rates in the OECD had decreased by 
14% during the same period. Similarly, the Hungarian mortality rates from IHD only decreased by 
6% since 1990, compared to the average decrease of 42% among OECD countries. 
56 A Biro “Did the junk food tax make the Hungarians eat healthier?” (2015) 54 Food Policy 107 114; P 




As the prevalence of these health issues increases, so does the need for medical 
treatment and healthcare funding.57 Further, Hungary was affected significantly by 
the 2008 global financial crisis, and sustained a 6,7% decrease in GDP in 2009.58 
After 2008, the Hungarian income tax system was restructured, which led to a HUF 
100 billion decrease in healthcare funding.59 This led to a healthcare workforce 
crisis, due to relatively low wages of healthcare professionals, migrating workers and 
ageing healthcare personnel.60 By 2010, Hungary faced one of the worst recessions 
among OECD countries, and its budget deficit was increasing.61 Against this 
background of the budget deficit, poor diet, increasing health concerns and the 
healthcare workforce crisis, a number of legislative and tax changes were 
implemented, which included the introduction of the Public Health Product Tax 
(“PHPT”).62 
The PHPT was approved by the Hungarian parliament in July 2011, and came 
into effect in September 2011.63 According to the Hungarian Ministry of Taxation, the 
PHPT was implemented to pursue health objectives and generate revenue to finance 
public health services, particularly health programmes.64 Accordingly, the revenue 
generated by the PHPT accrues to the Health Insurance Fund (“HIF”), but PHPT 
taxpayers may elect to pay up to 10% of the PHPT amount to a specific healthcare 
programme, to a maximum of HUF 100 000.65 It was further provided that any 
                                                                                                                                      
Health Systems in Transition HiT xvii; WHO “Healthy Diet” WHO; WHO Regional Office for Europe 
Nutrition, Physical Activity and Obesity Hungary (2013) 2-3. During the period 2007-2009, it was 
estimated that Hungarians consumed 12,1g-17,5g of salt/sodium per day, and that saturated fat 
represented 11,8% of total energy intake. These intakes exceed the WHO’s recommendations that 
saturated fat should not comprise more than 10% of energy intake, and that daily sodium 
consumption should be less than 2000mg (5g salt). Hungarians also consumed slightly less than 
the daily recommended intake of fruits and vegetables: 597g per day, compared to the WHO’s 
daily recommended minimum of 600g per day.  
57 Gaál et al (2011) HiT xxi. Public healthcare expenditure in Hungary is funded by tax revenues and 
social contributions. 
58 xix. 
59 Ecorys Report Annexes 212. 
60 Gaál et al (2011) HiT xxii. 
61 OECD OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary (2010) 19. 
62 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról. 
63 E Holt “Hungary to introduce broad range of fat taxes” (2011) 378 Lancet 755 755; 2011. évi CIII. 
Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról § 12. 
64 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról preamble. 
65 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról § 1(19), 8(6)(a) & 11; E Tamás “a 
népegészségügyi termékadó (neta) egészségmegőrző programok költségeivel való 
csökkentéséről” (25-03-2016) A Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal <http://online.kpr.hu/uploaded-
files/2016/03/0-56fb96cf52b13.pdf> (elérhetó 27-11-2018) [“Reducing the cost of public health 
node healthcare programs”]. The Health Insurance Fund is funded by the revenue collected from 




improvement to the nutritional quality of Hungarians’ diets would be regarded as a 
successful result of the PHPT. The PHPT was intended to further health objectives 
by influencing: consumers to reduce their consumption of unhealthy nutrients, and 
choose healthier alternatives; and manufacturers to reformulate their food products 
to be healthier.66 The majority of consumers believed that the objective of the PHPT 
was to improve public health and prevent the increase of the relevant health 
concerns by encouraging healthy diets and reducing the consumption of unhealthy 
foods. According to the survey data from a study done by the National Institute for 
Health Development (“NIHD Assessment”)67 however, in addition to this objective: 
around 55% of consumers believed that the objective of PHPT was to improve the 
government’s budget deficit; and only around 28% of consumers believed that PHPT 
sought to finance public health programmes.68 
3 3 2 3 Soft drinks taxes and Junk Food Tax in Mexico 
In January 2002, Mexico introduced a tax on the transfer or importation soft drinks 
and syrups containing sweeteners other than cane sugar (“2002 Mexican Sweetener 
Tax”).69 This tax was not imposed for revenue generation nor health promotion, but 
to protect the domestic sugar cane industry.70 In 2004, the United States of America 
(“USA”) argued that this tax was in conflict with international trade agreements 
prohibiting unequal tax treatment between similar domestic and international 
products.71 The USA successfully argued that, because 95% of Mexican sweetener 
production was cane sugar, and because 100% of Mexico’s sweetener imports from 
                                            
66 Ecorys Report Annexes 214; F Varga “A népegészségügyi termékadó” (15-12-2015) Egzatik 
Szakkiadó <http://online.kpr.hu/t/a-nepegeszsegugyi-termekado.php> (accessed 26-11-2018) 
[“Public Health Product Tax”] 
67 NIHD Public Health Product Taxes Impact Assessment (2013) 1. 
68 12. 
69 WTO Mexico- Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages Report of the Panel WT/DS308/R 
(2005) 5. This tax also applied to distributions of these products. 
70 13 & 21. There had been rapid growth in the Mexican sugar cane industry, and there was a surplus 
of cane sugar. However, due to a trade agreement between Mexico and the USA, there was a limit 
in terms of how much sugar cane could be exported duty-free. In order to re-balance the surplus, 
Mexico introduced this tax to increase the demand for local sugar cane, and decrease the demand 
for other imported sweeteners, such as beet sugar and HFCS. 
71 Art III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. In terms of this agreement, imported 
products “shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes... of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” Further, imported products “shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin.” 
Lastly, a tax “would be considered to be inconsistent... only in cases where competition was 
involved between, on the one hand, the tax product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive 




the USA were high-fructose corn syrup (“HFCS”), this tax amounted to dissimilar 
taxation of “directly competitive or substitutable imports,” accorded favourable 
treatment “to like products of national origin,” and thus did not comply with the 
existing international taxation framework.72 
Since 2002, the prevalence of obesity and obesity-related NCDs has increased 
noticeably in Mexico. In 2000, around 24,2% of Mexican adults were obese. At this 
stage, Mexico had the second-highest prevalence of obesity among OECD 
countries; the USA ranked first, with 30,9% of adults classified as obese.73 By 2015, 
the prevalence of obese adults in Mexico had increased to 33,3%. At this stage, 
Mexico was still second to the USA in terms of obesity, but the total proportion of 
overweight and obese adults combined had overtaken that of the USA: 72,5% of 
Mexican adults were overweight or obese, which comprised 33,3% obese and 39,2% 
overweight adults; compared to 38,2% obese and 31,9% overweight American 
adults and 31,9% overweight adults, for a total of  70,1% overweight and obese 
American adults.74 In 2011, Mexico also had the highest prevalence of Type 2 
Diabetes Mellitus (“T2DM”) among OECD countries.75 Further, during the period 
2007 to 2013, Mexicans consumed around 159,5 litres of SSBs and 49,6 litres of 
bottled water per person per year on average.76 By 2014, Mexico’s SSB 
consumption had overtaken that of the USA, and Mexico had the world’s second-
largest daily calorie consumption from SSBs.77  
It was estimated that: in 2011, NCDs accounted for 78% of all deaths in Mexico, 
including T2DM, respiratory diseases, cancers, cardiovascular diseases (“CVD”) and 
other NCDs; and in 2008 that obesity-related diseases accounted for MXN 42 billion 
in direct healthcare expenditure, which constituted 13% of total Mexican healthcare 
                                            
72 WTO Mexico- Tax Measures on Soft Drinks 132, 138 & 162; Article III of the General Agreement on 
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expenditures.78 These diseases were also estimated to account for MXN 25 billion in 
indirect costs as a result of decreased productivity. It was predicted that these costs 
would increase to MXN 78 to 101 billion in direct costs, and MXN 73 to 101 billion in 
indirect costs annually by 2017 if cost-effective, inter-sectoral prevention measures 
were not implemented. Accordingly, the Mexican Ministry of Health formulated a 
strategy to address obesity and T2DM (“Mexican Strategy”),79 which identified a 
number of effective measures, including a tax on SSBs.80 
In addition to a tax on certain flavoured non-alcoholic beverages containing added 
sugars (“Flavoured Drinks Tax”),81 a tax on certain non-essential food products 
(“Junk Food Tax”)82 was passed in December 2013. The Flavoured Drinks Tax and 
the Junk Food Tax have been implemented since January 2014.83 Unlike the 
Mexican 2002 Sweetener Tax, the Flavoured Drinks Tax does not differentiate 
between cane sugar and HFCS: the beverages targeted by the Flavoured Drinks Tax 
are defined as flavoured, non-alcoholic beverages made through dissolving any type 
of sugar in water; and the description of sugar includes calorific sugar sweeteners, 
such as monosaccharides, disaccharides and polysaccharides.84 The Flavoured 
Drinks Tax was therefore implemented in order to discourage the consumption of a 
broad range of dietary sources of added sugars in the relevant SSBs, and thereby 
reduce excessive energy intake in line with obesity and NCD reduction. Other 
measures outlined in the Mexican Strategy include measures aimed at: increasing 
fruit and vegetable consumption; improving decision-making through labelling 
requirements; reducing the marketing of unhealthy foods; and decreasing the 
consumption of sugar, sodium and saturated fats.85 According to a decree, the 
revenues collected from the Flavoured Drinks Tax must be allocated to: programmes 
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aimed at promoting, detecting, treating and preventing malnutrition, overweight and 
obesity and related NCDs; and the provision of water services in rural areas and 
water fountains public schools.86  
3 3 2 4 Philadelphia Beverage Tax 
Contrary to the argument by Hernández-Quevedo and Weatherly that incentivising 
manufacturers to reformulate their products is an indirect primary objective and that 
revenue generation is a secondary objective, recent developments such as the Soft 
Drinks Industry Levy (“SDIL”) in the United Kingdom (“UK”) and the Philadelphia 
Beverage Tax (“PBT”) indicate that these could be the direct primary objectives.87 
These taxes have been formulated differently from previous SSBs taxes in line with 
their objectives, as is further discussed below.88 In January 2017, Philadelphia 
became the first large city in the USA to implement an SSB tax.89 Philadelphia is the 
fifth largest city in the USA, and has one of the highest poverty rates.90 The newly-
elected Mayor, Jim Kenney, framed the PBT as a useful revenue source to fund 
investment programmes.91 Mayor Kenney, emphasized the tax’s potential to 
generate additional revenue, and did not focus on health objectives. Mayor Kenney 
stated that the revenues generated could be used to: develop community amenities, 
such as libraries and parks and recreation centres; and fund a universal education 
system for pre-kindergarten (“pre-K”) children in Philadelphia.92 According to Purtle 
et al: 
 “The mayor’s administration deliberately framed the SSB tax as a strategy to finance 
universal pre-kindergarten and improvements to recreational facilities- not as a health 
intervention. Interviewees expressed that the non-health frame shifted the policy 
debate away from contentious arguments about government involvement in individual 
behaviour to discussions about how to finance investments in youth and communities- 
goals for which broad support existed. Interviewees cited a poll conducted during the 
policymaking process that found that 84% of Philadelphians felt that universal pre-
kindergarten was “very important.” The non-health frame also allowed a wide range of 
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research findings to enter the policy debate. Interviewees and news articles cited 
research about the long-term benefits of pre-kindergarten on education outcomes and 
associated cost savings. This contributed to the SSB tax proposal being perceived as 
an evidence-based education policy that would increase levels of educational 
attainment and improve the social and economic trajectories of low-income 
Philadelphia youth.” 93 
3 3 2 5 Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the United Kingdom 
In 2009, 25% of adults were obese in the UK.94 Further, it was estimated that 
52,4% of the UK population consumed SSBs once per week in 2008, and that males 
and females respectively consumed 62g and 22g of SSBs per day.95 The SDIL was 
proposed in March 2016, following a report published by the UK Scientific Advisory 
Committee on Nutrition, recommending that the consumption of SSBs should be 
reduced due to the associations between SSB consumption, dental caries, weight 
gain, and increased risk of T2DM.96 Taxes on unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic 
beverages have predominantly been focused on health improvements through 
influencing consumer behaviour, while acknowledging that product reformulation 
could complement the health outcomes. However, because of the perception that 
these taxes are regressive, the SDIL was the first SSB tax specifically formulated to 
encourage product reformulation. 
The SDIL came into effect in April 2018 in the UK.97 The UK government has 
expressly appealed to the soft drinks industry to reformulate their products instead of 
passing on the increased prices to consumers, in order to reduce sugar consumption 
and minimise regressivity. According to Her Majesty (“HM”) Revenue and Customs: 
“Public Health England and the Chief Medical Officer have said that reformulation and 
smaller portion sizes are key for reducing sugar intakes. This is at the centre of the 
government’s Childhood Obesity Plan, and Public Health England’s sugar reduction 
programme... The Soft Drinks Industry Levy encourages producers to: (i) reduce 
added sugar content in drinks; (ii) market low sugar alternatives, and (iii) reduce 
portion sizes for high sugar drinks. All responses will reduce levy liability... The primary 
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aim of the SDIL is to encourage producers to remove added sugar from soft drinks.” 
(emphasis added)98  
The revenues collected from the SDIL are earmarked for breakfast clubs and 
physical activity in schools. Specifically, revenue from the SDIL “will be used to: 
double the primary school PE and sport premium from £160 million per year to £320 
million per year... provide up to £285 million a year to give 25% of secondary schools 
increased opportunity to extend their school day to offer a wider range of activities 
for pupils, including more sport;” and “provide £10 million funding a year to expand 
breakfast clubs in up to 1,600 schools... to ensure more children have a nutritious 
breakfast as a healthy start to their school day.”99 
3 3 3 Adam Smith’s Canons of taxation 
There are a number of overlapping criteria for assessing taxes, which can be 
summarised in terms of Adam Smith’s canons for a good tax system: equality; 
certainty; convenience; and economy.100 Although it is difficult to satisfy each of 
these criteria, it is important for tax laws to strike an appropriate balance between 
these principles in order to be effective and sustainable. As is further discussed 
below, if these taxes are not sustainable, their impact on health outcomes is 
limited.101 For example, the SSB tax in Ecuador was challenged because it did not 
clearly define which products were subject to the tax, and was difficult to 
implement.102 In this regard, the certainty principle provides that the amount of tax 
payable, the time of payment and the manner of payment should be clear. In terms 
of the convenience principle, tax laws should be simple to understand, and should be 
charged in the most convenient manner for taxpayers.103  
In terms of the equality principle, taxpayers should contribute taxes according to 
their ability to pay, the tax burden should be distributed fairly and equitably, and the 
regressive impact of taxes should be minimised.104  In terms of this principle, there 
should be horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires that 
taxpayers with the same ability to pay should pay the same amount, and vertical 
equity requires that taxpayers with different abilities to pay should be taxed 
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differently.105 Overall, in line with redistribution goals, taxes should not cause a larger 
degree of inequality between lower and higher socio-economic groups.106 However, 
it is not necessary for each tax in a tax system to be progressive, because there is a 
broad range of political and economic factors that influence redistribution within the 
tax and benefit system.107  
The most important consideration when discussing the regressive impact of taxes 
on unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages is the extent to which consumers 
respond to these taxes. These taxes are probably regressive if consumption of the 
targeted products does not decrease, or if overall dietary quality does not improve.108 
In response to the argument that the regressive impact on poorer consumers will be 
offset by disproportionate long-term health improvements, HPL’s impact will be 
regressive unless positive consumption changes and long-term health improvements 
actually materialise.109 Further, in response to the argument that health 
improvements as a result of HPL will increase the available funding for other health 
issues, which will benefit lower socio-economic groups: HPL’s impact will still be 
regressive unless: the health improvements as a result of consumption changes 
materialise; and the government actually increases healthcare expenditure for these 
other health issues.110 
In order for a tax system to be respected, taxpayers should regard it as fair, and 
perceive the outcome of the tax to be legitimate. In this regard, it is important for 
there to be fairness in terms of equality, and also in terms of procedure and the 
legitimate expectations of the taxpayers.111 Tax laws need to be formulated in terms 
of the legal framework, and should be transparent and consistent, otherwise they 
might be challenged.112 For example, the 2002 Mexican sweetener tax was in 
                                            
105 Muller A Framework 37; Cnossen “Introduction” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 2; WHO 
Global Strategy para 41(2). The WHO provides that policymakers should consider any 
unintentional effects that food excise taxes might have on vulnerable groups. 
106 Cnossen “Introduction” in Excise Tax Policy and Administration 2. 
107 Muller A Framework 37-39. 
108 Knowledge@Wharton “Do ‘Sin Taxes’ Really Change Consumer Behaviour?” (10-02-2017) 
Wharton University of Pennsylvania <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/do-sin-taxes-
really-change-consumer-behavior/> (accessed 07-11-2018). 
109 Jeffery A Stealth Tax 1; RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 10. 
110 The earmarking of tax revenues is discussed further under heading “3 4 2 1 Earmarked taxes and 
public support” of this thesis below. 





conflict with the certainty principle.113 Although most taxes will not be regarded as 
fair from all perspectives, it is particularly important for legislators to be transparent 
about the objectives of a tax where there is potential for opposition. If there is 
insufficient transparency regarding the underlying rationale for a tax, it could lead to 
a lack of legitimacy, and increase the potential for lobbying and non-compliance.114  
Lastly, in terms of the economy principle, taxes should not discourage economic 
activity: the procedures for collecting taxes should be efficient; and administrative 
and compliance costs of taxes should be minimised.115 Taxes are simpler and more 
administratively efficient where the number of taxpayers is limited. The writers of the 
Policy Paper provide that administrative and compliance costs are minimised when 
the number of taxpayers is limited, and the Duty-At-Source (“DAS”) principle is 
applied.116 Further, where food excise taxes are imposed on the manufacturers, 
administrative costs are reduced, because these taxpayers are likely to already be 
registered for other tax purposes, such as VAT.117 In terms of the economy principle, 
taxes should also be neutral, and not unduly influence economic decisions.118 In 
addition to the certainty principle, the 2002 Mexican sweetener tax was also in 
conflict with the economy principle: because the prices of HFCS became relatively 
more expensive than cane sugar after the tax’s implementation, those Mexican SSB 
manufacturers using HFCS were influenced to change to locally-produced cane 
sugar.119 Where taxes do not have a neutral effect, they are usually also more 
complicated. A lack of neutrality and simplicity creates more opportunities for tax 
avoidance, which usually results in more complex anti-avoidance laws. Where tax 
laws need to be continually revised in this regard, there is an increase in 
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administrative and compliance costs. This ultimately results in direct losses to the 
revenue authorities, as well as losses to society.120  
When formulating tax laws, trade-offs will need to be made between these 
principles, but it is important for there to be strong justifications for these tradeoffs. 
For example, governments impose taxes on certain harmful products because they 
are not neutral about the negative health effects caused by these products. In this 
case, the policy objective is reprising, and departure from the neutrality principle may 
be justified.121 In the light of the argument that food excise taxes are not regressive 
because they result in disproportionate health improvements for lower socio-
economic groups for example: the progressive health outcomes will depend on the 
extent to which the tax leads to health improvements compared to the potentially 
negative impact on these other objectives. For example, a food excise tax on an 
extensive range of food products was considered in Romania in 2010. This tax was 
not implemented, because it was considered to be too regressive, and would only 
achieve slight changes in consumption and health; the trade-off between 
redistributive goals and consumption changes was not considered to be justifiable in 
this case. It has been cautioned that governments should carefully assess the equity 
effects of such fiscal policies, as many studies have found these taxes to be 
regressive.122 Where these taxes are implemented, it is important to incorporate a 
monitoring and evaluation framework so that the long-term impact on other 
objectives can be investigated.123 
3 4 Conflict between tax objectives 
3 4 1 Revenue generation or reprising objectives 
As provided by Hernández-Quevedo and Weatherly, most taxes on unhealthy 
foods pursue similar health outcomes, but there are a number of channels through 
which these outcomes are achieved: through increased prices to the consumer, and 
a corresponding decrease in demand and consumption; through the incentive to 
manufacturers to minimise their tax liability and reformulate their products in line with 
                                            
120 Mirrlees et al Tax by Design 42. 
121 43. 
122 Holt (2011) Lancet 755. This tax in Romania would have targeted soft drinks, snacks, 
confectionery and fast food products. Among others, this planned tax faced strong opposition from 
the Food Industry Federation, which estimated that it would result in 36 000 job losses. 




the consumption changes pursued by policymakers; through revenue generation and 
increased spending on certain health initiatives; and through the signalling effect to 
consumers and manufacturers.124 The objectives of health promotion and revenue 
generation are not necessarily in conflict with each other. More specifically, however, 
the following objectives might be in conflict with each other: increased revenue as a 
result of long-term health improvements and increased expenditure on other health 
concerns; and increased revenue in the short term to fund health projects. 
Certain authors argue that the amount by which a food excise tax increases the 
prices of the targeted products is indicative of whether its objective is predominantly 
reprising or revenue generation.125 While any price increase might decrease demand 
and incentivise product reformulation, significant changes are only observed when 
prices are increased by a considerable amount. In this way, the objectives of 
revenue generation and health promotion might be in conflict with each other.126 
Because of this conflict, it is important for policymakers to clearly identify the tax’s 
objective and formulate the tax’s provisions accordingly.127 Lower tax rates usually 
enhance the predictability of the tax revenue to be collected, because they result in a 
smaller change in consumption patterns.128 Where the tax is specifically formulated 
to influence consumption and consumption is effectively deterred however, the 
revenue collected should rather be used for short-term projects that rely on once-off 
funding, instead of on-going health projects that will rely on inconsistent revenues. In 
addition to enhancing their effectiveness, clearly formulating these taxes in terms of 
reprising or revenue generation will increase the strength of the signalling effect and 
public support.129 
3 4 2 Use of tax revenue 
3 4 2 1 Earmarked taxes and public support 
The OECD follows a similar definition of “tax” to the one provided in Shuttleworth, 
where the Constitutional Court provided that it is characteristic of a tax that the 
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taxpayers do not receive any particular service in return for payment.130  Despite 
this, a number of jurisdictions have hypothecated or “earmarked” certain tax 
revenues for specific purposes.131 Public and political opposition to a tax reform 
could potentially be reduced if the relevant taxes are earmarked, in terms of which 
the collected revenue is dedicated to a specific fund or expenditure purpose.132 In 
this way, the earmarking of revenues from a tax reform could improve the 
sustainability of tax reforms.133 Backholer et al provide that: 
“In order to improve the design and evaluation of SSB taxation policies... mechanisms 
should be developed for earmarking of revenue to additional population prevention 
health related strategies. This is likely to garner greater public support and result in 
greater population health benefits. Earmarking of revenue may be achieved through 
the direction of revenue to a newly generated health fund or through the allocation of 
revenue to a general budget, with a corresponding commitment to increase 
governmental spending on health-related activities. Although the allocation of revenue 
to a separate fund is more likely to result in funds being spent on population prevention 
interventions, this may not be administratively possible for some countries.”134 
The primary health objective of food excise taxes could be enhanced where the 
collected revenue is dedicated to some related health project or initiative targeting 
obesity and NCDs.135 For example, the tax revenue collected from the PHPT in 
Hungary has been used to increase the wages of health sector workers.136 Further, 
the revenue generated from the SDIL is “invested in giving school-aged children a 
brighter and healthier future, including programmes to encourage physical activity 
and balanced diets.”137 There is also provision for the revenue collected from the 
Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico to be allocated to programmes aimed at: addressing 
overweight, obesity, malnutrition and chronic degenerate diseases; increasing 
access to drinking water services; and providing public school buildings with drinking 
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fountains and a continuous supply of drinking water.138 However, this revenue 
accrues to the general budget, and there is little evidence that any of it is used for 
these health programmes.139  
Earmarking could also be used to direct funds back to lower socio-economic 
consumers in order to mitigate the regressive impact of the tax, through: subsidizing 
healthy foods; providing cash rebates; or funding projects that provide 
disproportionate benefits to lower socio-economic groups that bear a large portion of 
the economic burden of the tax.140 Due to the potentially regressive effects and 
negative impact on the sugar industries and employment, it has been argued that at 
least a portion of the revenue collected from the HPL should be earmarked in order 
to mitigate these effects.141 However, the Final Response Document provides that 
the revenue collected from all taxes accrues to the National Revenue Fund (“NRF”), 
and that the designation of HPL revenue for health promotion would place undue 
constraint on the budgeting process: 
“All tax revenues accrue to the National Revenue Fund for general government 
expenditure, as per determined priorities, however there is a commitment for 
budgetary support for health promotion programmes identified by the NDOH. The 
legislative earmarking of revenue is not supported as it will introduce rigidities in the 
budgeting process. SA government has committed to increasing investments in health 
promotion targeting NCDs and has published this commitment in Treasury documents 
and international WHO publications.”142 
It could be argued that this response is not satisfactory. However, it is not an 
unreasonable response, because it is more complicated for the government to 
budget where tax revenues are earmarked. These increased complexities could 
ultimately be detrimental to the government’s ability to pursue other objectives, such 
as the equitable distribution of resources.143 In the context of environmental taxes, 
the RSA National Treasury provided that: 
“Generally speaking, there are no clear-cut criteria to dictate when revenue 
hypothecation is appropriate or not. As a rule, the full earmarking of selected tax 
revenues is not a preferred option due to the constraints placed on the budget process 
and the rigidities that tend to follow from earmarking lead to the inappropriate 
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allocation of resources. Earmarking practices may also limit the extent to which 
environmentally-related tax revenues can be used as part of a possible tax shifting 
exercise. Requests for earmarking will, therefore, have to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis, with on budget funding through the normal budgetary process being the 
first best option. As a second best alternative, the partial or soft earmarking of tax 
revenues could be considered in that revenues will have to flow via the fiscus with the 
procision that special consideration be given to fund certain activities but with no fixed 
commitment to allocate all the revenues from a specific source to such activities.”144 
The RSA National Treasury is therefore not generally in favour of strict earmarking 
policy. However, while governments should ideally be able to make political 
decisions independently from expenditure decisions, the popularity of these taxes 
could still be greatly improved where the expenditure is directly connected to the 
purpose of the tax.145 Taxpayers are less likely to support a tax where they do not 
benefit from the revenue collected.146 Particularly where public confidence is limited, 
it might be favourable to earmark the revenue from taxes on unhealthy foods and 
beverages.147 Even though the revenue would otherwise accrue to the particular 
jurisdiction’s general revenue fund, and a portion would be used for the relevant 
objective, the earmarking of the revenue could increase the transparency of the tax 
reform.148  
Another issue with earmarked taxes in this regard is: where food excise taxes 
effectively reduce consumption by a considerable amount, the revenues collected 
are unpredictable. Where a certain health project is funded by this type of unstable 
earmarked revenue, it is much more difficult to plan, and less efficient at achieving its 
health promotion objectives.149 In order to offset the unpredictable nature of these 
revenues, some argue that earmarking should be accompanied by a commitment by 
the relevant government to maintain the increase in expenditure on the particular 
cause. Some argue that the use of partial earmarking might mitigate some of the 
disadvantages associated with full earmarking. In terms of partial earmarking, there 
is an association between a tax reform and an overall increase in government 
expenditure on a particular programme, but there is no strict assignment of these 
funds, and the government’s flexibility is not constrained.150  
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3 4 2 2 Lobbying in the United States of America 
The direct costs of obesity and obesity-related NCDs are significant in the USA, 
where it has been estimated that annual medical expenditures could be reduced by 
between 7% and 11% if obesity were eliminated.151 As discussed above, in order to 
improve diets and health, a number of interventions have been used at various levels 
of government in the USA.152  Because these health interventions threaten 
commercial interests, the food and beverage industry allocates substantial resources 
to influence these policies.153 For example, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and the American 
Business Association alone spent around $114,2 million on lobbying in the USA 
during the period 2009 to 2015.154 In addition to other efforts, pre-emption laws have 
been used by lobbyists to prevent the implementation of certain nutrition-based 
regulations. For example, pre-emptive laws were enacted in 26 states during the 
period 2003 to 2013, in terms of which governments cannot litigate on claims that 
diets cause obesity and obesity-related NCDs, or make laws where litigation is 
provided as a remedy in such a case. Further, during the period 2008 to 2018, 
twelve states enacted pre-emptive laws on nutritional labels, portion size regulations, 
taxes, marketing and the sale and distribution of food and non-alcoholic beverages. 
For example, local governments within the state of Ohio are pre-empted form 
regulating consumer incentive items and the provision of nutritional information at 
restaurants.155 
A federal SSB tax was proposed in the 1980s, in order to raise revenue, and not 
to promote health objectives. However, lobbying efforts by the SSB industry lead to 
the dismissal of this tax.156 Under the Obama Administration in 2010, a federal SSB 
tax was again considered. However, there were lobbying efforts by a coalition of 
SSB industry members, SSB suppliers and SSB mass-marketers. Due to these 
efforts, the Senate Finance Committee only considered the proposal briefly before 
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discarding it.157 The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Dietary 
Guidelines Advisory Committee has provided that unhealthy foods and drinks should 
be taxed, and that these revenues should be earmarked for obesity prevention and 
nutrition education programmes. In March 2015, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro 
introduced a bill providing for a federal $0,01 per fluid ounce SSB tax on drinks 
containing caloric sweeteners. However, nothing has materialised of this proposed 
legislation.158 Min provides that, although “state legislatures have often introduced 
soda tax policies, these policies have either been repealed or have not been 
implemented, mainly due to fierce resistance by lobbyists.”159 
Although the use of earmarked taxes does not necessarily increase the level of 
expenditure on the relevant cause or project, earmarking has been described as “the 
most successful way to frame an SSB tax in order to gain more public and political 
support.”160 In New York, for example: 
“A 2008 poll of New York State residents found that 52% support a soda tax, rising 
to72% when the revenue would be dedicated to programs to prevent obesity in 
children and adults. How the issue is framed is essential, with highest support when 
the tax is introduced in the context of promoting health and the revenues earmarked 
for child nutrition or obesity prevention programs.”161 
After a number of SSB and soft drinks tax proposals were rejected or abandoned 
at federal, state and local levels, the City of Berkeley in Alameda County, California 
(“Berkeley”) became the first local jurisdiction in the USA to pass a tax on SSBs.162 
Despite the $2,45 million spent on industry lobbying efforts in Berkeley between 
January 2014 and January 2015, the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Product Tax 
(“SSBPT”) was passed in November 2014, and became effective in January 2015.163 
The objective of the SSBPT is the reduction of the external costs of diseases that are 
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related to SSBs consumption. Although the revenue generated by the SSBPT 
accrues to the City of Berkeley’s general revenue fund, the Berkeley City Council 
receives recommendations from a Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Product Panel of 
Experts (“the SSBPT Panel”), that makes “recommendations on how and to what 
extent the City should establish and/or fund programs to reduce the consumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages in Berkeley and to address the effects of such 
consumption.”164 SSBPT has generated around $1,2 million per year, and the 
SSBPT Panel has advised that $4,15 million to be allocated to health programmes 
aimed at reducing SSB consumption. Accordingly, over $2,16 million has been spent 
on school-based prevention measures, and over $1,7 million has been spent on 
diabetes prevention, health and nutrition education, and training for youth leadership 
in community organisations.165  
In addition to this use of SSBPT revenue, the ability of the SSBPT to withstand 
industry opposition has largely been attributed to widespread information and 
education campaigns leading up to the proposal.166 Similarly, although described as 
an “earmarked” tax, the revenue generated from the PBT accrues to the General 
Fund, and there is a commitment to use it for its dedicated purposes.167 Mayor 
Kenney has stated that the PBT was successfully implemented because it was 
framed as a revenue-raising tax, and was used to fund health and education 
programmes. He believes that transparency was an important aspect of the 
sustainability of the tax.168 Lockwood agrees that the association between the SSB 
tax and the spending programmes was an important factor in the sustainability of the 
tax, because a number of proposed SSB taxes in the USA had failed, which were not 
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linked to any specific spending programme. However, it has been argued that 
income taxes are a more efficient source of revenue for these programmes.169  
3 4 3 Minimum price change to influence consumption 
Where food excise taxes are charged against the manufacturer, there are 
increased costs of production: from the tax itself; and from increased administrative 
costs, including tax registration and accounting, etc. Food excise taxes primarily 
aimed at reducing consumption require that the tax is either: charged on the 
manufacturers, who increase the prices for consumers; or charged on the 
consumers themselves.170 There are limited cases where these taxes are levied 
against the consumers themselves, and the following discussion only considers the 
implications for taxes levied against manufacturers. Where taxes on unhealthy food 
and beverage products are levied against the manufacturers of these products, it is 
usually expected that: manufacturers will pass through this tax burden to consumers 
in the form of increased prices; and that consumers’ demand for these products will 
thereby decrease, which will lead to dietary improvements in line with the relevant 
health objectives.171  
A number of States and local jurisdictions in the USA apply higher-than-standard 
sales tax rates for soft drinks, or exclude these drinks form sales tax exemptions. For 
example, soft drinks are excluded from the food and non-alcoholic beverages 
exemption in terms of the 6% sales tax in Pennsylvania.172 The average effective tax 
rate on these beverages across all states is lower than this 6%, and although 
Fletcher et al provide that these do influence consumption, their impact on weight is 
relatively small.173 While most authors agree that a minimum level of price increase 
is needed in order to significantly deter consumption, certain authors believe that this 
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level is 20%, and others argue that it could be lower than this.174 The WHO refers to 
a systematic review by Powell et al as evidence showing “that a tax on sugary drinks 
that raises prices by 20% can lead to a reduction in consumption of around 20%, 
thus preventing obesity and diabetes.”175 
Duffey et al provide that an 18% price increase for SSBs would lead to 
“significant” reductions in Body Mass Index (“BMI”) and the risks for obesity-related 
NCDs.176 In support of the 20% rule: Bodker et al provide that more significant 
decreases in purchases are observed for products that have larger price 
increases;177 and Biro estimated that a 29% increase in average prices of food 
products subject to the PHPT in Hungary was necessary to achieve significant 
consumption changes.178 In a systematic review, Wright et al examined 22 studies 
on food excise taxes, and specifically considered this 20% rule.179 Of the studies 
considered: positive health impacts were identified for all studies where food excise 
taxes increased the prices of the targeted products by at least 20%; only half of the 
studies on food excise taxes that increased the prices by less than 20% identified 
positive health impacts; and the other half of these studies on food excise taxes that 
increased the prices by less than 20% identified negligible or negative health 
impacts. It could therefore be argued that, although a number of studies indicate that 
a food excise tax that increases the prices of the targeted foods by less than 20% 
could produce health benefits, the evidence in favour of the 20% rule appears to be 
stronger.180  
One exception to the 20% rule appears to be the Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico, 
which increased the prices of the targeted products by around 10%.181 In response 
to a comment that the rate of HPL should be increased so that prices increase 
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sufficiently to induce a “meaningful impact,” the Final Response Document provided 
that: 
“The studies do not show that the impact will only be realised with a tax rate above 20 
per cent. Given the price elasticities of the products, the proposed tax rate will still 
increase prices and create an incentive for product reformulation and reduce the 
consumption of sugary beverages and promote better health outcomes. However, 
there will be less of an impact than if the effective tax rate was set at 20 per cent. 
Mexico introduced a tax of soft drinks in 2014 of 1 peso per litre (i.e. around 10 per 
cent) and the consumption of sugary beverages did decrease.” (emphasis added)182 
This comparison to Mexico is further discussed below.183 However, price is not the 
only consideration for consumption decisions, and consumers and manufacturers 
could respond to the tax in a number of ways that might undermine the health 
objective, regardless of the anticipated price increases.  Stacey et al (2019) provide 
that the “ultimate reductions in disease risk... are determined by how market actors 
respond to the incentive structure that these policies impose,” and Thiele and 
Roosen provide that the “most important question regarding the consumer is, how 
their health will be affected by the tax; but this remains largely unclear.”184 It is 
therefore important for policymakers to consider: how both consumers’ and 
manufacturers’ behaviour could influence the tax’s effectiveness, specifically in the 
light of the health and consumption context of the relevant jurisdiction; and how 
various aspects of formulation could influence these responses.  
There are a broad range of factors in the complex consumer food environment 
that influence how food excise taxes influence health outcomes.185 According to the 
South African National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (“SANHANES”), for 
example, the majority of grocery shopping done in South Africa in 2012 was by 
females, and of these females who participated in the survey: 64,5% considered the 
price of the food item; 17,5% considered the taste of the food item; 14,3% 
considered the health effects of the food item; 14,1% considered the nutritional 
content of the food item; 14,1% considered how well or for how long the food item 
keeps; 9,6% considered the safety of the food item in terms of hygiene; 9,6% 
considered convenience; and 7,1% considered how easy it is to prepare the food 
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item.186 These considerations are different for different ages and different socio-
economic groups. Although price was the predominant consideration in terms of the 
SANHANES survey, non-market-based interventions aimed at influencing the 
acceptability and availability of certain foods are also necessary to meaningfully 
improve the consumer food environment. 
3 5 Channels for reprising objective 
3 5 1 Consumer behaviour 
3 5 1 1 Price elasticity and cross-price elasticity of demand 
Consumption changes in response to increased prices depend on the price 
elasticity of demand, which is defined as a “measure of the responsiveness of the 
quantity demanded of a good to a change in its price when all other influences on 
buying plans remain the same.”187 It is generally accepted that the demand for food 
is relatively inelastic: the change in the demand is proportionally smaller than the 
change in price.188 Therefore, to some extent, a food excise tax that increases prices 
for consumers will result in some level of reduced consumption of the targeted foods. 
However, it is unclear whether this outcome will necessarily have a positive impact 
on overall dietary quality, because there is a broad range of factors that influence 
substitution patterns and overall dietary quality. 
In addition to the price elasticity of demand for the targeted food products, the 
cross-price elasticity of demand for substitute products is an important consideration. 
Cross-price elasticity of demand is defined as a “measure of the responsiveness of 
the demand for a good to a change in the price of a substitute... other things 
remaining the same.”189 The higher the price elasticity of demand is for the targeted 
products, the more likely consumers are to purchase untaxed substitute products in 
their place. In this context, it is important to consider whether increased consumption 
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of substitute products reinforces or undermines the health objective.190 In line with 
the health objective, consumers might increase their consumption of untaxed, 
healthier substitute foods in place of the targeted unhealthy foods. However, it is also 
possible that consumers replace the targeted foods with other untaxed or cheaper 
unhealthy substitutes. For example, some consumers might drink SSBs because 
they enjoy the taste of soft drinks, and others might consume SSBs because they 
enjoy the taste of sugar; consumers who enjoy the taste of soft drinks would be more 
likely to substitute SSBs for artificially-sweetened beverages (“ASBs”), and 
consumers who enjoy the taste of sugar might choose to substitute SSBs for other 
sugary food products.191  
If only certain SSBs are subject to the tax, then consumers might substitute these 
SSBs with untaxed SSBs. Further, food excise taxes that target only one nutrient 
may lead to substitution towards untaxed food products that contain other harmful 
nutrients. For example, an SSB tax could lead to substitution towards chocolate and 
confectionery products, which could increase the consumption of saturated fat. Even 
if such a substitution results in decreased sugar consumption, the increase in 
consumption of saturated fat could offset any improvements to diet quality and 
energy intake. Therefore, the sizes and patterns of cross-price elasticities of demand 
across other food products will also affect the tax’s effectiveness in decreasing the 
consumption of the targeted nutrient.192  
3 5 1 2 Need for subsidies and other non-market-based interventions 
When used as the only policy intervention, certain research indicates that market-
based interventions may not be very effective at improving overall nutritional 
intake.193 Because taxes have the effect of decreasing the real income of 
consumers, purchasing power is reduced. Depending on the elasticities and cross-
price elasticities of demand for the targeted products and their substitutes, 
consumers might spend: a larger portion of their income on the taxed products; and 
less on healthier foods, because they have less available income. Conversely: Thow 
et al found that while subsidies do lead to an increase in consumption of the targeted 
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healthy foods, they usually also lead to an increase in consumption of unhealthy 
foods, because consumers have more income available to spend on these foods;194 
and Cobiac et al found that a subsidy on fruits and vegetables would likely lead to an 
increase in sodium intake and total energy intake.195 However, this study also found 
that, in the absence of a subsidy on fruits and vegetables, the use of excise taxes on 
certain nutrients, junk food and SSBs would lead to a decrease in the consumption 
of fruits and vegetables.196 
Research suggests that the cost-per-calorie for EDNPs is lower than that of 
healthier foods. Where there is a lack of information and education on nutrition and a 
lack of resources, poorer consumers choose foods to meet their basic energy needs 
instead of choosing healthier foods.197 Where taxes on EDNPs are introduced, 
poorer consumers may allocate an even smaller proportion of their income to 
healthier foods, because the EDNPs have become more expensive. In the case of 
SSBs taxes, these consumers might not substitute sugary drinks for ASBs, as these 
would not meet their energy requirements.198 Where there is a lack of nutrition 
education, EDNPs are cheaper per-calorie than healthy foods, and poorer 
consumers’ demand is relatively inelastic for these foods, then a food excise tax that 
increases the prices of these foods is likely regressive, and might reinforce existing 
health inequalities.199 Therefore, while a tax might discourage consumption through 
increased prices, it is important to: implement some non-market-based education or 
information measure relevant to the consumption of unhealthy foods targeted by the 
tax; and consider introducing a subsidy on healthier foods, depending on the 
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consumption patterns in the relevant jurisdiction.200 These complementary measures 
could both minimise the regressive impact of food excise taxes for poorer 
consumers, as well as reinforce the health objective. 
3 5 1 3 Soda Tax in Denmark and other factors that influence demand 
Since the Soda Tax was first implemented, the rates have fluctuated, and the list 
of taxable products has changed. Before 1984 for example, the Soda Tax was levied 
at the rate of 0,8 Danish Kroner (“DKK”) per litre, and after 1984 this rate almost 
doubled, to DKK 1,58 per litre.201 Although there is no research on the impact that 
the Soda Tax might have had on health or obesity objectives, both before and after 
the differentiated rates were applied, it still provides useful lessons on: how different 
rates and scopes of taxable products could influence health objectives and revenue 
objectives; the potentially negative impact on redistribution and economic growth 
objectives; and how factors other than price can influence demand. For example, the 
sale of soda products doubled during the period 1976 to 1999, and the tax rate 
increase in 1984 had a limited impact on the sales of soda products. It has been 
suggested that this might have been influenced by the fact that it became more 
fashionable during this time to drink branded soda products, such as Coca-Cola.202  
From data collected during 1999 to 2013, the Ecorys Report observed that the 
demand for cola decreased after prices increased, and increased after tax 
reductions.203 However, this study noted that there was volatility in the market for 
soda, and that not all of the demand changes were attributable to the tax changes. 
For example, between 2005 and 2006, there were no tax changes, but the demand 
for low-calorie soda increased significantly.204 After the differentiated rates were 
applied for soda products, there was a slight increase in consumption of low-calorie 
cola, but these changes should be viewed in the light of the existing trend of 
increasing low-calorie cola consumption.205 As discussed below, cross-border trade 
is another important consideration, particularly within the European Union (“EU”) and 
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the USA.206 Consumers could also respond to tax-induced price increases by 
engaging in cross-border trade, which undermines the health objective. 
3 5 2 Food industry response 
3 5 2 1 Manufacturer and retailer behaviour 
In order to offset the increased costs of production, manufacturers could respond 
in a number of other ways.207 For example, manufacturers could reformulate their 
products to limit their tax liability, or distribute the increased costs across other, un-
taxed products. This could ultimately defeat any health objective, particularly if the 
price increase is distributed over healthy foods.208 Manufacturers could also respond 
to the increased costs by: introducing new products, which may or may not be 
healthier than the targeted products; adopting more aggressive marketing strategies 
to counteract a decrease in demand for SSBs; and lobbying against the tax. 
Particularly for the beverage industry, there is incentive to resist SSB taxes through 
marketing.209 Increased marketing and lobbying efforts undermine the health 
objectives pursued by the tax, because: marketing has been shown to increase 
sales, so consumption of the targeted products might not decrease as anticipated; 
and it is possible for taxes to be repealed as a result of successful lobbying efforts. 
For example, although SSB taxes were passed in three additional cities in California 
after the successful implementation of the SSBPT in Berkeley, lobbying efforts have 
resulted in new pre-emption laws in California. In terms of these laws, no additional 
local governments may enact similar taxes until 2030.210 According to an article in 
The New York Times: 
“Beverage companies spent at least $7 million to get an initiative on the ballot this 
November that would have prevented local communities from raising taxes without 
approval from two-thirds of voters or an elected body, rather than a simple majority. 
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Such a change would have made it much more difficult for localities to pay for policy, 
fire transit and other public services. According to several state senators, the industry 
then went to lawmakers in Sacramento with a proposal: Pass a bill banning soda and 
food taxes, and the industry would drop its November ballot initiative... Several top 
lawmakers said they opposed the measure banning soft drink taxes... but many felt 
obliged to support it because they were so worried about the effects of the broader 
ballot initiative.”211  
Similar pre-emption laws have also been passed in Arizona and Michigan.212 In 
addition to pre-emption laws, the food and beverage industry has employed the 
following tactics to undermine health policy efforts: funding scientific research in 
order to influence nutrition policy;213 public messaging in order to highlight certain 
aspects of healthy lifestyles, while simultaneously promoting their products as a 
component of a “balanced lifestyle;” and funding the financing of “grassroots” 
opposition, in order to create a broader opposition base.214  
3 5 2 2 Tax pass-through 
Where manufacturers increase their prices, they might do so to a lesser extent 
than the increased costs of production; only where markets are perfectly competitive 
and there is perfectly inelastic demand, will a 1% tax result in a 1% increase in retail 
price. Because the demand for SSBs is elastic, retailers or distributors may choose 
to absorb the increase in costs or distribute the increased costs across other, 
untaxed products. Where this occurs, the tax is “under-shifted” and prices increase 
by less than expected.215 Similarly, manufacturers could also undermine the 
governments’ health objectives where subsidies or reduced VAT rates are 
introduced for healthy foods. This issue was discussed when it was considered 
whether reduced VAT rates should be introduced for healthy foods in Denmark in 
2008. It was noted that it was possible for retailers to not fully pass on the reduced 
prices to consumers, but instead collect larger profits. This would also result in 
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diluted dietary improvements, and the government would lose revenue 
unnecessarily.216  
In the case of SSBs taxes, studies have shown that the pass-through rate ranges 
between 63% to over 300%, depending on the brands, beverage types and retailers. 
Particularly in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, taxes might be over-shifted by 
the retailers or distributors to the consumers. Studies have shown that taxes have 
been over-shifted in the case of excise taxes on alcohol, cigarettes and saturated 
fat.217 According to the Ecorys Report, the “underlying assumption” for the channel of 
consumption changes in response to the tax “is that these changes in producer 
prices are fully passed through to consumer prices... under-shifting... is not 
desirable, while over-shifting... could be welcomed from this logic.”218 As a result of 
the SSBPT in Berkeley, producers and retailers absorbed a portion of this tax, with 
the effect that less than half of this tax was passed through to consumers. Where 
producers and retailers absorb a large portion of the tax, this will dilute the tax’s 
impact on consumption and thereby limit its effectiveness in achieving the health 
objectives.219  
It is unclear to what extent the tax will be passed through to consumer prices, but 
research indicates that the pass-through rate is higher when the industry is supplied 
with more information on the tax before implementation.220 The Ecorys Report 
observed that the prices of the targeted products increased by more than the tax rate 
in Denmark, Hungary, Finland and France, with the exception of energy drinks and 
salty snacks in Hungary.221 The decision to pass the tax burden on to consumers will 
depend on a number of market considerations, such as market competition and the 
demand for the relevant food product.222 According to the Ecorys Report: 
“The dominant factors in shaping the responses of manufacturers and retailers are the 
existing margins within the product market in question, the design of the tax and the 
direction of the tax change, the market share and thus bargaining power of individual 
retailers and producers, and the availability of substitute products.”223 
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3 5 2 3 Product reformulation 
Manufacturers may respond to food excise taxes by reformulating their products 
to either avoid the tax or minimise their liability.224 The decision to reformulate 
products depends on two main factors: the tax design; and the nature of the targeted 
product.225 Further, the nature of certain products is such that reformulation is almost 
impossible. For example, if a tax based on the saturated fat content in certain dairy 
products and meats is imposed on food manufacturers, reformulation may not be 
possible or feasible for meats, given the nature of this food. For certain dairy 
products, however, it might be possible to reformulate these products so that the 
saturated fat content is below the threshold.226 This would be a desirable outcome 
from a health perspective, because the overall consumption of saturated fat from 
these dairy products could decrease. Although product reformulation increases 
production costs, these costs could be once-off depending on the nature of the 
product and the tax design.227  
The incentive to reformulate food products might have unintended, undesirable 
effects on other unhealthy nutrients and additives that are not targeted by the tax.228 
To illustrate this possibility with the saturated fat example, the food manufacturers 
might alter their products’ recipes to compensate for the loss of flavour that the 
saturated fat provided. For example, these products could be reformulated to contain 
less fibre and unsaturated fat, or to contain more sugar and sodium.229 This could 
potentially lead to an increase, rather than a decrease in the prevalence of obesity 
and NCDs.230 In the case of SSBs taxes, SSBs manufacturers might replace the 
sugar with artificial sweeteners. There is currently much conflicting research and 
relatively little conclusive evidence on whether artificial sweeteners are in fact 
healthier alternatives to sugar. Although food standards authorities generally agree 
that moderate amounts of aspartame, acesulfame-K, neotame, saccharin, sucralose 
and stevia are safe for human consumption, there are a number of other artificial 
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sweeteners that are treated differently in different jurisdictions.231 For example, 
sodium cyclamate is listed as a permissible sweetener in South Africa, but was 
banned in the USA and the UK after a study found that this substance increased the 
incidence of bladder tumours in rats.232  
If these sweeteners do contribute to adverse health effects in the long term, then 
although this type of SSB reformulation might decrease energy intake, it could be 
argued that it is in conflict with broader health objectives. South Africa’s Food-Based 
Dietary Guidelines (“FBDGs”) make almost no reference to artificial sweeteners, but 
in the information provided for the “Rethink your drink – choose water!” campaign, 
the NDOH provided that: “artificially sweetened drinks... are a better short-term 
choice than sugary drinks;” but “this does not mean... artificially sweetened drinks 
are healthy, as they still taste very sweet and cravings for sweet goods can 
continue;” and therefore, ASBs “should not be part of a long-term healthy eating 
plan.” While it is acknowledged that ASBs might be a good substitute for regular 
SSBs consumers, the NDOH provides that the consumption of ASBs should be used 
as a “step to cutting down” SSBs consumption.233 
3 6 Conclusion 
There are a number of channels through which taxes on certain unhealthy foods 
could lead to improved health outcomes: by reducing demand and thus consumption 
through increased prices; by incentivising manufacturers to reformulate unhealthy 
products to minimize the increased costs of production or avoid tax liability; through 
the funding of other health prevention initiatives with the revenues collected from the 
tax; and in terms of the signalling effect to consumers and manufacturers about the 
negative health consequences of certain foods or nutrients.234 The Policy Paper 
provides that the HPL will assist in both: reducing negative health consequences to 
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individuals by encouraging reduced sugar consumption; and correcting a market 
failure, by reducing the external costs from increased public healthcare 
expenditure.235 The Final Response Document provides that the price increases as a 
result of the HPL will “promote better health outcomes” by creating “an incentive for 
product reformulation” and reducing “the consumption of sugary beverages.”236 
Further, the Policy Paper provides that the HPL will also serve an important price-
signalling function, which will assist consumers in making more informed decisions 
regarding the harm of excessive sugar consumption from SSBs.237  
Similarly to the health-promotion channels described for the HPL, the relevant 
food taxes and tax changes implemented in Denmark, Hungary and Mexico also 
sought to improve health through discouraging consumption and encouraging 
product reformulation.238 However, more attention was given to the revenue-
generating potential of these taxes in these other jurisdictions, and: although the 
additional revenue that could be generated from the HPL was discussed, this aspect 
was not emphasized; and the HPL was specifically framed in terms of health 
promotion.239 While health promotion has typically been pursued through the 
reduced consumption channel, the recently-implemented SDIL in the UK specifically 
aims to encourage product reformulation instead of increased prices.240 In contrast 
to these other taxes, the PBT in Philadelphia was specifically framed in terms of 
revenue generation, and not health promotion; this tax was not even framed in terms 
of revenue generation for purposes of funding health promotion, but rather for 
developing community amenities and funding a universal pre-K education system in 
Philadelphia.241  
In general, revenue generation is the most important objective of taxation, but 
taxes can also be used to pursue other socio-economic and political objectives, 
including: economic growth; reprising; and the redistribution of resources.242 In this 
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context, the reprising objective encompasses both the channels of discouraging 
consumption and encouraging reformulation, as well as the signalling channel. 
Where food taxes are introduced in order to generate revenue for health 
programmes, the objectives of revenue generation and reprising are not necessarily 
in conflict with each other. However, there could be a conflict between the channels 
for improving health outcomes: where these taxes aim to generate revenue to fund 
immediate health projects; and where these taxes aim to increase the available 
revenue for other health concerns over the long term, as a result of long-term dietary 
and health improvements. 
Taxes in general are evaluated in terms of Adam Smith’s canons for a good tax 
system: equality; certainty; convenience; and economy.243 Although it is difficult to 
satisfy each of these criteria, it is important for tax laws to strike an appropriate 
balance between these principles in order to be effective and sustainable. Where 
these taxes are not sustainable, their ability to pursue their objectives is limited. 
Mayor Kenney has stated that the PBT was successfully implemented because it 
was framed as a revenue-raising tax, and that this transparency was an important 
aspect of the tax’s sustainability.244 The earmarking of revenues from a tax reform 
could strengthen the public’s support for tax increases, and thereby increase their 
sustainability.245 Earmarking could also be used to direct funds back to lower socio-
economic consumers in order to mitigate the regressive impact of the tax, through: 
subsidizing healthy foods; providing cash rebates; or funding projects that provide 
disproportionate benefits to lower socio-economic groups that bear a large portion of 
the economic burden of the tax.246 However, where the effect of these taxes is that 
consumption is successfully reduced or products are significantly reformulated, the 
revenue collected will decrease: low tax rates are important where the policy 
objective is revenue generation, because this results in minimal price increases and 
a stable stream of revenue. It may therefore important for policymakers to clearly 
identify the tax’s objective and the relevant channel, and formulate its provisions 
accordingly. Where reprising is the objective of these taxes, the earmarking of these 
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revenues are not recommended for on-going projects, but could be used for once-off 
projects.247 
Most authors agree that food taxes formulated in terms of the reprising objectives 
need to increase prices by a minimum amount. Although a number of studies 
indicate that taxes that increase prices by less than 20% could produce health 
benefits, the evidence in favour of the 20% rule appears to be stronger, and the 
WHO itself refers to a study that provides that “a tax on sugary drinks that raises 
prices by 20% can lead to a reduction in consumption of around 20%, thus 
preventing obesity and diabetes.”248 However, price is not the only consideration for 
consumption decisions, and it is important for policymakers to consider: how both 
consumers’ and manufacturers’ behaviour could influence the tax’s effectiveness, 
specifically in the light of the health and consumption context of the relevant 
jurisdiction; and how various aspects of formulation could influence these responses. 
Among other factors, consumption changes and the overall impact on dietary quality 
depend on the price elasticity of demand for the targeted products, and the cross-
price elasticity of demand for substitute products. 249 It is possible for increased 
prices to change consumption: in line with the health objective, where consumption 
of unhealthy nutrients and ingredients is reduced, and consumers substitute 
healthier foods; or against the health objective, where consumers substitute the 
targeted food products with similarly unhealthy ones, or reduce their consumption of 
healthier foods. In this regard, non-market-based interventions aimed at educating 
and informing consumers about health and nutrition could reinforce the health impact 
and minimise undesirable responses. 
Further, where these taxes are levied against the manufacturers of the relevant 
products, these manufacturers could respond in a number of other ways in order to 
offset the increased costs of production, including: through reformulating their 
products to limit their tax liability; by distributing the increased costs across other, un-
taxed products; by introducing new products; by adopting more aggressive 
marketing strategies; and by lobbying against the tax.250 The decision for 
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manufacturers to pass the tax burden on to consumers depends on a number of 
market considerations, such as: market share and competition; the existing profit 
“margins within the product market in question;” the demand for the targeted 
products and the demand for available substitute products; and “the design of the tax 
and direction of the tax change.”251 Manufacturers could also respond to these taxes 
by reformulating their products to either avoid the tax or minimise their liability.252 
This decision to reformulate will depend on the tax design and the nature of the 
targeted product.253 Further, while consumption of the targeted nutrients is a 
possible outcome, product reformulation will not necessarily be in line with the health 
objective, because manufacturers could increase their products’ content of other 
harmful nutrients and ingredients.254 
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CHAPTER 4: FORMULATION OF MARKET-BASED INTERVENTIONS 
4 1 Introduction 
In the light of the considerations highlighted in Chapter 3, this chapter discusses 
the relevant aspects of formulation that could influence how these taxes translate to 
dietary improvements and health outcomes. In addition to discussing the formulation 
of the Health Promotion Levy (“HPL”) and the sugar-sweetened beverage (“SSB”) 
taxes in the selected comparative jurisdictions, a number of other types of market-
based interventions are discussed in order to compare and contrast the relevant 
aspects of formulation. The advantages and disadvantages of both specific taxes 
and general taxes on goods and services are discussed, and the legal implications of 
other market-based interventions are explained with reference to experiences in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom (“UK”) and the United States of America (“USA”). 
The discussion is then focused on specific taxes, and how the policy objective and 
the relevant channel should inform how these taxes are formulated. Of particular 
importance here is the scope of products covered by the tax, and the type of tax rate 
structure. Comments are then made on the relevant advantages and challenges 
presented by certain aspects of formulation, and suggestions are made about which 
types of formulation might be more suitable for certain policy objectives and their 
channels for health improvement. The formulation of the HPL is critically compared 
to the formulation of other taxes on sugary drinks: the Soda Tax in Denmark; the 
Public Health Product Tax (“PHPT”) in Hungary; the Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico; 
the Philadelphia Beverage Tax (“PBT”); the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Product 
Tax (“SSBPT”) in Berkeley, California; and the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (“SDIL”) in 
the UK. Although not a tax, the treatment of different products and subjects as 
proposed in terms of the Portion Cap Rule are also considered. In order to address 
the criticism that the scope of products covered by the HPL is too narrow, taxes 
targeting a broader scope of products are also discussed: the Junk Food Tax in 




4 2 Taxes on certain unhealthy foods or nutrient-based taxes 
4 2 1 Overview of comparative jurisdictions 
As discussed above, excessive energy consumption is the main cause of obesity 
and non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”), but there are a number of nutrients and 
ingredients that contribute relatively more to this energy consumption, such as added 
sugar and saturated fat.1 In addition to these nutrients, policy interventions could 
also target other non-calorific nutrients or ingredients that are otherwise harmful to 
health, such as alcohol, sodium or caffeine. For example, Mexico and Hungary have 
implemented taxes targeting caffeine and energy drinks.2 These interventions 
targeting these other nutrients or ingredients specific to other health issues are 
briefly discussed below.3 However, this thesis focuses on interventions aimed at 
reducing excessive energy consumption and addressing obesity-related NCDs and 
other health concerns caused predominantly by sugar and SSB consumption. 
The decision to tax a specific food product or the content of a particular nutrient in 
a range of products can have significant implications for the tax’s success in 
achieving its policy objectives.4 While some jurisdictions have implemented food 
excise taxes that target a particular category of unhealthy foods, others’ food excise 
taxes target a particular unhealthy nutrient in a range of products (“nutrient-based 
taxes”), such as added sugar and saturated fat. For example, Denmark and Hungary 
implemented certain nutrient-based taxes: the Saturated Fat Tax in Denmark was 
based on the saturated fat content in a range of foods;5 while the PHPT in Hungary 
targets a number of harmful nutrients and ingredients in a wide range of food and 
non-alcoholic beverage products, including sodium, caffeine, alcohol and added 
sugar.6 Unlike these taxes, Mexico implemented a Junk Food Tax in January 2014, 
which targets energy consumption, and not any particular nutrient. However, it is 
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probably not possible or practical to tax calories themselves in all foods and 
beverages, and the Junk Food Tax is only levied on certain non-essential processed 
food products containing an excess of 275 calories per 100 grams.7 
France introduced a food excise tax on the category soft drinks that contain any 
added sugars (“SSBs”) or artificial sweeteners (“ASBs”). Similarly, the soft drinks tax 
in India applies to the category of sweetened non-alcoholic beverages, including 
both SSBs and ASBs.8 A number of authors describe “SSB taxes” as food excise 
taxes imposed on the category of SSBs, regardless of their sugar content.9 For 
example, the PBT legislation refers to “sugar-sweetened beverages,” but this is a 
misnomer, as the taxable beverages are not necessarily sweetened with sugar.10 
PBT targets certain soft drinks containing: any sugar-based caloric sweeteners;11 or 
artificial sugar sweetener substitutes.12 Although not always done in practice, it is 
useful for present purposes to distinguish between nutrient-based food excise taxes 
on SSBs that are levied with some reference to their sugar content (hereafter 
referred to as “SSB taxes”), and food excise taxes that target ASBs along with SSBs, 
with no reference to their sugar content (hereafter referred to as “soft drink taxes”).  
SSB taxes have a stronger impact on obesity reduction than soft drinks taxes 
through the reprising objectives, because: manufacturers are more inclined to reduce 
the sugar content in their SSBs in order to minimise their tax liability; and consumers 
are more likely to change their consumption away from SSBs, where ASBs and other 
less sugary drinks become relatively cheaper as a result of the tax.13 In terms of this 
distinction, the taxes in France, India and Philadelphia are soft drink taxes. PBT-
taxable beverages are therefore referred to as soft drinks hereunder. Because of the 
potential impact on consumption changes, the decision between implementing a soft 
drink tax or an SSB tax may indicate whether the objective is predominantly focused 
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on stable revenue generation, or reprising. For example, Denmark implemented a 
number of taxes on sugary products since the 1930s, with the purpose of increasing 
government revenue.14 Among these was the Soda Tax, which was a soft drinks tax 
that made no reference to sugar content. Along with other tax changes aimed at 
health promotion, the legislative provisions for the Danish Soda Tax were changed in 
2010, so that it became an SSB tax in line with the government’s health promotion 
objectives.15 
4 2 2 Danish taxes targeting sugar or certain sugar-sweetened products 
The Danish tax authorities have provided that the Soda Tax was imposed for 
revenue collection, as well as for the promotion of healthcare.16 In order for the Soda 
Tax to influence consumption in line with the health objective more effectively, the 
Spring Package 2.0 proposed that the rates should be differentiated, so that higher-
sugar products became relatively more expensive than lower-sugar products.17 At 
this time, the Soda Tax rate was DKK 0,91 per litre for all soda products, regardless 
of their sugar content. The Prevention Commission initially considered the impact of 
a 110% increase in the tax rate, but it was later proposed that the rate be changed 
as follows: for products with a sugar content of less than 0,5 grams per 100 millilitres 
(“lower-sugar products”), the rate should be reduced by DKK 0,34 per litre, so that 
the rate payable becomes DKK 0,57 per litre; and for products with a sugar content 
exceeding 0,5 grams per 100 millilitres (“higher-sugar products”), the rate should be 
increased by DKK 0,24 per litre, so that the rate payable becomes DKK 1,15 per 
litre.18 Although the Prevention Commission estimated revenue increases as a result 
of a 110% increase in the Soda Tax rate, the amended tax rates as discussed in the 
Spring Package 2.0 were not expected to lead to increases in government revenue. 
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These tax changes would therefore be more focused on pursuing the health 
objective than on additional revenue generation.19 
Similar tax changes were made in terms of the Chocolate and Confectionery Tax 
and the Ice Cream Tax in 2010. The rates for these taxes were also differentiated in 
2010 according to the same threshold sugar content in the relevant products. At this 
time, the rates for the relevant ice cream products and chocolate and confectionery 
products were DKK 3,40 per litre and DKK 14,20 per kilogram respectively.20 The Ice 
Cream Tax is charged on certain ice cream products (“ice cream products”), 
including ordinary ice cream and ice cream mixes intended for processing in ice 
cream appliances for commercial consumption.21 The Chocolate and Confectionery 
Tax is levied on three different categories of chocolate and confectionery products 
(“Chapter 1 products”) and their components (“Chapter 2 products” and “Chapter 3 
products”).22 Chapter 1 products include: chocolate and chocolate products; liquorice 
products; marzipan; nougat; confectioneries; chewing gum; candied fruit; waffles; 
cakes; and biscuits.23 In 2010, the rate for lower sugar Chapter 1 products remained 
at DKK 14,20 per kilogram of final product, and increased to DKK 17,75 per kilogram 
of final product for higher sugar products.24 Similarly, the rate for lower sugar ice 
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cream products remained at DKK 3,40 per litre, and the rate for higher sugar ice 
cream products was increased to DKK 4,25 per litre in 2010.25 
4 3 General goods and services taxes and other policy objectives 
4 3 1 Ad valorem and specific tax rates 
Excise taxes are usually levied at a specified rate on a qualitative measure of the 
targeted products. For example, the Danish Chocolate and Confectionery Tax was 
levied at the specified rate (DKK 17,75 in 2010) on the qualitative measure (per 
kilogram) of the targeted products (higher-sugar Chapter 1 products). Less 
frequently, excise taxes are also levied at ad valorem rates which are applied to the 
value of the targeted products.26 For example, the Junk Food Tax in Mexico is levied 
at an ad valorem rate of 8% on the relevant products.27 Specific rates have been 
found to be associated with more significant health benefits than ad valorem rates, 
because: ad valorem rates impose higher rates on more expensive products, which 
increase the price differences across different brands, and thus provide more scope 
for consumers to substitute for cheaper brands of the targeted products.28  
In addition to not supporting the health objective through decreased consumption, 
ad valorem excise taxes also provide limited incentive for manufacturers to 
reformulate their products.29 Conversely, the use of ad valorem rates sometimes 
results in manufacturers deliberately introducing cheaper alternatives to the market, 
which often have a higher content of the targeted nutrient than the original food 
products had.30 The use of ad valorem rates therefore does not support health 
promotion objectives, because: consumers may substitute cheaper versions of the 
same product; and, instead of reformulating their products, manufacturers may 
perpetuate this undesirable substitution effect.31 General taxes on goods and 
services usually apply ad valorem rates and do not discriminate between the 
                                            
25 Lov nr 524 af 12.06.2009 om ændring af lov om afgift af chokolade- og sukkervarer m.m., lov om 
afgift af konsum-is, lov om afgift af mineralvand m.v., lov om tobaksafgifter og lov om afgift af øl, 
vin og frugtvin m.m § 2. 
26 SARS “Ad Valorem Products” (29-09-2017) SARS 
<http://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Customs-Excise/Excise/Ad-Valorem-
Products/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed 03-09-2018). 
27 Art 2(I)(J) de la Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción Servicios. 
28 Ecorys Report 23. 
29 23. 
30 RSA National Treasury Policy Paper 14-15. 




nutritional content of different foods, so the potential to reduce sugar consumption 
through differentiated general goods and services tax rates is limited.32 However, ad 
valorem taxes are easier to administer and adjust for inflation than specific excise 
taxes.33 
4 3 2 Differentiated Value-Added Tax rates in the United Kingdom 
In terms of the UK Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“UK VAT Act”), the standard rate of 
VAT is 20%, but most foods are zero-rated to minimise the regressive impact.34 
However, the VAT zero-rating does not apply to certain food and non-alcoholic 
beverage products, such as ice cream, juices, sports drinks, soft drinks, potato 
crisps, and confectionery.35 “Confectionery” excludes cakes and biscuits, but not 
chocolate or biscuits that are wholly or partly covered in chocolate. Because the 
standard rate applies to chocolate but biscuits and cakes are zero-rated, this results 
in complicated classifications between certain confectionery products, such as:  
biscuits that are not covered in chocolate (zero-rated), but contain chocolate 
(standard rate), such as chocolate-chip cookies; and two biscuits (zero-rated) with a 
layer of chocolate (standard rate) sandwiched between them.36 Further, although 
chocolate-covered biscuits are subject to the standard VAT rate, chocolate-covered 
cakes are zero-rated.37 
In 1991, one of the largest Jaffa cakes manufacturers appealed against a decision 
by the customs and excise department that classified Jaffa cakes as biscuits, in 
United Biscuits (UK) Ltd (“United Biscuits”).38 It had previously been accepted that 
Jaffa cakes were cakes, which attracted the zero-rating. The new classification thus 
meant that this confectionery attracted the standard rate, because they were no 
longer cakes, but biscuits covered in chocolate. The VAT tribunal in United Biscuits 
described this product as comprising three elements: sponge cake that is soft while it 
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is fresh; a small amount of sweet orange jam on top of the sponge cake; and a thin 
layer of dark chocolate covering this sponge cake and jam. Further descriptions 
include that Jaffa cakes taste mainly of chocolate and jam, while the sponge cake 
comprises the greater volume of the product.39 
 Although Jaffa cakes have characteristics of both biscuits and cakes, it was 
accepted that this confectionery had “sufficient characteristics of cakes to qualify as 
cakes.”40 Although VAT zero-ratings may serve an important purpose for 
redistributive goals, it could be argued that the distinctions between certain standard 
rate and zero-rate products are sometimes arbitrary. For example, other bakery 
goods such as gingerbread, flapjacks, marshmallow teacakes, caramel shortcake 
and meringues are zero-rated, while the standard rate is applied to cereal bars, 
Florentines, shortbread and coconut ice.41 Further, carbonated drinks and 
preparations for milkshakes are subject to the standard VAT rate, while chocolate 
drinks and milkshakes themselves are zero-rated.42 This distortion is detrimental to 
economic activity, and may waste government resources in the classification 
process, as seen in United Biscuits.43 
Although no specific reference was made to these differentiated VAT rates in the 
UK, similar concerns were highlighted in Denmark when lower VAT rates were 
considered for healthy foods. For example, European Union (“EU”) rules stipulate 
that precise definitions of “healthy” foods need to be provided where differentiated 
rates are to be applied for these foods. Formulating these precise definitions 
increases administrative costs, and often leads to lobbying by the food industry as to 
which products should be excluded.44 Further complications arise where the 
“healthy” foods are not sold individually, but combined with other, unhealthy foods.45 
It was ultimately decided that this would be an undesirable tax change in Denmark, 
because it would increase administrative costs and over-complicate the VAT 
system.46 
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4 3 3 Food subsidies and sales taxes in the United States of America 
4 3 3 1 Sales taxes, tax incidence and the signalling effect 
Because of the shortcomings of ad valorem rates, the use of differentiated general 
goods and service tax rates is not recommended. However, it should be noted that a 
number of jurisdictions have used this approach to increase the relative prices of 
certain unhealthy food products. For example, certain states and local governments 
in the USA apply higher-than-standard sales tax rates to soda or exclude soda from 
sales tax exemptions. Such state jurisdictions include California, Colorado, Illinois, 
New York, Pennsylvania and Washington.47 For example, sales taxes in 
Pennsylvania are only paid by the final purchaser to the retailer, who is required to 
submit it to the tax authorities. Unlike VAT in a number of jurisdictions, the purchase 
price of goods subject to the sales tax in Pennsylvania is not required to reflect the 
sales-tax inclusive price of the goods.48 Where SSBs are excluded from sales tax 
exemptions and this is reflected on the consumers’ receipt, this could complement 
the reprising objective and the signalling effect, because consumers are more likely 
to observe the difference in prices.  
It has been commented that a similar deterrent effect could be achieved where the 
amount of tax is indicated on consumers’ receipts for specific excise taxes on certain 
unhealthy products. For example, although the PBT is not a sales tax, retailers 
displayed the amount of the tax on a separate line on receipts following the 
implementation of PBT. However, it is unclear whether this practice will be sustained, 
or if it was only used initially as a means to explain the increase in prices.49 In theory, 
a food excise tax levied against the consumer at the point of purchase could 
minimise any undesirable behaviour by the food industry, and may provide a greater 
incentive for consumers to reduce their consumption of the targeted products. 
However, this option would be much more administratively burdensome on 
retailers.50 Further, ad valorem rates are not optimal for changing consumption, but 
the imposition of a nutrient-based specific tax against retailers is not recommended 
                                            
47 Chriqui et al State Sales Taxes on Regular Soda 2. 
48 Pa. Code § 31(2)(4). 
49 Knowledge@Wharton “Do ‘Sin Taxes’ Really Change Consumer Behaviour?” Wharton University of 
Pennsylvania. 




as it would impose an even larger administrative burden.51 For these and other 
various reasons, excise taxes are generally charged against the manufacturers and 
importers of the targeted products.52 For example: the SDIL is levied against 
manufacturers and importers of the relevant SDIL products; local manufacturers and 
importers of HPL products are subject to the HPL, in terms of the Duty-At-Source 
(“DAS”) principle; and the PHPT is charged on the first domestic sale of PHPT 
products, against the domestic manufacturers or the first-time domestic sellers of 
PHPT products.53 
 The Ice Cream Tax in Demark is payable by the commercial manufacturers and 
importers of ice cream products, according to the volume of these products received 
from abroad or delivered from the manufacturers’ premises during the tax period.54 
In the case of the Chocolate and Confectionery Tax and the Ice Cream Tax in 
Denmark, manufacturers and importers of lower-sugar products are required to 
provide the necessary documentation to establish the sugar content in their 
products.55 The Saturated Fat Tax was payable by the following: local commercial 
producers of saturated fat foods; local commercial food manufacturers who used 
saturated fat foods to produce their foods exclusively for wholesale; commercial 
importers of saturated fat foods, who received these foods or commercially 
introduced these foods into Denmark from another country; and commercial distance 
sellers who sold saturated fat foods to local Danish non-traders, where these foods 
were shipped directly or indirectly by the seller or on his behalf.56 
The SSBPT is charged on the “distribution” of certain SSB products in Berkeley.57  
The PBT is levied upon the final supply, delivery, acquisition or transport of the SSB 
to a “dealer,” before the dealer makes retail sales of these drinks within 
                                            
51 WCRF Building momentum 13. It is less onerous for retailers if the tax has already been paid at the 
producer level. 
52 Ecorys Report 55. 
53 Ss32-35 of the UK Finance Act 2017 c.10; 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról 
§ 3-4; Torma “Hungary- Corporate Taxation- Country Analyses- 14. Miscellaneous Indirect Taxes” 
IBFD Tax Research Platform. These manufacturers and first-time sellers of PHPT products are 
liable, regardless of whether they sell these products to distributors or directly to consumers. 
54 Bekendtgørelse nr 127 af 22.02.2018 af lov om afgift af konsum-is § 2. 
55 § 5b. 
56 Lov nr. 247 af 30.03.2011 om afgift af mættet fedt i visse fødevarer (fedtafgiftsloven) § 3(1)-(4). 
57 Berkeley, California, Municipal Code § 7.72.010, 7.72.030(G) & (L)-(M). The distributors of the 
relevant products are liable for SSBPT, and not the retailers or manufacturers. “Retailers” are 
defined in as “persons” who sell SSB products to consumers, and “persons” include individuals, 
trusts and various types of companies. Further, “consumers” are defined as natural persons who 





Philadelphia.58 A “dealer” is anyone engaged in the business of retail sales of SSBs 
within Philadelphia, including distributors, retail stores, restaurants and vending 
machine owners and operators.59 Provided that the notification requirements have 
been fulfilled, only distributors are liable to pay PBT; dealers are exempt.60 Where a 
registered distributor is also a dealer, then such an entity is only liable to pay PBT 
once.61 Dealers may only make retail sales of SSBs where: these SSBs were 
acquired from registered distributors; and registration and notification requirements 
have been fulfilled.62 The implications that this provision has on the tax burden was 
challenged a number of times, most recently in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Williams v City of Philadelphia (“Williams 2018”),63 discussed below.64 
4 3 3 2 Implications of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programme 
The PBT has also been legally challenged on the grounds that such a tax is pre-
empted by the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programme (“SNAP”) legislation, 
which provides that taxes may not be levied on food items bought with SNAP 
benefits.65 While a number of states and counties are discouraging SSB 
consumption through sales taxes or SSBs taxes, it could be argued that SSB 
consumption is effectively being subsidised through food assistance programmes.66 
SNAP is a federal programme, and is the largest of 15 nutrition programmes that are 
administered by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), under the 
Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”). The objective of SNAP is as follows: 
“It is declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general welfare, to 
safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising levels of 
nutrition among low-income households. Congress finds that the limited food 
purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition 
among members of such households. Congress further finds that increased utilization 
of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will 
promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of the Nation’s agricultural abundance 
and will strengthen the Nation’s agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly 
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marketing and distribution of foods. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a 
supplemental nutrition assistance program is herein authorized which will permit low-
income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade 
by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for 
participation.”67 
The following foods may be purchased with SNAP benefits: fruits and vegetables; 
dairy products; meats, fish and poultry; breads and cereals; and seeds and plants 
suitable for household consumption. The dominant objective of SNAP is not health 
improvement, but improving equality and welfare.68 While other nutrition 
programmes have a list of approved foods, SNAP does not distinguish between 
healthy foods and unhealthy foods: SSBs, ice cream, confectionery and other 
unhealthy snacks can be purchased with SNAP benefits.69 States may not 
participate in the SNAP programme if “State or local sales taxes or other taxes or 
fees, including but not limited to excise taxes, are collected within the State on 
purchases made with food stamp coupons.”70 Therefore, although a number of local 
jurisdictions apply higher-than-standard sales tax rates or exclude SSBs from sales 
tax exemptions, these higher rates are not paid when consumers purchase these 
products with SNAP benefits. This provision is intended to prevent federal revenue 
from being transferred to State and local governments, which would compromise the 
welfare objective of SNAP, because costs would ultimately increase for lower-
income consumers.71 
Studies have shown that SNAP stimulates economic growth and employment, and 
successfully reduces food insecurity and poverty in general. Accordingly, it could be 
argued that decreased food insecurity will decrease negative health consequences 
associated with food insecurity, such as poor nutrient intake. However, a number of 
authors have argued that the current framework for SNAP overlooks an important 
opportunity to advance health objectives, by minimising dietary risk factors.72 While 
there is some evidence that SNAP has a positive influence on nutritional quality, the 
fact that unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages comprise a large portion of 
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SNAP expenditures is contrary to health objectives.73 For example, the most-
purchased item under this food assistance programme is SSBs, which accounts for 
around 9,3% of all SNAP purchases. Jerrett argues that the fact that the large 
volumes of unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages are purchased with SNAP 
benefits is ultimately contrary to SNAP’s objective: 
“The goal of SNAP is ‘[t]o alleviate... hunger and malnutrition’ that stems from ‘the 
limited food purchasing power of low-income households.’ This $74billion programme 
is funded by the federal government and administered by the states....The 
contradictions behind the stated goal of SNAP and its actual use to purchase SSBs 
has been a source of consternation among public health advocates and was flagged 
as a potential area for reform in advance of the 2014 Farm Bill. Cities, states, and 
health groups have long called for the freedom to restrict the purchase of soda with 
SNAP dollars.”74 
A number of states and localities have requested state waivers to exclude SSBs 
from SNAP benefits. However, for various reasons, these requests have been 
denied. The FNS has argued that excluding unhealthy foods from SNAP benefits 
would lead to: further stigmatization of lower socio-economic groups, which is 
contrary to the objectives of SNAP; burdensome changes to point-of-sale systems 
used in grocery stores; and increased administrative costs, for very little or no 
change in diet.75 The FNS further argues that SNAP participation has not been 
proven to contribute to unhealthy diets, and that, regardless of restrictions, the 
majority of SNAP participants would likely continue to purchase the restricted foods 
with their own income.76  
4 4 Taxes targeting sugar-sweetened beverages 
4 4 1 Taxes on all sugar or certain sugar-sweetened products 
Where governments intervene with food excise taxes, the tax base should not be 
defined too narrowly, and similar products should be taxed in the same manner. If a 
food excise tax only covers a small range of products, and cheaper substitutes exist, 
then consumers could replace the targeted products with similar, untaxed products. 
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These substitutes are not necessarily healthier than the targeted products, so the 
substitution effect could mitigate the health impact of the tax.77 Although not 
implemented for health objectives, the differentiated VAT rates in the UK 
demonstrate the importance of considering substitution when defining the tax base. 
Because biscuits and cakes could be considered close substitutes, consumers could 
substitute taxed biscuits with untaxed cakes under this VAT system. If these 
differentiated rates were used in order to reduce sugar consumption, this substitution 
would frustrate the reprising objective.78  
The HPL has been criticised for only targeting SSBs, and not a broader range of 
sugar-sweetened products.79 However, it may not be practical or even possible to 
introduce a tax that covers all possible substitutes. Similarly to how it would not be 
practical to tax all calories, it would probably not be practical to tax all sugar. In 
theory, while a tax levied on sugar cane at the place of production might lead to price 
increases for all sugary products, such a tax has not been introduced for various 
reasons. In the Prevention Commission’s Recommendations, for example, it was 
provided that the introduction of a new a tax on pure sugar would be administratively 
burdensome, and disruptive to competition. It was therefore concluded that, in order 
to reduce sugar consumption, it would be better to increase the existing taxes on soft 
drinks, ice cream, chocolate and confectionery.80 In discussing the formulation 
options for a tax targeting sugar consumption in Australia, Lloyd and MacLaren 
explain a number of the issues with the argument that all sugar should be taxed: 
“There is an obvious argument for taxing the sugar content of all foods and drinks. It is 
the sugar consumption from all forms and sources that damages the health of some 
individuals. Taxing only SSBs is like taxing only beer and not liquors and wine. For 
example, confectionery and chocolates are a major source of excess sugar 
consumption. Breakfast cereals, ‘treats’ and lollies given to children are also a major 
source of excess sugar consumption for this age group. Counting against this 
proposal, however, is the difficulty of drawing the boundary for such a broad product 
group... Moreover, this proposal would impose large compliance costs on 
manufacturers who would have to test and certify the sugar content of all sugary foods 
and drinks. And who would certify the sugar content of imported sugary foods and 
drinks? An alternative is to tax sugar milled in Australia by means of a sugar excise tax 
coupled with an equal import duty on sugar imported in a raw or refined state. This 
would be much simpler and impose much lower compliance costs than taxing the 
sugar content of foods and drinks... Imports of sugar could be taxed on entry. This tax 
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would not, however, cover the sugar content of processed foods and drinks imported 
into Australia. To do so would require testing and certification of imports.”81 
There are a number of other reasons why taxing all sugar is not practical, 
including that: there is a wide range of food and drink products that contain sugar; 
sugar is not only used in foods and drinks, but may be used for the manufacture of 
biodegradable fuels and other useful commodities; and a number of jurisdictions use 
subsidies and import tariffs to protect their domestic sugar farming industry. The 
imposition of a tax on sugar cane is problematic for countries where sugar 
manufacture contributes significantly to the economy. For example, it has been 
estimated that the South African sugar industry contributes around R14 billion to the 
national economy annually, “given its agricultural and industrial investments, foreign 
exchange earnings, labour-intensity (especially in rural areas) and direct linkages 
with other downstream industries.”82 While it could be argued that taxing sugar in this 
way might achieve optimal health outcomes, it would be much more administratively 
burdensome, and would likely be very detrimental to the economy. 
It should further be noted that, in order to achieve optimal results in line with such 
a rationale, it would probably be necessary to target all sources of dietary sugars. As 
highlighted in the case of the 2002 Mexican Sweetener Tax, sugar cane is not the 
only source of dietary sugars, or even of added sugars. For the purposes of the 
Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico, “sugar” includes monosaccharides, disaccharides 
and polysaccharides where these are used as calorific or nutritive sweeteners.83 
Further, the SSBPT in Berkeley targets drinks containing “added caloric 
sweeteners,” including sucrose, glucose, fructose and high-fructose corn syrup 
(“HFCS”).84 For purposes of the PHPT: “sugar” includes: cane sugar or beet sugar; 
chemically pure sucrose, lactose, glucose, maltose and fructose, in their solid form; 
artificial honey, regardless of whether it contains natural honey; caramel; and other 
unflavoured and uncoloured sugar syrups.85 In addition to added sugars, there are 
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many dietary sources of intrinsic sugars. For example, intrinsic sugar is present in 
milk and most fruits and vegetables, which are generally regarded as healthy. Unlike 
SSBs containing added sugars exclusively, these potential substitute beverages 
offer some additional nutritional value. For example, milk is described as an 
important source of protein, calcium and vitamin D, and fruit juice might be an 
important dietary source of antioxidants and certain vitamins and minerals.86 
However, excessive consumption of milk and fruit juice respectively has been 
associated with: the incidence of certain cancers; and weight gain and increased 
dental caries.87 
The Policy Paper provides that beverages containing only intrinsic sugars should 
be excluded from the HPL, because it is the added sugars in SSBs that have 
negative health effects.88 Accordingly, 100% fruit and vegetable juices and 
unsweetened milk and milk products are not subject to the HPL.89 However, the 
“sugar” content for purposes of HPL means the total sugar content, including intrinsic 
sugar, added sugar and “other sweetening matter.”90 Therefore, where sugar is 
added to any of the would-be exempt products, and the total sugar content in the 
final product exceeds the tax-free threshold, these products are taxed according to 
their total sugar content, and no distinction is made between their intrinsic sugar and 
added sugar contents.91 The SDIL targets SSBs that contain “added sugar 
ingredients,” that “are combined with other ingredients at any stage” of production. 
These added sugar ingredients include calorific mono- and disaccharides and other 
substances containing these types of sugars.92 Further, the definition of added sugar 
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ingredients for purposes of the SDIL does not include intrinsic sugars from milk and 
fruit and vegetable juices.93 
In addition to the SSB category, the PHPT in Hungary has four other categories of 
products targeting sugar: flavoured beer; alcoholic refreshments; fruit jams; and 
confectionery products.94 Griffith et al provide that food excise taxes aimed at 
reducing sugar consumption should target food products that represent a large 
portion of sugar consumption in the particular jurisdiction.95 For example, of the total 
sales of dietary sources of added sugars in the UK in 2016, 17% comprised of soft 
drinks, while chocolate and confectionery comprised 18%.96 Where SSBs are not the 
largest source of dietary sugar, it might be more effective to impose a tax on other 
foods that represent a larger portion of sugar consumption, such as chocolate, 
confectionery, cakes, biscuits and ice cream. However, these other dietary sources 
of sugar may contain other beneficial nutrients apart from sugar, which are more 
satiating and increase “nutritionally adequate” calorie consumption.97 Therefore, 
while SSBs might not represent the largest share of sugar intake, most jurisdictions 
do not impose sugary food taxes, because: it is more difficult to reformulate these 
products; it is more administratively complicated to calculate the sugar content in 
these products; these taxes have a larger regressive impact, because these foods 
offer additional nutritional value and the scope of these products is much broader 
than SSBs; and the substitution effects are more complicated with foods than with 
beverages.98  
National Treasury and SARS have explained that sugar in sugary beverages will 
be targeted instead of other ingredients in other foods, because sugar is a clear 
contributor to obesity and NCDs, and the HPL will be an effective mechanism to 
combat excessive sugar consumption.99 Sugary drinks have been shown to 
significantly contribute to rising levels of obesity, because this liquid energy is not as 
satisfying as solid foods, so consumers tend to consume more calories.100 The sugar 
in fruit, and even in sugary confectionery, is accompanied by fibre, which “digests 
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more slowly than liquid, and the sugar is thus released more slowly in the 
bloodstream.” Because the added sugar in SSBs is not accompanied by fibre, this 
form of sugar consumption has a number of harmful health effects, including that 
because: this sugar is processed more quickly in the liver and pancreas, it could 
eventually cause NCDs such as liver disease, heart disease and Type 2 Diabetes 
Mellitus (“T2DM”); and triglycerides are produced in the body in response to this 
sugar, this leads to increases in the risk for heart attacks.101 
While this decision has been criticised, it is submitted that it is probably sensible to 
limit the scope of the HPL to SSBs. The majority of other jurisdictions have limited 
these taxes to SSBs specifically, and there is limited available research on the 
effectiveness of taxes that target a broader range of products. Further, due to the 
nature of these other foods, it is difficult to evaluate the overall impact on 
consumption of taxes that target a broader and more complicated range of food 
products.102 However, because the Final Response Document provides that “the 
sugar in other products would also need to be addressed” and the that “100% fruit 
juice and vegetable juice, unsweetened milk and unsweetened milk products... 
exemptions will be reconsidered in the future,” it is useful to consider the 
experiences from other jurisdictions that have targeted a broader range of sugar-
sweetened foods and beverages, as well as other unhealthy nutrients and 
ingredients.103 Further, although fruit juice provides “relative nutritional value and 
contributions to rural employment and incomes,” the “effects of fruit juice on weight 
gain and diabetes are comparable to those of other sugary beverages.”104 However, 
most jurisdictions exclude 100% fruit juices from their SSB taxes, and Stacey et al 
(2017) provided the negligible own-price elasticity for these beverages suggested 
that the “public health arguments for their inclusion” would “not yield meaningful 
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reductions in sugar intake from their consumption” in 2017.105 These authors caution 
however, that the food industry could respond to the HPL by promoting 100% fruit 
and vegetable juices as substitutes for the targeted SSBs.106 
4 4 2 Tax rate structure and thresholds 
4 4 2 1 Options for specific tax rates 
Apart from the distinction between specific and ad valorem rates, there are a 
number of design options for specific tax rates that might influence the tax’s potential 
to reduce consumption or incentivise reformulation. These options include a flat levy, 
a levy based on the total content of the targeted nutrient in the relevant product, and 
a differentiated levy that applies to different threshold contents of the targeted 
nutrient.107 In the case of a flat levy, the same rate applies according to some 
quantitative measure of the product itself, regardless of the quantity of the targeted 
nutrient. For example: the Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico is levied at MXN 1,17 per 
litre of non-alcoholic beverages with any added sugar content;108 and the SSBPT is 
charged at $0,01 per fluid ounce on certain SSB products in Berkeley.109 A food 
excise tax formulated in this manner is relatively simple to administer, but is not the 
most effective for reducing sugar consumption, because: it provides little incentive to 
consumers to reduce their sugar consumption by replacing more sugary SSBs with 
less sugary SSBs, as the prices for all SSBs increase by the same amount; and, 
unless manufacturers can escape the liability for the tax by eliminating the target 
ingredient from their products entirely, there is no incentive for them to reformulate 
their products to contain less sugar.110  
Although it might be more administratively complicated, the use of a threshold for 
sugar content in SSBs may improve the ability of a flat levy to achieve health 
objectives. After differentiated rates were introduced for lower- and higher-sugar 
products, Soda Tax in Denmark is an example of such a formulation. To have a 
greater impact on health objectives in this way, the Flavoured Drinks Tax could be 
levied at a flat rate of MXN 1,17 per litre of SSBs that contain an excess of a certain 
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sugar threshold. Although this is technically how the Flavoured Drinks Tax already 
operates, the provision for a 5 grams per 100 millilitres threshold, for example, could 
provide incentive for: consumers to substitute towards the less sugary products, 
because ASBs and SSBs with a sugar content below 5 grams per 100 millilitres 
could become relatively cheaper than SSBs in excess of this threshold; and 
manufacturers to reformulate their SSB products so that their sugar content 
becomes less than 5 grams per 100 millilitres. 
It has been argued that because added sugars have no nutritional value, each 
gram of sugar in SSBs or sugary foods should be taxed. While the use of a threshold 
might provide a greater incentive for manufacturers to reformulate, a tax applied 
specifically to the sugar content is the potentially the best target for incentivising 
reduced sugar consumption. Where each gram of sugar is taxed (“tax-per-gram”), 
the prices of the taxed beverages should increase according to their impact on the 
health concerns. This approach has been used in Mauritius, which levies an SSB tax 
at the rate of 3 cents per gram of sugar contained in the targeted SSBs.111 Taxes 
based on the total content of the targeted nutrient in a particular food product are 
more administratively complicated, but are likely to be more successful in achieving 
health objectives than flat levies. The HPL has combined these two approaches: only 
SSBs with a sugar content exceeding 4 grams per 100 millilitres are taxable; and the 
sugar content in excess of this threshold is taxed at 2,21 cents per gram of sugar.112 
More recently, there has been increasing interest in the use of differentiated tax 
rates that apply “tiers” or “bands” according to different threshold contents of the 
nutrients targeted by the tax. This option might provide the greatest incentive to 
manufacturers to reformulate their products.113 For example, the SDIL introduced in 
the UK in April 2018 and the SSB tax introduced in Thailand in September 2017 
have specifically used this approach to encourage reformulation.114 In Thailand, 
differentiated rates according to various sugar thresholds, and these rates and 
thresholds are adjusted over a number of years in order to normalise this tax among 
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the public.115 For example, SSBs with a sugar content of less than 6 grams per 100 
millilitres are exempt, and the per litre tax rates for SSBs from September 2017 to 
September 2019 are: THB 0,10 where the sugar content is between 6 grams and 8 
grams per 100 millilitres; THB 0,30 where the sugar content is between 8 grams and 
10 grams per 100 millilitres; THB 0,50 where the sugar content is between 10 grams 
and 14 grams per 100 millilitres; and THB 1,00 where the sugar content exceeds 14 
grams per 100 millilitres. By October 2023, the following per litre tax rates and 
thresholds will apply: THB 1,00 where the sugar content is between 6 grams and 8 
grams per 100 millilitres; THB 3,00 where the sugar content is between 8 grams and 
10 grams per 100 millilitres; and THB 5,00 where the sugar content exceeds 10 
grams per 100 millilitres.116 This tax allows for gradual product reformulation, which 
could be conducive to changing consumers’ tastes as well as mitigating some of the 
increased costs to manufacturers. 
4 4 2 2 Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the United Kingdom 
Similarly to the SSB tax in Thailand, the SDIL also uses a tiered system with 
different rates according to the level of sugar content in the relevant SSBs.117 This 
SSB tax is unique from the others discussed in this thesis, in that it applies three 
tiers, in terms of which: “low-sugar” non-alcoholic beverages have a sugar content of 
less than 5 grams per 100 millilitres; “medium-sugar” SSBs have a sugar content 
between 5 grams and 8 grams per 100 millilitres; and “high-sugar” SSBs have a 
sugar content in excess of 8 grams per 100 millilitres.118 In terms of this tax, low-
sugar SSBs are exempt, while: medium-sugar SSBs are taxed at £0,18 per litre; and 
high-sugar SSBs are taxed at £0,24 per litre.119 While public health campaigners, 
such as Action on Sugar, advocate that chocolate and confectionery should be taxed 
alongside SDIL products, opponents criticise these taxes because of their potentially 
regressive effects on consumers. Sugar taxes on a narrower range of products are 
likely to have a less regressive impact.120 It has further been rationalised that an 
SSB tax that applies different bands or thresholds could have an even less 
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regressive impact than an SSB tax that targets each gram of sugar. Accordingly, the 
UK government has specifically appealed to the food industry to reformulate their 
SSB products to contain less sugar, instead of passing on the increased prices to 
consumers.121 
While both approaches would provide some incentive for manufacturers to 
reformulate their products, it could be argued that the use of multiple bands or 
thresholds is more effective in this regard than a tax levied according to the total 
sugar content. For example, the tax-per-gram rate for an SSB containing 10 grams 
of sugar per 100 millilitres would need to be £0,0024 per gram of sugar, in order to 
translate to a £0,24 price increase per litre. Depending on the costs to reformulate, 
manufacturers would be more inclined to reduce the sugar content where these two 
bands are applied: for the 8 gram threshold, only 2 grams of sugar needs to be 
removed for the tax liability to be reduced by £0,06 per litre, compared to the 
£0,0048 per litre reduction in liability where 2 grams of sugar is removed and a the 
tax is levied on each gram; and for the 5 gram threshold, the tax liability could be 
completely eliminated if 5 grams of sugar is removed, compared to the £0,012 per 
litre reduction in liability if 5 grams of sugar is removed and the tax is levied on each 
gram of sugar. However, it could be argued that a tax-per-gram rate provides greater 
incentive for manufacturers to remove more sugar than the scenario where the tax is 
only levied above the sugar content excluded by the 5 grams per 100 millilitres tier. 
Where products are reformulated and prices do not increase, the effects on 
consumption might be less noticeable. However, it is submitted that, where the costs 
of reformulation are reasonably low, relatively smaller consumption changes from an 
SSB tax that applies different bands might still be beneficial for health outcomes in 
that consumers’ taste preferences for soft drinks could gradually change towards 
less sugary options.  
4 4 3 Scope of products targeted 
4 4 3 1 Ready-to-drink sugar-sweetened beverages 
Among others, the HPL is payable on: chocolate and cocoa beverages; drinking 
straws that contain flavouring preparations; waters that contain added sugar or other 
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sweetening matter; and certain non-alcoholic beers. HPL is levied at the rate of 2,21 
cents per gram of sugar in these products above a tax-free threshold of 4 grams per 
100 millilitres sugar content.122 A similar tax-free threshold is used under the SDIL in 
the UK: SSBs that contain less than 5 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres are excluded 
from the tax; and a higher rate is applicable for SSBs in excess of eight grams of 
sugar per 100 millilitres.123 For purposes of the SDIL, taxable SSBs include 
beverages with an alcoholic strength of less than 1,2% and preparations for making 
these beverages.124 The PHPT SSBs category includes pre-packaged sugar-
sweetened soft drinks, such as sweetened waters containing added sugar, aerated 
waters and mineral waters.125 The threshold sugar content for this PHPT category is 
8 grams per 100 millilitres.126 In 2011, the per litre tax rate for soft drinks was HUF 5, 
which increased to HUF 7 in 2012.127 Since 2019, the per litre tax rate for soft drinks 
has increased to HUF 15.128 
Among others, the Danish Soda Tax was charged on carbonated and non-
carbonated non-alcoholic beverages.129 As discussed above, the rates for the 
Danish Soda Tax were only differentiated from 2010, according to a 0,5 grams per 
100 millilitres threshold sugar content.130 However, it should be noted that this was 
not a tax-free threshold; the relevant beverages with a sugar content of less than 0,5 
grams per 100 millilitres were merely subject to a lower rate of tax. “Sugary drinks” 
that would have been subject to the Portion Cap Rule in NYC were defined as both 
carbonated and non-carbonated sugar-sweetened non-alcoholic beverages that 
contain more than 25 calories per eight fluid ounces (around 236,59 millilitres).131 If 
100 grams of granulated sugar provides around 387 calories, and granulated sugar 
were the only source of energy in the relevant SSB, then this two calories per fluid 
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ounce threshold translates to around 2,73 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres.132 For 
the purposes of SSBPT in Berkeley, SSBs are defined as beverages intended for 
human consumption, which contain added caloric sweetener and have a minimum 
energy content of two calories per fluid ounce, including soda, energy drinks and 
sports drinks.133 If the example of granulated sugar is used again, the two calories 
per fluid ounce threshold translates to around 1,76 grams of sugar per 100 
millilitres.134 
While the thresholds for purposes of the Danish Soda Tax and the SSBPT are 
much lower than the 4, 5 and 8 grams per 100 millilitres thresholds for the HPL, SDIL 
and PHPT respectively, the threshold sugar content for the Flavoured Drinks Tax in 
Mexico is even lower: the only requirement for this tax to apply to the relevant 
flavoured drinks in terms of sugar content is that these drinks contain any amount of 
added sugars.135 Flavoured drinks are described as both carbonated and non-
carbonated non-alcoholic beverages, made by dissolving any type of sugar in water, 
which may also contain natural or synthetic flavours, fruit and vegetable juice and 
other ingredients.136 Further, unlike these other taxes, the PBT is not an SSB tax, 
and makes no distinction between SSBs and ASBs. The PBT applies to soft drinks, 
which are defined as non-alcoholic beverages or concentrates for preparing non-
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alcoholic beverages, containing either: any sugar-based caloric sweeteners; or 
artificial sugar sweetener substitutes.137  
As discussed above, Denmark, Hungary, Mexico, the UK and the USA have 
mandatory regulations for the provision of nutritional information on pre-packaged 
foods.138 In addition to improving the food information environment, such regulations 
enhance the administrative efficiency of SSB taxes that apply tax-free thresholds or 
tax each gram of sugar. The current labelling regulations in South Africa, however, 
are arguably not optimal for the administration of the HPL. The sugar content for 
ready-to-drink HPL products is calculated according to “the sugar content as certified 
on a test report obtained and retained from a testing laboratory accredited with and 
using methodology recognised by the” SANAS or the ILAC.139 In the absence of a 
satisfactory label or report, the sugar content is deemed to be 20 grams per 100 
millilitres.140 This provision for deemed sugar content is intended to provide an 
incentive to manufacturers to comply with labelling guidelines, because 20 grams of 
sugar per 100 millilitres is above the average sugar content in ready-to-drink 
SSBs.141 
4 4 3 2 Syrups and preparations for making sugar-sweetened beverages 
The Policy Paper originally recommended that the tax be levied on each gram of 
sugar, so no provision was made for how concentrates should be treated.142 
However, it was provided that “fruit juice concentrates have anything between 20% 
and 50% fruit juice content and are normally diluted on a 1:4 basis.”143 The 
introduction of the threshold sugar content has presented challenges for how this 
threshold should translate to concentrates. In order to support the health objective 
and minimise undesirable substitution effects, the prices of syrups and concentrates 
should increase by the same proportional amount as for ready-to-drink SSBs. It was 
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originally proposed that concentrates should be subject to a lower rate of 1,05 cents 
per gram of sugar exceeding the 4 grams per 100 millilitre threshold, with no 
reference to dilution ratios.144 However, the Amendment Act provided that the sugar 
content for these products “must be calculated based on the total volume of the 
prepared beverage when mixed or diluted according to the manufacturer’s product 
specifications.” This provision was amended in April 2019, and the sugar content for 
these products is currently calculated according to: 
(a) “the sugar content as certified on a test report as contemplated in paragraph 5(a) 
above of the total volume of the prepared beverages when mixed or diluted according 
to the manufacturer’s product specifications; and 
(b) the average sugar content as certified on such test report of the sugar content for 
all the prepared beverage options when mixed or diluted according to the 
manufacturer’s multiple product specifications; or 
(c) in the absence of such a test report, the sugar content of the prepared beverage 
will be deemed to constitute 20 grams per 100 millilitres should the concentrate or 
preparation be mixed or diluted at a ratio of one to nine parts water.”145 
In addition to ready-to-drink SSBs, the SDIL in the UK also applies to liquids 
which, “when prepared in a specified manner,” constitute such SSBs.146 In order to 
be classified as such, these liquids are required to be prepared by way of one or a 
combination of the following processes: dilution with water; combination with carbon 
dioxide; or combination with or “processed so as to create crushed ice.”147 The SDIL 
is charged according to the sugar content of these “prepared drinks,” when diluted 
“in accordance with the relevant dilution ratio.”148 This “relevant dilution ratio” is 
either: “the dilution ratio stated on, or calculated by reference to information stated 
on, the packaging of the soft drink;” or determined by the tax authorities in instances 
where the packaging does not stipulate the dilution ratio, or where “it is reasonable to 
assume that the main purpose, or one of the main purposes of stating that particular 
dilution ratio or information is avoiding or reducing” the amount of SDIL payable.149 
The use of tax-free thresholds presents an opportunity for avoidance, particularly 
in the case of syrups and concentrates. This is evident from the provisions in South 
Africa and the UK for assuming a relatively high sugar content, or allowing tax 
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authorities to make a determination on the sugar content. In Hungary, however, the 
same tax-free threshold for ready-to-drink SSBs is applied to sugar-sweetened 
syrups, but these are taxed at a higher rate. These sugar-sweetened syrups are 
described as water- and extract-based flavourings containing sugar, which are used 
for the preparation of soft drinks.150 Because both of these categories of SSBs are 
taxed at a flat rate per litre above the sugar content threshold, the need for 
complicated calculations and other provisions for avoidance are limited. This 
formulation has a weaker link to the health objective however, and provides limited 
incentive for manufacturers to reformulate because the threshold is relatively low.151 
From 2012 to 2018, the tax rate for these syrups was HUF 200 per litre, which 
increased to HUF 240 per litre in 2019.152 
After the differentiated rates for the Soda Tax were introduced in Denmark, the tax 
payable on concentrates that were intended for commercial production of carbonated 
soft drinks was calculated according to the sugar content in the readily drinkable 
product, based on the manufacturers’ directions for dilution on the product’s 
packaging. Further, the package of imported concentrates needed to contain a 
declaration: that the product was a concentrate, intended for commercial production 
in small appliances; and on how many litres could be produced with the 
concentrate.153  
In addition to SSBs, the SSBPT also targets “added caloric sweeteners,” which 
are defined as substances or mixtures of substances used to make SSBs, through 
mixing with other substances such as water, tea or fruit juice.154 The amount of tax 
payable is calculated according to the maximum volume of SSBs that could be 
produced from these added caloric sweeteners, according to the manufacturers’ 
directions for dilution.155  
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The calculation of the tax payable under the PBT and Mexico’s Flavoured Drinks 
Tax is simpler than for these other SSB taxes discussed, because the relevant SSBs 
are not taxed according to their sugar content: the PBT applies to both ASBs and 
SSBs; and the Flavoured Drinks Tax applies where the relevant products contain 
any amount of added sugar. For both of these taxes, the taxable volume is 
calculated according to the total volume of the relevant beverages that can be 
prepared according to the manufacturers’ dilution specifications.156 Mexico’s 
Flavoured Drinks Tax also applies to concentrates, syrups and preparations for 
making these beverages, including where these are used in machines to make and 
dispense these beverages. However, this tax is not payable when these beverages 
are made and sold in establishments that provide food and beverages services, such 
as restaurants and bars.157 In contrast, the PBT is only payable on syrups and 
concentrates for the commercial manufacture or retail sale of the prepared 
beverages, and not those for the production of beverages by the consumers 
themselves.158 
4 4 3 3 Exemptions and exclusions 
Most SSB and soft drinks taxes exclude certain milk drinks and 100% fruit and 
vegetable juices.159 Alcoholic beverages, certain medicines and infant formula are 
also commonly excluded from these taxes. In South Africa, a refund is available for 
the full amount of HPL paid on HPL goods that are used in the manufacture of other 
goods that are not subject to HPL, and the duty is not payable on HPL products that 
are used in the production of other dutiable goods, such as alcohol.160 Infant formula 
and medicines are also excluded from the list of HPL products. Further, 100% fruit 
and vegetable juices and unsweetened milk are excluded from the HPL. Among 
other exemptions, 100% fruit and vegetable juices and milk and milk-based drinks 
were not subject to the Danish Soda Tax.161 Similarly, because “added sugar” for 
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purposes of the SDIL excludes intrinsic sugars from fruits, vegetables and milk, 
100% fruit and vegetable juices and unsweetened milk is exempt from this tax.162 
Soft drinks used for medicinal purposes are also excluded from the SDIL.163 
However, the exemptions for milk drinks for purposes of the SDIL are broader than 
that of the HPL. Milk-based beverages are exempt in the UK, where these contain 
more than 75% milk in the prepared beverage, and milk substitute beverages are 
exempt where they contain more than 120 milligrams of calcium per 100 millilitres.164  
The exemptions for milk and fruit and vegetable beverages for purposes of the 
PBT are broader than that for both the HPL and the SDIL: drinks containing more 
than 50% milk or fresh fruit and vegetables are excluded from the application of the 
PBT.165 These exemptions in terms of the PHPT are even broader than those 
available in terms of the SDIL and the PBT. For syrups and concentrates for making 
SSBs in terms of the PHPT, an exemption is applicable where these products 
contain more than 25% fruit or vegetable content.166 Further, for ready-to-drink 
SSBs, an exemption is available where these contain either more than 25% fruit or 
vegetable content, or more than 50% milk solids.167 The Portion Cap Rule in NYC 
would have also excluded beverages containing more than 50% milk or a soy-based 
milk substitute.168 As a result, drinks such as milkshakes could be excluded from this 
rule where the relevant Food Service Establishments (“FSEs”) could prove that these 
drinks contained more than 50% milk or milk substitute, so excessive sugar 
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consumption from these drinks would not necessarily have decreased.169 For 
example, Dunkin’ Donuts could still offer large “Oreo Vanilla Bean Coolattas,” which 
contain around 174 grams of sugar (696 calories).170 Further, the Portion Cap Rule 
would have only applied to SSBs to which the manufacturer or FSE had added 
sugar. 100% fruit juices and beverages which were sweetened by the final consumer 
were therefore excluded.171 Similarly, unsweetened non-alcoholic beverages to 
which the consumer can add sugar, or request that the seller adds sugar, at the point 
of purchase are excluded from the application of the PBT.172 Further, baby formula 
and medical foods are also excluded from the PBT.173 
The SSBPT does not apply to beverages “in which milk is the primary ingredient.” 
Beverages “in which milk is the primary ingredient” are described as beverages in 
which milk constitutes a “greater volume of the product than any other.”174 In addition 
to these milk beverages, alcoholic beverages, beverages for medical purposes, 
beverages used as meal replacements or for weight loss, infant formula and 100% 
fruit and vegetable juices are excluded from the SSBPT.175 Further, “natural or 
common sweeteners” are excluded from the description of “added caloric sweetener” 
for purposes of the SSBPT.176 The Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico is not payable on 
patented medicines, milk in any presentation, and on beverages sold at restaurants 
and other places where food and beverage services are provided.177 Further, 
because this tax is only payable on beverages where added sugars or nutritive 
sweeteners are dissolved in water, 100% fruit and vegetable juices and calorie-free 
ASBs are also excluded.178 
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170 Neistat “Soda Ban Explained” The New York Times.  
171 NYC Health Code § 81.53(a)(1)(B); Neistat “NYC Soda Ban explained, sort of (New York Times 
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Donuts could still sell such drinks in medium- and large-sized containers. 
172 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Municipal Code § 19-4101(3)(c). 
173 § 19-4101(3)(c). 
174 Berkeley, California, Municipal Code § 7.72.030(A), (J) & (O)(2). For purposes of the milk drink 
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substitutes for milk, such as almond milk or soy milk. 
175 § 7.72.030(A), (J) & (O)(2). 
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brown sugar and granulated white sugar 
177 Arts 8(I)(f) & 13(VII) de la Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción Servicios. 




In addition to 100% fruit and vegetable juices, milk-based beverages, milk 
substitute beverages and soft drinks used for medicinal purposes, alcohol substitute 
beverages are also exempt from the SDIL.179 Alcohol substitute beverages are soft 
drinks which are “similar to a particular kind of alcoholic beverage,” and are 
packaged and marketed as direct replacements “for the particular kind of alcoholic 
beverage to which it is similar.”180 The marketing of alcohol substitute beverages 
may not be directed at children under the age of 18, and one of the further conditions 
must be met for the exemption to apply: the beverage is manufactured from an 
alcoholic beverage through de-alcoholisation; the beverage is manufactured through 
mixing with fruit juice, beer, cider, wine or made-wine; or the beverage is 
manufactured through a distillation or fermentation process whereby alcohol is 
produced, but the alcoholic strength does not exceed 1,2%.181 
4 5 Taxes targeting a broader range of food products and other nutrients  
4 5 1 Junk Food Tax in Mexico 
As discussed above, the introduction of the Flavoured Drinks Tax took place 
alongside the introduction of the Junk Food Tax in Mexico in 2013.182 This Junk 
Food Tax applies to certain: snacks; confectionery products; chocolate and other 
products derived from cocoa; puddings; fruit and vegetable sweets; peanut and 
hazelnut creams; dulches de leche; cereal-based food products; and ice cream, ice 
snow and ice popsicles.183 “Snacks” are described as processed foods made from 
flours, grains and cereals, and include processed fruits and seeds.184 Further, 
confectionery products include marzipan, gelatine, marshmallow and nougat, and 
fruit and vegetable sweets include marmalades and crystallised fruits and 
vegetables. Chocolate and products derived from cocoa include any presentation of 
these food and drinks products containing a homogeneous mixture of any amount of: 
cocoa paste; cocoa butter; or cocoa and sugar or other sweeteners.185  
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180 Ss30(4)(a) and 30(5) of the UK Finance Act 2017 c.10; Reg 9(2) of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy 
Regulations 2018 No. 41; “Alcoholic beverage” is defined as a beverage with an alcoholic strength 
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181 Regs 9(2)-(5) of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy Regulations 2018 No. 41. 
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There are two conditions for the Junk Food Tax to apply to a food product: it 
needs to be classified in terms of the list of the relevant products; and it needs to 
have an energy density exceeding 275 kilocalories per 100 grams. The Junk Food 
Tax is distinct from the Flavoured Drinks Tax, as most sugary drinks have a lower 
energy density than 275 kilocalories per 100 grams. Once a food product is 
classified in terms of this list, its energy density is determined from the nutritional 
information provided on its label.186 If the label does not provide for the caloric 
density as a proportion per 100 grams, then the total number of kilocalories in the 
product is multiplied by 100, and divided by the total weight of the product in 
grams.187 If a food product does not apply a label, then it is assumed that it contains 
an excess of 275 kilocalories per 100 grams, unless it can be proven otherwise.188  
Because certain food products are considered to be an important component in 
the general diet of the Mexican population, certain basic foods are excluded from the 
operation of the Junk Food Tax. These include: wheat and corn tortilla; non-sweet 
breads; sugar-free crackers with a maximum sodium content of 1200 milligrams per 
100 grams; and cereal-based foods for young children and infants. Further, foods 
prepared with a cereal base are not considered to be food preparations that require 
an additional process to be eaten directly. Tax authorities acknowledged that basic 
foodstuffs should not be included under the Junk Food Tax, because this would be 
regressive.189 Unlike the Flavoured Drinks Tax, there is no provision for earmarking 
the revenues collected from this tax, nor have any commitments been made for this 
revenue be used for health promotion initiatives.190 
4 5 2 Saturated Fat Tax in Denmark 
As mentioned above, saturated fat was identified as a large contributor to certain 
health issues and deaths attributable to dietary risk factors in Denmark in 
2009.191 According to self-reported data in 2005, the average saturated fat 
consumption in Denmark represented around 14,5% of total energy intake.192 
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Further studies indicated that: Danish people consumed an average of 35 grams of 
saturated fat per day during the period 2003 to 2008; and that saturated fat 
comprised around 15 to 16% of Danish daily energy intake, which was above the 
10% recommended maximum intake.193 Animal products and vegetable fats were 
identified as the primary sources of saturated fat intake. These products include milk, 
butter, margarine, vegetable oils, cheeses and meats. In order to reduce the 
consumption of saturated fat, it would be optimal to for the tax to target these primary 
sources.194 However, because of the varying saturated fat contents in different cuts 
of meat and the associated administrative difficulties in distinguishing between these, 
the Prevention Commission provided that meats should be excluded from the tax 
base.195 
The Saturated Fat Tax was introduced in March 2011, and came into effect in 
October 2011.196 This tax was imposed at a rate of DKK 16 per kilogram of saturated 
fat in the following foods (“saturated fat foods”), where the saturated fat content 
exceeded 2,3 grams per 100 grams: certain meats; certain dairy products; certain 
animal fat products; certain food oils and fats; certain margarines; certain lubricating 
mixtures; and other food products which could be considered to be a substitute or 
imitation of these foods.197 Unlike the thresholds used for taxes targeting sugary 
products, this 2,3 grams per 100 grams saturated fat threshold was not intended to 
incentivise product reformulation, but to: encourage consumers to consume less 
saturated fat; and ensure that milk would be excluded, because most milk contains 
less than 2,3% saturated fat, and was considered to be a healthy component of 
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saturated fat used in food preparation. 
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195 144. 
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marketed. Annex 1 provides standard saturated fat contents and rates for different types of meats. 
Although the rate of DKK 16/kg was lower than that provided in the Prevention Commission’s 
Recommendations, it was estimated that the inclusion of meat in the tax base would raise the 




children’s diets. Further, the nature of most of these saturated fat foods is such that 
reformulation would be impractical and likely impossible. While it is possible to 
reformulate certain dairy products, meat, for example, cannot be reformulated to 
contain less fat.  
In theory, a tax formulated in this way might have the strongest deterrent effect on 
saturated fat consumption, because: the prices of these foods would increase 
relative to their saturated fat content; and in the case of meats, there would be 
incentive for consumers to replace fattier types and cuts of meats with relatively less 
fatty options. However, as the Prevention Commission cautioned, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the varying contents of saturated fat in different meats and cuts 
of meat.198 Further, a large portion of the meats sold in retail stores was supplied as 
whole animal carcasses before being processed into smaller cuts. In order to 
minimise administrative difficulties in calculating the saturated fat content in meats, 
the Saturated Fat Tax provided for standardised saturated fat contents for different 
meats.199 This has been criticised, because the larger tax burden on fattier cuts of 
meat relative to leaner cuts of the same meat was eliminated. This aspect of 
formulation was not in line with the objective to reduce saturated fat consumption; it 
did not provide incentive for consumers to purchase cuts of meat with lower 
saturated fat contents in such cases, because they did not become relatively 
cheaper than the fattier cuts of meat.200  
The tax period was one month, and the tax base was the weight of saturated fat in 
these foods, except for the standard saturated fat contents for meats.201 For Danish 
manufacturers, the tax was calculated according to the total weight of saturated fat 
foods produced during the tax period, and for commercial importers, the tax was 
calculated according to the total weight of taxable foods that were received or 
imported during the tax period.202 It could be argued that the health impact would be 
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199 Jensen et al (2015) PHN 3086. 
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Saturated Fat Tax. 
201 Lov nr. 247 af 30.03.2011 om afgift af mættet fedt i visse fødevarer (fedtafgiftsloven) § 6 & 14.  
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calculated according to the total weight of saturated fat foods used to produce their food products, 




emphasized and substitution effects minimised because the Saturated Fat Tax 
targeted saturated fat itself. However, even with the standard saturated fat contents 
for meats, this tax imposed a heavy administrative burden on taxpayers, who were 
required to calculate and documents the content of saturated fat in the taxable foods.  
For saturated fat foods other than meat, the calculation could be based on the 
nutrition declaration, publicly available food information or a technical analysis on the 
food. If the taxpayer failed to document the weight of saturated fat in the taxable 
foods, then the tax was paid on the weight of the total fat content in the final food 
product. If it was not possible to calculate the weight of the total fat, then the tax was 
calculated according to the total weight of the final food product. The customs and 
tax administration had the discretion to adjust the taxable amount based on fat 
content or total weight, if it was considered that the amount was less than it should 
have been, had it been calculated correctly. 203  These provisions could be compared 
to the treatment of concentrates in the HPL in South Africa: where the targeted 
products do not comply with the relevant labelling or documentary requirements, 
much higher contents of the targeted nutrients could be assumed as a form of 
punitive measure. 
Similarly to the argument highlighted by Lloyd and MacLaren that taxes targeting 
sugar itself would present administrative complications in the case of imports, the 
calculation of tax liability for imported saturated fat foods was even more complicated 
than for the calculation for domestically-produced saturated fat foods.204 Take, for 
example, potato crisps fried in vegetable oil. Local manufacturers of potato crisps 
would have bought the vegetable oil at a higher price as a result of the tax, and 
passed through some of these increased costs to consumers of the final product. In 
this way, the health objective is emphasized, because a broad range of saturated fat 
                                                                                                                                      
manufacturers who manufactured saturated fat foods for export, or foods that were unfit for human 
consumption; these manufacturers were not required to pay tax on the portion of production that 
was exported or unfit for human consumption. For commercial importers and registered companies 
that received or imported saturated fat food exclusively for trade with other registered companies, 
the tax was calculated according to the total weight of taxable foods that were received or imported 
during the tax period. Further, distance sellers calculated the tax according to the volume of 
taxable food sold during the tax period. However, for Danish wholesalers, the tax was calculated 
according to the total weight of saturated fat foods used to produce their food products, including 
waste and shrinkage, etc. 
203 § 6. For example, in the case where whole animals are not delivered, taxpayers have the election 
to either: deduct 27,5% for pigs, and 25% for other animals; or calculate the base according to cuts 
of meat delivered, based on publicly available food information. 




in a broad range of products is targeted, and not just the specified saturated fat 
foods. However, where potato crisps were imported into Denmark, the manufacturer 
outside of Denmark did not necessarily pay the increased prices for the vegetable oil 
used to fry the potato crisps, so the price of this product would not reflect the same 
increase as the domestically-manufactured product. In order to overcome this hurdle, 
a cover charge was imposed on these other foods received, imported or sold by 
distance selling into Denmark.205 Unlike the treatment of imported saturated fat 
foods, this cover charge was paid according to the saturated fat foods used to make 
these other foods.206 
Similarly to the provisions for saturated fat foods other than meat: taxpayers for 
the cover charge were required to calculate, document and provide a declaration on 
the weight of saturated fat in the taxable foods used to produce these other food 
products.207 These calculations were based on the standard rates for meat and other 
publicly available food information, and higher tax liability was imposed where 
taxpayers did not provide the relevant declaration.208 While the approach for 
domestically-manufactured products more accurately reflected the price increase 
according to their saturated fat contents, the approach for imported equivalents was 
inconsistent. For example, the amount of tax payable on imported potato crisps 
could be calculated according to the total volume of vegetable oil used to fry them, 
which would be a much larger liability for these products, compared to similar 
domestically-manufactured products. 
4 5 3 Public Health Product Tax in Hungary 
PHPT is levied on certain pre-packaged food products that contain an excess of 
specified amounts of salt, sugar, or caffeine.209 There is also a PHPT category for 
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certain alcoholic beverages, which targets alcohol, but this category will not be 
further discussed in this thesis.210 Of the food excise taxes considered in this thesis, 
PHPT has the broadest scope of taxable products. When PHPT was implemented in 
September 2011, these products included certain pre-packaged: SSBs; 
confectionery products; energy drinks; salty snacks; and powdered soups and salty 
condiments.211 After January 2012, the tax was extended to include sugar-
sweetened cocoa powders, syrups, fruit jams, flavoured beers and alcoholic 
refreshments.212 The tax base is the total volume or mass of the relevant products, 
expressed as litres or kilograms. For each of these categories of taxable products, 
there is a different flat tax rate, and different thresholds for the content of the 
targeted nutrients and ingredients.213 Therefore, PHPT is a nutrient-based tax that 
applies flat rates for the targeted products above a certain tax-free threshold content 
of the relevant nutrients and ingredients. 
As discussed above, the PHPT has five categories targeting sugar, including 
SSBs.214 Although flavoured beer and alcoholic refreshments contain alcohol, these 
categories are taxed according to their sugar content. This category is distinct from 
both: the category specifically targeting alcohol content; and the SSB category, 
because it applies to these beverages that contain both alcohol and added sugar. 
The category flavoured beer covers drinks similar to soft drinks, but that: contain 
beer; have a sugar content exceeding 5 grams per 100 millilitres; and have an 
alcohol content of less than 5%.215 The same characteristics of the flavoured beer 
category apply to alcoholic refreshments, but instead of beer, these drinks contain 
spirits or liqueurs such as whisky, gin, vodka, spirits derived from distilled grape 
wine, rum and other spirits derived from cane sugar.216 These categories target both 
                                                                                                                                      
consumer; they contain a predetermined amount of product, in units expressed in terms of mass or 
volume; and this predetermined amount cannot be varied without modifying or breaking the 
packaging. 
210 § 2(i). 
211 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról § 12(1); WHO Regional Office for Europe 
Assessment of the Impact 16. 
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sugar and alcohol content, and have been included under the PHPT since 2012. The 
tax rate for these drinks was HUF 20 per litre from 2012 to 2018, and increased to 
HUF 25 per litre in 2019.217 The category for fruit jams includes: fruit jams; fruit 
extracts; marmalades; fruit jellies; fruit or nut pastes or purees.218 This category was 
included in 2012, and covers fruit jams with a sugar content exceeding 35 grams per 
100 grams.219 From 2012 to 2018, the rate was HUF 500 per kilogram, and 
increased to HUF 600 per kilogram in 2019.220 Unlike the SSB category, the tax-free 
sugar content threshold is stricter for these beverages, and the rates are higher. 
The final category targeting added sugar in confectionery products includes: 
products without cocoa (“sugar-sweetened confectionery”); products containing 
cocoa, where cocoa comprises less than 40% of the product (“sugar-sweetened 
cocoa confectionery”); and products containing more than 40% cocoa (“sugar-
sweetened cocoa powder”).221 Products containing a minimum of 20% honey, and 
less than 40% sugar are excluded from this category.222 Sugar-sweetened 
confectionery products include the following, where these products contain an 
excess of 25 grams of sugar per 100 grams of product: white chocolate; liquorice 
extract; chewing gum; breads; cakes; pastries; biscuits; wafers; waffles; rice paper; 
cracker bread; ginger bread; matzos; ice cream; and edible ice.223 Sugar-sweetened 
cocoa confectionery include the following products, where these products have a 
sugar content exceeding 40 grams per 100 grams of product, contain cocoa, and 
comprise less than 50% milk: sugar-sweetened cocoa powder; chocolate slabs; filled 
chocolate bars; chocolate spreads; and preparations for making beverages.224 The 
rate for sugar-sweetened confectionery was HUF 100 per kilogram in 2011, which 
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and 2105. 
224 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról § 2(cb); European Commission Taxation 




increased to HUF 130 per kilogram in 2012 and to HUF 160 per kilogram in 2019. 
Sugar-sweetened cocoa powders were only included under the scope of PHPT from 
2012. From 2012 to 2018, the rate for these products was HUF 70 per kilogram, 
which increased to HUF 85 per kilogram in 2019.225 
The PHPT category for energy drinks targets caffeine. Energy drinks are defined 
as soft drinks as described above,226 which contain methyl xanthine.227 While these 
drinks contain methyl xanthine, they may also contain taurine.228 This category is 
thus subdivided into: energy drinks containing taurine (“taurine energy drinks”); and 
energy drinks not containing taurine (“methyl xanthine energy drinks”). Where energy 
drinks have a methyl xanthine content exceeding 1 milligram per 100 millilitres, then 
any taurine content will classify them as taurine energy drinks. Where the methyl 
xanthine content in these drinks is less than 1 milligram per 100 millilitres, then their 
taurine content needs to exceed 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres in order to be 
classified as taurine energy drinks.229 The threshold content of methyl xanthine for 
methyl xanthine energy drinks is 15 milligrams per 100 millilitres.230 From 2011 to 
2018, the rate for taurine energy drinks was HUF 250 per litre, which increased to 
HUF 300 per litre in 2019.231 Methyl xanthine energy drinks were only included under 
the scope of PHPT from 2013. From 2013 to 2018, the rate for methyl xanthine 
energy drinks was HUF 40 per litre, which increased to HUF 50 per litre in 2019.232 
PHPT has two categories targeting salt: salty snacks; and powdered soups and 
salty condiments. The salty snacks category includes certain ready-to-eat products 
that: contain grains, potatoes or seed oils; are processed by curing, roasting or 
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extruding; and have a salt content exceeding 1 gram per 100 grams of product.233 
Salty snacks include: thinly sliced fried or baked potatoes, regardless of whether or 
not they are flavoured; pre-packaged fruit and nuts, including pineapples, citrus 
fruits, pears, apricots, peaches, nectarines, strawberries, palm hearts, other tropical 
fruits, peanut butter and roasted peanuts; and breads, cakes, pastries, biscuits, 
wafers, waffles, rice paper, cracker bread, ginger bread and matzos.234 The PHPT 
category “powdered soups and salty condiments” includes the following, where these 
products have a salt content exceeding 5 grams per 100 grams: sauces; 
preparations for sauces; condiments; seasonings; mango chutney; aromatic bitters; 
soya sauce; soups; broths; and preparations for soups and broths.235 The rate for 
these two categories targeting salt was originally HUF 200 per kilogram, and 
increased to HUF 250 per kilogram in January 2012.236 In 2019, the tax rate for 
these categories increased to HUF 300 per kilogram.237 Since January 2012, breads 
and bakery products with a salt content of less than 2 grams per 100 grams of 
product were excluded from the PHPT.238  
4 6 Conclusion 
Nutrient-based taxes are more effective for pursuing health objectives than taxes 
that target a category of unhealthy foods or beverages with no reference to their 
nutritional content.239 General taxes on goods and services usually apply ad valorem 
rates and do not differentiate between the nutritional content of foods and 
beverages, so the potential to pursue health objective with these taxes is limited.240 
Although specific tax rates are more complicated and difficult to implement, ad 
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valamint a bevándorlási különadóról § 136 & 255. 
238 2011. évi CIII. Törvény a népegészségügyi termékadóról § 2(d); Biro (2015) Food Policy 8. 
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valorem rates are not recommended for food excise taxes.241 Likewise, without the 
use of thresholds, flat rate levies are not the most effective formulation option for 
health promotion objectives.242 SSB taxes are often criticised for not targeting a 
broader range of sugar-sweetened products.243 However, it may not be practical or 
even possible to introduce a tax that covers all possible substitutes. The 
administrative complications that could arise from a tax that targets all dietary 
sources of a particular nutrient are demonstrated in the case of the Saturated Fat 
Tax in Denmark. While a number of jurisdictions have targeted the sugar content in a 
broader range of food products, these other dietary sources of sugar may contain 
other beneficial nutrients apart from sugar, which are more satiating and increase 
“nutritionally adequate” energy consumption.244  
With the exception of the PBT, the taxes discussed under heading “4 Taxes 
targeting sugar-sweetened beverages” are SSB taxes, as described in heading “2 1 
Overview of comparative jurisdictions” as “nutrient-based food excise taxes on SSBs 
that are levied with some reference to their sugar content.” SSB taxes are more 
effective for health objectives than soft drinks taxes through the reprising 
channels.245 Because the PBT treats SSBs and ASBs similarly, there is limited 
incentive for consumers to substitute less sugary beverages and for manufacturers 
to reformulate these soft drinks to contain less sugar in line with health promotion 
objectives. However, because the impact of such tax on consumer and manufacturer 
behaviour is probably smaller than that of SSB taxes, its revenue streams are more 
stable. The main differences between the SSB taxes discussed are the scope of 
products targeted by the tax, the type of specific tax rates applied, the extent to 
which the tax increases the prices, and the use of tax-free thresholds according to 
sugar content.  
Most SSB taxes have a tax-free threshold sugar content, to encourage 
consumption of SSBs below this threshold, and to encourage manufacturers to 
reformulate their SSBs to contain less sugar. For example, the PHPT in Hungary is 
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only charged on SSBs that contain more than 8 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres.246 
Although not a “tax-free” threshold, after the Danish Soda Tax was changed in line 
with health objectives in 2010, differentiated rates were applied for SSBs that 
contained more and less than 0,5 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres respectively.247 
Similarly to the 5 grams per 100 millilitres threshold in terms of the SDIL in the UK, 
the HPL applies a tax-free threshold of 4 grams per 100 millilitres.248 However, the 
HPL is unique in that HPL products above this threshold are taxed per gram of sugar 
above 4 grams per 100 millilitres, while these other SSB taxes apply a flat rate.249 
Further, the SDIL is unique in that it applies a flat levy to two tiers of SSBs according 
to their sugar content: £0,18 per litre for SSBs that contain between 5 and 8 grams of 
sugar per 100 millilitres; and £0,24 per litre for SSBs that contain more than 8 grams 
of sugar per 100 millilitres.250 Depending on the tax administrative capacity and the 
channel through which the tax is intended to improve health objectives: specific tax 
rates that target the total content of the targeted nutrient are probably the most 
effective option for discouraging consumption through increased prices; and specific 
tax rates that apply differentiated thresholds or tiers are likely to be more conducive 
to product reformulation.251  
The use of either of these specific tax rates is complicated by the lack of 
mandatory labelling regulations on the provision of nutritional information. As 
discussed above, such regulations are arguably an indispensible foundation for most 
interventions aimed at improving the consumer food environment, and particularly for 
levying nutrient-based taxes.252 While all of the other jurisdictions discussed have 
such regulations in place, South Africa does not. As a consequence, legislators have 
resorted to applying punitive higher rates for HPL products that do not supply 
nutritional information on their labels. Although this is an attempt to combat it, the 
current formulation of the HPL provides opportunities for manufacturers to engage in 
tax avoidance. The use of tax-free thresholds is also complicated in the case of 
concentrates and preparations for making SSBs. The HPL and the SDIL payable on 
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these products are both calculated according to the sugar content in the final 
product, as diluted according to the manufacturers’ directions. While equal tax 
treatment of these products might be important for the health objective, the 
administrative complications involved could be minimised if a similar approach to that 
of the PHPT in Hungary were used. While ready-to-drinks SSBs containing more 
than 8 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres are taxed at HUF 15 per litre, concentrates 
in excess of 8 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres are simply taxed at HUF 240 per litre 
and the amount of sugar in the prepared beverages is not considered.253 
Most jurisdictions exclude certain milk drinks, fruit and vegetable juices, alcoholic 
beverages, medicines and infant formula.254 Although milk and fruit juices contain 
natural sugars, unlike SSBs containing added sugars exclusively, these drinks offer 
some additional nutritional value.255 These drinks are also more difficult to 
reformulate than SSBs containing added sugars exclusively, and fruit agriculture 
contributes to “rural employment and incomes.”256 For these reasons, most 
jurisdictions exclude 100% milk and fruit and vegetable juices from their SSB 
taxes.257 However, there are a number of differences between the scope of milk 
drinks and fruit and vegetable juices excluded from these taxes. For example, only 
100% milk and fruit and vegetable juices are excluded from the HPL, while the SDIL 
excludes milk-based drinks that contain more than 75% milk, and the Public Health 
Product Tax (“PHPT”) excludes ready-to-drink beverages that contain more than 
50% milk or 25% fruit or vegetable content.258 Because these milk drinks and fruit 
and vegetable juices are potential substitutes for the targeted SSBs, it is important to 
consider the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand for these drinks. 
Stacey et al (2017) argued that the own-price elasticity of demand for 100% fruit and 
vegetable juices was negligible in 2017, so the inclusion of these drinks would not 
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improve the HPL’s impact on health unless the food industry actively started to 
promote these drinks as substitutes for targeted SSBs.259 
                                            




CHAPTER 5: IMPACT ON OBESITY AND OTHER OBJECTIVES 
5 1 Introduction 
The relevant aspects of formulation that could influence the effectiveness of the 
taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages in the selected comparative jurisdictions 
were considered in Chapter 4. This Chapter discusses the impact that these taxes 
have had on health and other outcomes in these jurisdictions, and comments on how 
certain aspects of formulation might have influenced these. It is further considered 
how other developments and non-market-based interventions in these jurisdictions 
might influence the effectiveness of the market-based interventions. The relevant 
legal challenges in the United States of America (“USA”) are discussed, because the 
effectiveness of these interventions is greatly limited where they are repealed. 
Further criticisms of these interventions are expanded, with reference to the 
considerations and aspects of formulation discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Because the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (“SDIL”) and the Philadelphia Beverage 
Tax (“PBT”) in particular have been implemented more recently than the taxes in 
Denmark, Hungary and Mexico, this discussion focuses on these older taxes. With 
reference to the limited available evidence, comments are made on the impact of the 
SDIL and the PBT, but it will be necessary to monitor their effectiveness in the 
following years. Following the discussion on the comparative jurisdictions, recent 
research on the effects of the HPL is considered, and comments are made on: 
whether changes to the HPL’s current formulation could result in improved health 
outcomes; and whether development of certain non-market-based interventions in 
terms of the “multiple-intervention approach” could complement the HPL’s objective. 
5 2 Comparative jurisdictions 
5 2 1 Legal challenges in the United States of America 
5 2 1 1 Portion Cap Rule in New York City 
As discussed above, the limited scope of SSBs and Food Service Establishments 




effectiveness in changing consumption and health.1 Apart from these criticisms 
however, this rule was particularly unpopular in the SSB industry.2 The Portion Cap 
Rule was set to enter into effect in 2013, but in October 2012, the soft drink industry 
and a number of other businesses and organisations challenged the authority of the 
NYC Board of Health to implement such a rule. The New York County Supreme 
Court found that the Portion Cap Rule: was a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine on the part of the NYC Board of health; and was arbitrary and capricious.3 
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals confirmed that the NYC Board of Health 
exceeded its scope of regulatory authority in adopting this rule.4 Upon this 
determination by the New York Court of Appeals however, the question of whether 
this rule was also arbitrary and capricious was not considered.5 
In considering whether the NYC Board of Health violated the separation of powers 
doctrine, both courts applied the test used in Boreali v Axelrod (“Boreali”),6 which is 
used to distinguish between legislative policy-making and administrative rule-making. 
The test used in Boreali involves the consideration of certain “coalescing 
circumstances” which “paint a portrait of an agency that has improperly assumed” 
legislative power. One of these circumstances is whether there was an “effort to 
weight the goal of promoting health against its social cost and to reach a suitable 
compromise.” In Boreali it was provided that the Public Health Commission had 
“constructed a regulatory scheme laden with exceptions based solely upon economic 
and social concerns,” but that achieving “the proper balance among health concerns, 
cost and privacy interests... is a uniquely legislative function.”7 The Court of Appeals 
emphasized that policy-making should only be exercised by the people’s duly 
elected legislative branch.8 Because the Portion Cap Rule involved value judgments 
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on economics and personal autonomy, the Board of Health engaged in policy-
making, and the rule was invalidated.9 Although this rule did not come into effect, it 
has been argued that the attention it drew to the obesity discussion was a positive 
outcome.10 
5 2 1 2 Philadelphia Beverage Tax 
Similarly to the Portion Cap Rule and other SSB taxes, the food industry was 
strongly opposed to the PBT. Between January and June 2017, the American 
Beverage Association alone spent just under $3 million on marketing campaigns 
against the tax.11 Further, during the period July to September 2017, the former 
mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, is reported to have spent around $2,3 
million on marketing campaigns in favour of the PBT.12 This tax was challenged in 
the Common Pleas Court in 2016, and upheld by the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania in 2017 in Williams v City of Philadelphia (“Williams 2017”).13 On 
appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also upheld the tax in Williams v City of 
Philadelphia (“Williams 2018”).14 This legal action was brought by a group of 
retailers, consumers, distributors and trade associations, and there were three main 
arguments against this tax: that the PBT was pre-empted by SNAP legislation, which 
provides that taxes may not be levied on food items bought with SNAP benefits;15 
that the PBT violates the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
because the tax results in unequal treatment;16 and that the PBT amounts to double 
taxation on soft drinks in terms of the Sterling Act of August 5, 1932 (“Sterling Act”), 
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because these beverages are already subject to the state sales tax in 
Pennsylvania.17 Pre-emption of double taxation in terms of the Sterling Act was the 
only issue considered in Williams 2018, and these other two arguments were 
rejected in the lower courts.  
The PBT was not found to be in conflict with the SNAP provision restricting State 
and local governments from levying taxes on foods purchased with SNAP benefits, 
because it is levied against non-retail distributions and not retail purchase 
transactions.18 The Commonwealth Court in Williams 2017 referred to the 1975 
decision in Gurley v Rhoden (“Gurley”),19 where the issue of determining the legal 
burden of taxation was addressed. It was provided in Gurley that, in order to 
determine the legal incidence, the plain language and legislative intent of the 
relevant statute needs to be considered. Regardless of the economic burden, the 
legal burden is the important consideration. In terms of the plain language of the 
Philadelphia SSB tax, the tax liability is on distributors, defined as “any person who 
supplies sugar-sweetened beverages to a dealer,” and the tax is triggered when a 
“distribution” is made. Therefore, because the legal burden of this SSB tax is on the 
distributors, there is no conflict with SNAP legislation.20 Further, the Commonwealth 
Court found that the PBT was not in conflict with the Uniformity Clause of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that “all taxes shall be uniform, upon the 
same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and 
shall be levied and collected under general laws.”21 However, the Commonwealth 
Court provided that the PBT only applies to one class, and held that this was a 
“specific tax uniformly applied to all members of the class, distributors, and therefore 
meets the requirements of the uniformity clause.”22   
The Sterling Act provides that “first class” cities have the authority to levy taxes, 
provided that they may not exercise this authority on products or transactions 
already subject to state taxes. In both Williams 2017 and Williams 2018, the plaintiffs 
                                            
17 Williams v City of Philadelphia 188 A.3d 421 (Pa. 2018). 
18 Williams v City of Philadelphia 164 A.3d 576 2077 (CD 2016) 2078 (Pa Cmwlth. 2017) 587-594. 
19 421 US 200 205 (1975). 
20 Williams v City of Philadelphia 164 A.3d 576 2077 (CD 2016) 2078 (Pa Cmwlth. 2017) 587-594. 
Regardless of whether or not the tax is ultimately passed through to consumers, because the 
relevant legislation provides that the legal burden is on the distributors, there is no conflict with the 
SNAP provisions. 
21 Williams v City of Philadelphia 164 A.3d 576 2077 (CD 2016) 2078 (Pa Cmwlth. 2017) 595; The 
Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 Art. VIII, § 1 s1. 




argued that, because these PBT beverages were already subject to the 6% sales tax 
in Pennsylvania, PBT amounted to double taxation and was therefore in conflict with 
the Sterling Act. However, both the Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court found that there was no double taxation, because the PBT and the 
Pennsylvania sales tax applied to different subjects: the PBT applies to distributions 
of these beverages; while the sales tax applies to retail sales of these beverages. As 
with the rationale that the PBT was not pre-empted by SNAP legislation, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided that the main consideration for double 
taxation is the legal incidence, and not the economic incidence of the tax. It was 
further provided that any fairness concerns were of a legislative, and not a judicial 
nature.23 Following the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Mayor Kenney 
issued the following statement: 
 “I am grateful to the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for their fair and 
careful review of this case... Beyond the legal resolution, today’s decisive ruling offers 
renewed hope for tens of thousands of Philadelphia children and families who struggle 
for better lives in the face of rampant poverty. 
“Those families – and Philadelphia as a whole – now have a clear path toward 
substantive, tangible improvements in their lives.  It is a path that will bring the 
educational gains of free, quality pre-K seats, the benefits to neighborhoods brought 
by Community Schools, and the quality of life improvements and economic benefits 
brought by rebuilding parks, recreation centers, playgrounds and libraries.  These 
programs, funded by the beverage tax, will fuel the aspirations and dreams of those 
who have waited too long for investments in their communities.  The City of 
Philadelphia will now proceed expeditiously with our original plans – delayed in whole 
or part by nearly two years of litigation — to fully ramp up these programs now that the 
legal challenge has been resolved.”24 
Mayor Kenney stated that the tax was successfully implemented because it was 
framed as a revenue-raising tax, which was earmarked for health and education 
programmes. He believes that transparency was an important aspect of the 
sustainability of the tax.25 Lockwood agrees that the association between the tax and 
the spending programmes is an important factor for sustainability, because the 
previously proposed taxes were not linked to any specific spending programmes.26 
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However, Lockwood argues that the PBT is not the best source of funding for this 
pre-K education, and that income taxes may be a better option.27  
Further criticisms of the PBT include that: the money spent on lobbying and 
litigation could be better spent actually funding the relevant programmes; the PBT 
has caused job losses; and that its revenue-generating capacity is limited because 
consumers could purchase these beverages for lower prices in neighbouring cities.28 
Soft drinks and SSB taxes in the USA have been criticised because of the 
inconsistencies between each state. Consumers in states with sugar taxes can avoid 
the tax by buying these products in a neighbouring state, so it is argued that a 
nation-wide tax in would be more effective in reducing consumption.29 In terms of the 
Sterling Act, “first class” cities and towns are those with more than one million 
residents.30 Philadelphia is the only first class city in Pennsylvania, so it is the only 
city in Pennsylvania with such a tax. If people in Philadelphia simply drive over the 
Ben Franklin Bridge in order to purchase soda in New Jersey, then consumption 
would not be reduced and there would be no health benefits. In this way, the PBT 
could lead to undesirable consequences, such as wasted fuel and time, and 
increasing pollution from motor vehicles.31 
5 2 2 Saturated Fat Tax in Denmark 
5 2 2 1 Impact on prices 
The Saturated Fat Tax was expected to be fully passed through to consumers, 
and it was estimated that these price increases would reduce consumption of the 
targeted products by 4%.32 Jensen et al estimated that the Saturated Fat Tax had a 
very small or insignificant impact on the prices of certain low-fat and medium-fat 
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products, and only high-fat products showed any meaningful price increases.33 This 
finding supports the health objective, because the prices of higher-fat products 
increased more than for lower-fat products. Thiele and Roosen observed that the 
prices of oils and fats increased significantly.34 The prices for butter, margarine, 
cooking oils, olive oils and vegetable oils increased in line with the expectations of 
the Ecorys Report.35  
The lowest price increase observed was for olive oils, which have a relatively low 
content of saturated fat. Further, the highest price increase observed was for cooking 
oils, which have a relatively high content of saturated fat.36 This effect that the prices 
increased more for oils and fats that had relatively higher saturated fat contents is in 
line with the health objective. The Ecorys Report further observed that the tax on oils 
and fats was fully passed through to consumers, and retailers’ and manufacturers’ 
profit margins remained the same.37 An ex post analysis done by Jensen and Smed 
showed mixed results for the tax’s effects on prices: supermarkets increased their 
prices of margarines and blends in line with the tax increase, but under-shifted the 
tax in the case of oils and butter; and discount stores increased their prices of oils 
and blends in line with the tax, but increased their profit margins for butter and 
margarine.38  
5 2 2 2 Impact on consumption and health 
As a result of the increased prices, the demand for most oils and fats either 
continued to decline, or decreased suddenly.39 The Ecorys Report observed that the 
demand for vegetable oil remained stable, and increased for olive oil after 2012, 
while the demand for other categories of oils and fats decreased by between 5,5% 
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and 8,2%. The differences in the demand changes between these categories could 
be because olive oils and vegetable oils have relatively less saturated fat than butter, 
margarine and cooking oils: because the tax imposed on these products was less 
than the other categories, their price increases were relatively smaller and they may 
have become relatively cheaper.40 The Ecorys Report further observed a small 
increase in the market share for non-premium brands across most products, at the 
expense of premium brands and unclassified brands.41 These trends continued after 
the introduction of the tax, with two exceptions: there was a sharp increase in the 
market share for non-premium olive oils, and the small share of the market held by 
premium brands for cooking fats was almost totally eradicated.42  
Jensen and Smed estimated that the tax-induced price increases resulted to a 
10% to 15% reduction in consumption of oils and fats, which corresponded to a 3,66 
gram decrease in saturated fat consumption per person per day.43 However, 
hoarding effects were observed, and these authors caution that these results should 
also be interpreted carefully because the data period was relatively short.44 It was 
further observed that there was a shift in demand from supermarkets towards 
discount stores. Such a shift does not support the health objective, because the 
effects on consumption are reduced.45 Bodker et al considered the substitution 
effects between saturated fat foods and other foods, and estimated that there was a 
total 911 000 kilogram reduction in the consumption of butter, butter blends, 
margarines, fats, oils, cheese, cream, sour cream, chips, snacks, cookies and 
biscuits.46 These authors estimated an average reduction in consumption of 2,16%, 
which is much smaller than the 10% to 15% reduction estimated by Jensen and 
Smed. It is explained that these different results may arise from the differences 
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between the populations studied.47 Bodker et al also considered the demand for food 
products not specifically targeted by the tax, such as chips and biscuits, and 
estimated that the consumption of these products increased by an average of 
1,53%.48 
Jensen et al estimated that there was a 4% to 6% reduction in consumption of 
saturated fat from cream and minced beef, but no change in saturated fat 
consumption from sour cream.49 These authors argue that such a reduction in 
saturated fat consumption would have a limited impact on the health objective. Using 
survey data, Smed et al modelled the effects that the Saturated Fat Tax had on 
energy intake, and consumption of saturated fat and other nutrients.50 These authors 
found that there was an average decrease in consumption of saturated fat of 4%. 
Further, this study found that there was an average 7,9% increase in vegetable 
consumption and a 3,7% increase in fibre consumption. The above results are all in 
line with the general objective of reducing saturated fat consumption. However, this 
study found that the tax also led to a number of undesirable substitution effects. For 
example, the consumption of fruit decreased for certain age groups, and the 
consumption of salt increased for certain age groups.51  
As a result of the estimated changes in the relevant saturated fat foods and other 
foods, Bodker et al estimated the following nutritional changes, as a proportion of 
total energy intake: the consumption of saturated fat decreased from 7,3% to 7%; the 
consumption of monounsaturated fat decreased from 5,6% to 5,4%; and the 
consumption of polyunsaturated fat decreased from 2,1% to 2%.52 Unsaturated fat is 
regarded as an important nutrient in a healthy diet, so this unintended consequence 
might mitigate the positive impact on health. Using two different models, it was 
estimated that these changes in consumption could result in either: a 0,3% decrease 
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48 Bodker et al (2015) Prev. Med 202. This average increase in consumption is comprised of the 
following changes in consumption of these other products: the consumption of chips increased by 
11,7%; the consumption of snacks increased by 1,7%; the consumption of cookies decreased by 
2,7%; and the consumption of biscuits decreased by 4,6%. The total increase in consumption of 
these other foods undermines the health objective of the Saturated Fat Tax, although the 
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49 Jensen et al (2015) PHN 3091. 
50  S Smed, P Scarborough, M Rayner & J Jensen “The effects of the Danish saturated fat tax on food 
and nutrient intake and modelled health outcomes: an econometric and comparative risk 
assessment evaluation” (2016) 70 EJCN 681 682. 
51 683. Fruit consumption decreased for women, older women and younger men, and salt 
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in the risk of ischemic heart disease (“IHD”), which corresponds to 50 averted IHD-
related deaths per year; or a 0,2% increase in the risk of IHD, which corresponds to 
40 more IHD-related deaths per year.53 As a result of the estimated changes in 
consumption of saturated fat, sodium, fibre and fruits and vegetables, Smed et al 
estimated that deaths as a result of IHD would decrease, but there would be an 
increase in deaths caused by strokes and heart failures.54 Overall, these authors 
estimated that this tax had a slightly positive impact on health, with 123 deaths 
averted per year.55  
There is no literature on product reformulation as a result of the Saturated Fat 
Tax. This could be due to the fact that: the fat content in these products cannot be 
reduced; low fat alternatives of the taxed products existed before the tax was 
introduced; and for distance sales and wholesalers, the tax was not levied on the 
saturated fat in the final product, but on the fat used to produce it.56 From a survey 
conducted by the Danish Food and Drink Federation, the members of the Dansk 
Industri (“DI”) stated that up to 35% of the fat used in production was wasted.57  For 
these reasons, industry organisations believe that the tax should rather have been 
paid on the saturated fat contained in the final product.58  
It has also been argued that the standard rates for meats did not support the 
health objective, because certain cuts of the same meat have different fat contents.59 
Further, in order to maintain sales, it was possible for retailers to distribute their 
increased costs across other products that were not subject to the tax. This 
behaviour is in conflict with health objectives where healthier foods become relatively 
more expensive as a result.60 It is difficult to predict any long-term health effects, as 
this tax was only implemented for 15 months. The Ecorys Report concludes that the 
Saturated Fat Tax did achieve both of its policy objectives of health promotion and 
revenue generation, although at the expense of the affected companies.61 However, 
based on the findings of Smed et al and Bodker et al, it is arguable that the predicted 
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consumption changes would have had a marginal impact on public health. Further, 
because many Danish consumers crossed the national borders to purchase the 
targeted foods, the predicted health effects may be even less significant.62   
5 2 2 3 Impact on other policy objectives 
The Saturated Fat Tax was repealed with effect from January 2013.63 The 
decision to repeal this tax was made without consulting any evidence as to its 
effectiveness in improving consumption and health.64 Rather, it was submitted that 
this tax was repealed due to economic concerns, including increasing administrative 
costs for companies and threatening Danish jobs. Social welfare was also 
specifically considered, and the regressive impact of such food taxes on lower socio-
economic groups was acknowledged.65 This tax increased the administrative burden 
for all the relevant taxpayers: wholesalers and taxpayers who were subject to the 
cover charge faced the additional burden of supplying the relevant declaration on the 
saturated fat used in production;66 retailers also incurred administrative costs in 
adjusting their IT systems and recalculating tax rates;67 and even companies that did 
not produce foods for human consumption were subject to the increased 
administrative burden of registering in terms of the Saturated Fat Tax in order to 
apply for the reimbursement.68 It was estimated that Danish companies paid DKK 
500 million for this tax in 2011, and that DKK 50 million (10%) of these costs were 
administrative costs.69 The Danish Chamber of Commerce estimated that the total 
administrative costs to retail and wholesale companies was DKK 200 million, and the 
Danish Agriculture and Food Council estimated that the annual administrative costs 
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were DKK 100 million for its members.70 As a result of these increased costs, many 
staff members were retrenched in order to offset the administrative burden.71  
This tax was also blamed for the increase in the inflation rate: in November 2011, 
it was estimated that this tax caused the inflation rate to increase by 4,7%, while real 
wages decreased by 0,8%.72 The Danish Chamber of Commerce and Danish 
Agriculture and Food Council estimated that this tax resulted in: a 0,16% percentage 
point increase in the general inflation rate; the food inflation increasing from 3,38% to 
4,66%; and decreased consumer spending, which would lead to job losses, 
predominantly in the retail sector.73 It has been estimated that 1 300 Danish jobs 
were lost in 2011 as a result of the increased administrative costs and decreased 
consumer spending. Further, this tax increased cross-border trade.74 For these 
reasons, this tax was very unpopular among Danish consumers.75 It has been 
suggested that, in order for health taxes to be sustained, it is important to maintain 
public and political support for these taxes. Healthcare professionals should be 
consulted for perspective on how to formulate these taxes effectively around the 
health objectives. If this is not done, then the purpose of these taxes will be 
perceived to be revenue collection, and they will become unpopular and vulnerable 
to lobbying and repeal.76   
The repeal of the Saturated Fat Tax was part of a range of other tax reforms 
aimed at improving the Danish economy, including the increase of income tax rates, 
the repeal of the Soda Tax, and the dismissal of plans to increase the Chocolate and 
Confectionery Tax and Ice Cream Tax rates.77 The Soda Tax was also criticised for 
its economic effects, and its repeal was triggered due to the poor reception of the 
Saturated Fat Tax.78 Accordingly, the Soda Tax rates were first reduced from July 
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2013, and then the tax was totally repealed from January 2014.79 According to the 
Danish Ministry of Taxation’s Trade Report in 2010, it was estimated that the cross-
border trade in soda products had stabilised at around 100 million litres per year.80 
Where it is possible for consumers to purchase taxed products in nearby 
jurisdictions, the health impact is reduced and the relevant local industries 
experience reduced sales.81 
Following the tax changes in 2013 and 2014, the demand for soda products 
increased by: 7% for regular cola; and 4,9% for low-calorie cola.  However, the 
Ecorys Report provides that it is unclear to what extent these demand increases 
were attributable to the tax decreases, given the volatility of the market for these 
products.82 Further, because there were numerous tax changes, it is difficult to 
determine how the market would have responded without the Soda Tax. It is 
therefore necessary to interpret any of these observations cautiously. According to a 
report from June 2018 however, the cross-border trade has decreased for soda, beer 
and chocolate and confectionary.83 As a result of this decrease, it is provided that 
there has been an increase in the turnover of Danish stores, which is beneficial for 
the Danish businesses themselves, and also creates more jobs.84 There was a 
proposal to increase the rates for both the Chocolate Tax and the Ice Cream Tax 
from January 2018.85 However, these proposals were revised, and various other 
                                            
79 Lov nr. 789 af 28.06.2013 om ophævelse af lov om afgift af mineralvand m.v. og om ændring af øl- 
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80 Skatteministeriet “Tax changes on beer and wine” (05-05-2010) Skatteministeriet 
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82 Ecorys Report 36. 
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84 Skatteministeriet “Borders fall: the Danes pick up fewer beers, soda and candy bags on the other 
side of the border” Skatteministeriet. 
85 Bekendtgørelse nr. 1163 af 05.09.2016 af lov om afgift af chokolade- og sukkervarer m.m. 
(chokoladeafgiftsloven) [Executive Order on the Chocolate Tax Act] § 2, 19 & 22; Lov nr. 1686 af 
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amendments were made to the Chocolate Tax Act, in order to: make these products 
more affordable for Danish consumers; reduce cross-border trade; and reduce the 
tax burden on Danish businesses.86 The rate for Chapter 1 chocolate and 
confectionery products was not increased in 2018, and the rates for Chapters 2 and 
3 products were reduced;87 waffles were excluded from the Chocolate and 
Confectionery Tax, and a reimbursement was made available for commercial ice 
cream manufacturers for chocolate and confectionery products used to manufacture 
ice cream since April 2019;88 and the tax on Chapter 2 products is abolished, and 
peanuts and other nuts are excluded from the Chocolate and Confectionery Tax from 
January 2020.89 
5 2 3 Public Health Product Tax in Hungary 
5 2 3 1 Impact on prices and product reformulation 
It was expected that the PHPT would generate HUF 5 billion in 2011, and HUF 20 
billion in each 2012 and 2013. From September 2011 to December 2014, the PHPT 
generated HUF 61,3 billion: HUF 3,27 billion in 2011; HUF 19,5 billion in 2012; HUF 
                                                                                                                                      
amending the Chocolate Tax Act, the Consumer Ice Cream Tax and several other laws] § 4. It was 
proposed that the rates for: high-sugar ice cream and Chapter 1 products increase to DKK 7,36/l 
and DKK 27,39/kg respectively; and low-sugar ice cream and Chapter 1 products increase to DKK 
5,88/l and DKK 23,30/kg respectively. It was also proposed that the rates for Chapters 2 and 3 
products be increased in 2018. 
86 Lov nr. 924 af 18.09.2012 om ændring af lov om forskellige forbrugsafgifter, 
brændstofforbrugsafgiftsloven, tonnageskatteloven og forskellige andre love [Act amending the Act 
on various consumption taxes and various other laws] § 5. The Ice Cream Tax rates since January 
2015 are still applicable: DKK 6,98/l for high-sugar products; and DKK 5,58/l for low-sugar 
products. 
87 Lov nr. 1686 af 26.12.2017 om ændring af chokoladeafgiftsloven, lov om forskellige 
forbrugsafgifter, kildeskatteloven, lov om afgift af konsum-is, spiritusafgiftsloven og øl- og 
vinafgiftsloven § 1, 12-20 & 22-23. 
88 Lov nr. 1728 af 27.12.2018 om ændring af tinglysningsafgiftsloven og forskellige andre love og om 
ophævelse af lov om afgift af antibiotika og vækstfremmere anvendt i foderstoffer [Act amending 
the Land Registration Tax Act and various other laws] § 5; Bekendtgørelse nr. 1163 af 05.09.2016 
af lov om afgift af chokolade- og sukkervarer m.m. (chokoladeafgiftsloven) § 8. Previously, ice 
cream manufacturers were only able to apply for a 45% deduction for chocolate and confectionery 
products used to manufacture ice cream. 
89 Lov nr. 1686 af 26.12.2017 om ændring af chokoladeafgiftsloven, lov om forskellige 
forbrugsafgifter, kildeskatteloven, lov om afgift af konsum-is, spiritusafgiftsloven og øl- og 
vinafgiftsloven § 1; Bekendtgørelse nr. 1163 af 05.09.2016 af lov om afgift af chokolade- og 
sukkervarer m.m. (chokoladeafgiftsloven) § 22. From January 2018 – December 2019, Chapter 3 
products are those containing 6 categories of taxable constituents: coconut; peanuts; other nut 
kernels, bulk products made wholly or partially from taxable products; other low-sugar taxable 
ingredients; and other high-sugar taxable ingredients. From January 2020, the tax on Chapter 3 
products only includes 2 categories of products containing: high-sugar taxable ingredients; and 
low-sugar taxable ingredients. Kindly refer to Annex G for the corresponding rates applicable to 




18,9 billion in 2013; and around HUF 20 billion in 2014. This is generally in line with 
the estimated revenue.90  Biro estimated that the average prices of processed foods 
increased by 10,2% over the period September 2011 to January 2012.91 Of the 
manufacturers who participated in the survey for the NIHD Assessment: around 92% 
increased the prices of their PHPT products, of which around 79% fully passed the 
tax through to the prices, and around 13% only increased their prices by a portion of 
the tax; and only 8% did not increase their prices in response to the tax.92 According 
to the Ecorys Report, energy drinks was the only category where prices did not 
increase as expected; and the prices for the categories of SSBs, salty snacks and 
pre-packaged confectionery mostly increased as expected, in line with the tax 
increases.93 
In addition to existing price trends, product reformulation and strategic pricing 
behaviour, a number of factors contributed to these price changes. In the survey for 
the NIHD Assessment, participating manufacturers provided that the following 
factors contributed to their price increases, in descending order of importance: the 
increased prices of raw materials; the increased VAT rate from 25% to 27% in 
2012;94 the increase in minimum wages; the introduction of the Food Chain 
Supervision Fee in 2012;95 the introduction of the Environment Product Fee in 
2011;96 and the narrowing of the domestic supply chain.97 Further, sugar inflation 
was volatile, and increased substantially in 2011.98 For example, one interviewee in 
the Ecorys Report explained that the prices of cocoa powdered beverages increased 
by 35% in 2012, but that PHPT only contributed 6,1% to this price increase; the 
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91 Biro (2015) Food Policy 17.  
92 NIHD Assessment 15. 
93 Ecorys Report 34; Biro (2015) Food Policy 7-9. 
94 European Commission & Eurostat Taxation trends in the European Union 2014 95. 
95 2011. évi CLXVI. Törvény Magyarország 2012. évi költségvetését megalapozó egyes törvények 
módosításáról [Law amending certain laws establishing Hungary’s 2012 budget] § 82; 2008. évi 
XLVI. Törvény az élelmiszerláncról és hatósági felügyeletéről [Law on the food chain and 
regulatory supervision] § 1 & 47B(1)-(3). 
96 2011. évi LXXXV. Törvény a környezetvédelmi termékdíjról [Law on the Environmental Product 
Fee] preamble & § 1(3) & 39. 
97 NIHD Assessment 16. 
98 Biro (2015) Food Policy 24; Hungarian Central Statistical Office “Consumer price indices by 
detailed groups of expenditure (2000-)” KSH; R Balázs “Taxation in Europe- Yearbook 2013 
Hungary” (29-11-2013) IREF Europe <https://en.irefeurope.org/multi-pages/914/Hungary> 
(accessed 04-04-2019)., the excise tax rates on alcohol, tobacco products and fuel were increased 




remaining 28,9% was due to other factors, such as the VAT increase and the 
increased prices of raw materials.99 
The prices of regular cola increased by a total 4,6% over the period 2011 to 2012, 
which was more than the expected 3,1%. Further, the profit margins for both retailers 
and manufacturers of SSBs increased over the period 2011 to 2013. This indicates 
that PHPT was over-shifted for the SSB category, and that strategic pricing 
behaviour was employed. This was particularly visible in the case of juices, where 
retailers’ profit margins for untaxed juices increased significantly, while their profit 
margins for taxed juices increased only slightly.100 The chocolate and confectionery 
category had the largest price increases, with total 10,6% and 9,9% increases for 
chocolate and confectionery respectively in the period 2011 to 2012. These price 
changes are much larger than the expected 4,9% increase for chocolate and 5,4% 
increase for confectionery.101 For salty snacks, prices increased by 11,7% over the 
period 2011 to 2012, which was less than the expected 18,1% increase.102 However, 
the price increases for this category were consistent with the pre-existing price 
trend.103 Lastly, the prices of energy drinks did not respond to PHPT as expected, 
and actually decreased in 2011 and 2013. It was expected that energy drinks prices 
would increase by 37,5% over the period 2011 to 2012, but these prices only 
increased by 1% in 2012, and decreased by 0,7% and 1,9% in 2011 and 2013 
respectively.104 This could be because the original thresholds were too high, and 
most energy drinks escaped the application of PHPT. However, after the thresholds 
were lowered, these products were reformulated and the taxed ingredients were 
replaced by others, such as taurine.105 In response to this reformulation, regulators 
included taurine in the tax base for energy drinks after 2013.106  
As discussed above, increasing prices is one of several ways in which 
manufacturers respond to taxes on production. An initial report done by the WHO 
suggested that there were significant reformulation efforts after PHPT was 
                                            
99 Ecorys Report Annexes 219. 
100 Ecorys Report 29 & 34. 
101 25-28 & 34. 
102 34. The price of salty snacks increased by 6,3% in 2011, by 5,4% in 2012, and by 3,3% in 2013. 
103 30. 
104 34. 
105 Biro (2015) Food Policy 7-9. 




implemented.107 According to the NIHD Assessment, around 40% of manufacturers 
reformulated their products, and of the manufacturers that indicated how they 
reformulated their products: around 41% reduced the quantity of the targeted 
ingredient; 29% reduced the quantity of the targeted ingredient and replaced it with 
another ingredient; 18% completely removed the targeted ingredient and replaced it 
with another ingredient; and 12% completely removed the targeted ingredient and 
did not replace it with another ingredient.108 In addition to the energy drinks category, 
reformulation also occurred on a smaller scale for chocolate and confectionery.109 A 
number of food manufacturers have argued that there is limited incentive to 
reformulate products due to: the strict threshold quantities for the targeted 
ingredients; and the fact that the tax is not charged according to the content of the 
targeted ingredients in the final product as consumed, but on the content of these 
ingredients in the products as they are sold. Further, many manufacturers claim to 
have reformulated a number of their products before PHPT was implemented. 
Although the introduction of the PHPT contributed to these reformulation efforts, a 
number were already underway.110 
The decision to reformulate will depend on a number of considerations. For 
example, in addition to price, taste is an important decision-making factor for 
consumers. After the PHPT was implemented, most peanut manufacturers 
introduced a non-salted version of these products, and the average Hungarian 
consumer regarded these versions as “tasteless.” Because salt itself is not subject to 
the PHPT, consumers may change their consumption patterns by purchasing the 
non-salted, non-taxed peanuts and adding their own salt. Where this is done, the 
health objective is not achieved through the reformulation channel nor through the 
increased prices channel. It may even be possible that consumers add more salt to 
the non-taxed, un-salted peanuts than the original, taxed peanuts, which would have 
a more harmful effect on health. The decision to reformulate will take into 
consideration whether the benefit of reformulating a product to escape the tax 
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outweighs the potential for consumers to stop purchasing the product because they 
no longer enjoy the taste.111 
The importance of taste was confirmed in the NIHD Assessment.112 According to 
the survey done for this study: between 85% and 90% of consumers considered the 
taste to be the most important aspect of decision-making; the price was regarded as 
an important aspect by 80% to 85% of consumers; between 50% and 65% of 
consumers considered the brand to be an important aspect; and only around 35% to 
50% of consumers considered the energy and nutritional composition as an 
important factor. Particularly in the case of SSBs, 92% of consumers regarded taste 
to be the most important factor. For energy drinks, consumers regarded the caffeine 
content as a very important factor.113 As discussed above, product reformulation 
should aim to gradually change consumers’ taste expectations, and should be a co-
ordinated effort by manufacturers and the government health authority. Where taste 
is an important factor for consumers and reformulation occurs suddenly or in 
isolation, consumers are more likely to reject the reformulated products.114 
5 2 3 2 Impact on consumption and health 
Hungarian consumers responded in a number of ways to the increased prices 
after the introduction of the PHPT. In line with the policy objective, some consumers: 
reduced their consumption of PHPT products; or substituted towards healthier, 
untaxed products. However, substitution effects were observed that were not in line 
with the health objective, where: consumers substituted PHPT products with other 
products containing the targeted ingredients, but that were not subject to PHPT 
either because they did not fall within the specified tariffs codes, or because they 
were not pre-packaged; and consumers substituted PHPT products for cheaper 
versions that were still subject to the PHPT.115 These latter substitution effects are 
not in line with the health objective, because: consumers did not reduce their 
consumption of the harmful ingredients; and the substituted products may even 
contain higher levels of the harmful ingredients. 
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It is difficult to estimate the exact impact that this tax had on sales and 
manufacturers’ and retailers’ profit margins, because: most of the affected 
businesses do not produce or sell PHPT products exclusively; and there were pre-
existing decreasing demand trends for SSBs, confectionery and salty snacks.116 Of 
the manufacturers who participated in the survey for the NIHD Assessment, the 
majority reported that their sales of PHPT products had decreased after PHPT was 
implemented: average monthly sales decreased for around 77,5% of these 
manufacturers; while around 17,5% reported that they had experienced no changes 
to their average monthly sales; and only around 5% reported that their average 
monthly sales had increased.117 Further, the NIHD Assessment found that, of 
Hungarian consumers who consumed PHPT products in 2011, 26% to 35% 
consumed less of these products in 2012.118 For the period 2011 to 2013, the Ecorys 
Report observed that the average consumption of PHPT products decreased by 10% 
to 15%.119 An initial report done by the WHO suggested that there was a 27% 
decrease in sales of the targeted foods.120 According to the WHO’s final report 
however, consumption had decreased by between 11% and 28% by 2014, 
depending on the product category.121  
The Ecorys Report observed the following changes in consumption of SSBs: the 
consumption of “cola” decreased by 2,7% in 2011, by 7,5% in 2012, and by 6% in 
2013; and the consumption of juice decreased by 2% in 2011, by 2% in 2012, and by 
4,4% in 2013.122 For the period 2011 to 2013, the consumption of “cola” decreased 
by a total of 16,2%, and the consumption of juices decreased by a total of 8,4%. 
These findings are similar to those of the WHO, which reported that the consumption 
of SSBs had decreased by 20% in 2014.123 According to industry figures for the 
period 2011 to 2013, SSBs sales decreased by: 15,1% for carbonated soft drinks; 
14,24% for fruit juices; 2,7% for juices, 11,11% for fruit nectars; 15% for fruit drinks 
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and teas; and 10% for iced teas.124 Overall, industry data indicated that the sales of 
carbonated soft drinks decreased by 15,1%, and sales of juices decreased by 2,7% 
over this period.  However, there was a pre-existing, decreasing trend for SSB 
demand: between 2007 and 2011, the demand for carbonated soft drinks had 
decreased by 13,51%, and the demand for juices had decreased by 22,92%. This 
decreasing demand trend was accelerated with the introduction of PHPT.125 Further, 
there was a significant decrease in consumption of cocoa beverages in 2011, with 
substitution towards other sugary drinks including milk products, fruit juices and tea 
products.126  
The Ecorys Report observed that the consumption of: confectionery increased by 
0,3% in 2011, decreased by 0,7% in 2012, and increased by 0,2% in 2013; and 
chocolate increased by 1,3% in 2011, by 0,3% in 2012, and decreased by 0,1% in 
2013.127 Further, the sales of premium brand confectionery increased after the 
second year of implementation.128 This is in line with the demand trend for previous 
years, and the Ecorys Report found that the demand for these categories remained 
stable and did not respond to price increases.129 However, based on findings of the 
WHO and data provided by PHPT manufacturers, demand for these products 
decreased beyond the pre-existing trend.130 The WHO reports that the consumption 
of pre-packaged sweets decreased by 14%. Further, industry data showed that: the 
sales of candies decreased by 15,1%, the sales of dragées decreased by 13,31% 
and the sales of desserts decreased by 10,88%; chocolate slabs was the only 
product in this category for which sales increased, by 3,02%.131  
According to the Ecorys Report, the consumption of salty snacks decreased by 
7,6% in 2011, by 6,2% in 2012, and then by 0,6% in 2013.132 The total decrease in 
consumption for the period 2011 to 2012 was thus 13,8%. This finding is similar to: 
industry data, which indicated a 13,9% decrease in consumption over the same 
period; and the WHO’s final report, which found that there was a 16% decrease in 
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consumption.133 However, the findings on the consumption changes for individual 
products within these categories were different.134 Based on industry figures, the 
sales of certain products within this category decreased as follows: by 15,4% for 
chips; by 22,2% for nuts; and by 15,3% for floury products, which include pretzels 
and salty sticks, etc.135 Industry data indicate that there was substitution away from 
taxed salty snacks, towards popcorn which is not subject to PHPT.136 This 
substitution effect is not necessarily in line with the health objective, because the 
popcorn consumed may contain even more salt than the taxed salty snacks. 
 Further, there was a decrease in consumption of seasonings.137 The WHO 
reported that the consumption of powdered soup and salty condiments had 
decreased by 11% by 2014.138 Between 2011 and 2013, industry data indicate that 
there was a 14,29% decrease in sales of seasonings, and decreases between 
3,73% and 32,19% for various types of soups.139 Untaxed mono-spices compete 
with PHPT seasonings, so the decrease in consumption of seasonings indicates that 
there was an increase in consumption of mono-spices. Further, because mono-
spices are used in home cooking, the decrease in demand for seasonings indicates 
that a number of consumers returned to home cooking. Similar to the substitution of 
popcorn for taxed salty snacks, this substitution towards home cooking may not be 
desirable in terms of the health objective, because home-cooked meals may contain 
the same level or even more of the targeted, harmful ingredients.140 
The Ecorys Report observed that the consumption of energy drinks initially 
increased by 13,1% in 2011, before decreasing by 6,8% in 2012 and 6,6% in 
2013.141 This finding was similar to those of: PHPT manufacturers, whose sales data 
indicate that energy drinks consumption decreased by 31,4% during 2011-2013; and 
the WHO, which reported that energy drink consumption had decreased by 28% by 
2014.142 According to the data analysis in the Ecorys Report, the demand for energy 
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drinks increased from 2005 to 2011, and only decreased after 2012 because of the 
amended definitions in this category.143 However, industry data showed that the 
demand for energy drinks was already decreasing before PHPT was implemented: 
between 2007 and 2011, the demand for this category had decreased by 38,6%.144 
From the above, it can be concluded that PHPT had a significant impact on the 
consumption of the targeted products. However, these consumption changes did not 
necessarily result in healthier consumption patterns, because: not all harmful 
ingredients were targeted by the tax; consumers replaced targeted products with 
other unhealthy products; portion-control is not necessarily present for home-
cooking, and home-cooked meals may contain even more of the targeted 
ingredients; and substitution towards untaxed products and cheaper brands of the 
same products does not lead to decreased consumption of the targeted nutrients, 
because these substituted products may even contain more of the targeted 
nutrients.145 
According to the WHO, during the period 2012 to 2014, the number of Hungarians 
consuming PHPT products: decreased from 22% to 16% for energy drinks; 
increased from 55% to 60% for sugar-sweetened soft drinks; increased from 68% to 
84% for pre-packaged sweets; and increased from 69% to 71% for salty snacks.146  
Although the proportion of Hungarians consuming these products increased for most 
of the categories considered, the WHO reports various changes in consumption 
patterns that had an overall desirable impact on public health. The WHO found that, 
of Hungarians who consumed these products: 2% to 6% substituted for different 
products; 5% to 11% chose different brands; 5% to 16% reduced their consumption; 
and 7% to 16% chose cheaper products.147 Further, for consumers who changed 
their consumption for the categories of SSBs, sugar confectionery, salty snacks, 
salty condiments and fruit jams, the NIHD Assessment found that 26% to 28% 
changed their consumption patterns positively, in line with PHPT’s health 
objective.148 
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The WHO found that the majority of consumers who substituted PHPT products, 
substituted healthier options.149 For example: 63% of energy drinks consumers and 
61% of sugar-sweetened soft drinks consumers who substituted these products, 
chose mineral water; and 82% of pre-packaged sweets consumers and 86% of salty 
snacks consumers who substituted these products, chose fresh fruits and 
vegetables. The majority of consumers who changed their consumption patterns, 
maintained these changes, but up to 12% of these consumers increased their 
consumption later.150 Further, the WHO found that overweight and obese individuals 
were more likely to change their consumption patterns than normal weight or 
underweight individuals: of Hungarian consumers who consumed PHPT products, 
overweight and obese individuals were 1,8 to 2,7 times more likely to change their 
consumption patterns than normal weight or underweight individuals.151 Importantly, 
overweight and obese individuals were found to be 1,9 times more likely to reduce 
their consumption of SSBs than normal weight or underweight individuals.152 
However, there were a number of factors that influenced consumption, apart from 
the tax-induced price changes.153 For example, the finding of the Ecorys Report that 
consumers substituted cheaper brands of the taxed products was a pre-existing 
trend, which may have been driven by the economic crisis.154 The increased VAT 
rate and prices of raw materials also affected consumers’ purchasing power before 
the PHPT was implemented. Initially, price increases were the primary reason for the 
reduction in consumption. Over time, however, increased awareness on the 
unhealthy nature of these products became similarly as important as price increases 
in reducing consumption.155 The WHO reports that this may be due to a number of 
factors, including that: consumers might have become accustomed to the increased 
prices; manufacturers and retailers might have absorbed the price increases; and 
health promotion campaigns might have further deterred consumption.156 
According to the NIHD Assessment, the two main reasons for reduced 
consumption were the increased prices, and consumers learning about the adverse 
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health effects of PHPT products.157 Of the 26% to 35% of consumers who consumed 
less PHPT products: between 60% and 80% provided that they did so due to the 
increased prices; and 15% to 35% provided that they did so because they learned 
about the negative health effects.158 With regards to consumer knowledge about 
PHPT, the following was observed from the survey conducted in the NIHD 
Assessment: more than two-thirds of consumers were aware that PHPT was 
implemented since September 2011, and that energy drinks, soft drinks and salty 
snacks were subject to this tax; just over 60% knew that pre-packaged sugar 
confectionery was subject to PHPT; just over 50% knew that powdered soups and 
seasonings were subject to PHPT; and less than half of consumers were aware that 
flavoured beer and alcoholic refreshments were subject to PHPT. Further, many 
consumers were mistakenly under the impression that certain non-taxed products 
were subject to PHPT: more than 40% believed that coffee was subject to PHPT; 
between 30% and 35% believed that fresh pastries were subject to PHPT; and 
around 15% believed that 100% fruit juices were subject to PHPT.159 
Before PHPT was implemented, Hungary had a number of existing health policy 
measures. In terms of information and education, and regulations on the availability 
of certain foods for school children, for example, the National Institute for Food and 
Nutrition Science has run an education programme for elementary schools since 
2010, which aims to: discourage SSB consumption; and promote water consumption 
by ensuring that free water is available at these schools.160 Further, in terms of 
marketing regulations, all advertising to children in elementary schools, dormitories, 
kindergartens and child protection institutions is prohibited.161 After PHPT 
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implemented, a number of other health policy measures were also introduced.162 For 
example, regulations were introduced in 2012, restricting the sale of PHPT foods and 
drinks on school premises and at events that were arranged for school children.  
Further, the sale of certain other food products through vending machines at schools 
is also prohibited, if these products do not comply with the nutritional guidelines of 
the National Institute of Pharmacy and Nutrition.163 Mandatory regulations on the 
maximum content of salt and trans-fatty acids (“TFAs”) were also introduced in 
Hungary in 2012 and 2013 respectively.164 The introduction of these additional 
measures is desirable from a public health perspective. However, the PHPT’s effects 
on consumption need to be understood in the context of these other changes; it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which these changes are attributable to PHPT, and 
how effective PHPT may have been without complementary measures. 
In addition to these other factors, data limitations also render it impossible to 
accurately estimate PHPT’s effects on health.165 Nevertheless, the WHO regards 
PHPT as a successful policy intervention, which achieved its policy objectives of: 
reducing consumption of the targeted products; promoting healthy diets; and 
improving the financing of health services.166 In its final report in 2015, the WHO 
commends PHPT for achieving the following: long-term reductions in consumption of 
PHPT foods, with 59% to 73% of consumers sustaining their reduced consumption; 
substitution towards healthier alternatives for over two-thirds of consumers who 
changed products; an increased likelihood of overweight and obese individuals to 
change their consumption habits; improved health literacy among the population; 
and a 25% increase in the wages of health sector workers.167  
To demonstrate the distributional impact of the PHPT, the WHO uses education 
levels as a signal of socioeconomic status.168 Awareness of PHPT differed between 
education levels, and that those with higher levels of education knew more about the 
tax than those with lower levels of education. The proportion of individuals 
consuming PHPT products was much higher for Hungarians with a primary level of 
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education than for those with secondary and higher levels of education. Further, as a 
result of PHPT, Hungarian consumers with a primary level of education had a higher 
tendency to change their consumption of PHPT products than those with secondary 
and higher levels of education.169 Biro is of the opinion that PHPT only reduced 
consumption of unhealthy foods among the lowest socio-economic groups, because: 
lower income groups have higher price sensitivities; and higher income groups are 
more likely to have had a higher education, and to have followed a relatively 
healthier diet before PHPT was implemented.170 
The revenue generated by PHPT is assigned to the Health Insurance Fund (“HIF”) 
in the government’s budget.171 These revenues contribute around 1% of the HIF’s 
income.172 This revenue was used to increase health sector wages by an average of 
17,6% in 2012, and by a further 8,2% in 2013. These wage increases benefited 
almost 95 000 health sector workers, including employees, workers and public 
servants working in government-, church- and higher education- owned health 
service providers.173 Although improved health education and healthcare funding are 
positive outcomes from PHPT, there has been little improvement in overweight and 
obesity prevalence since PHPT was implemented. OECD data indicate that the 
prevalence of overweight and obesity increased during the period 2007 to 2017. 
Self-reported data indicate that the prevalence of obese Hungarian adults: was 
around 19,5% in 2009, before PHPT was implemented; and had increased to 21% in 
2014, after PHPT was implemented.174 In terms of measured data, the prevalence of 
obesity among Hungarian adults: was 28,5% in 2010; and had increased to 30% in 
2015.175 Measured data show that the prevalence of obese 7- to 8-year-old children: 
was around 12% in the period 2007 to 2008; and had increased to around 13% by 
the period 2015 to 2017.176 The Hungarian Minister of State for Health Care, Zoltán 
Ónodi-Szűcs, has argued that, although this is concerning, it does not indicate that 
the health interventions have not been effective, because consumption changes 
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could take between five to ten years to translate to measurable health outcomes.177 
The latest data available for measured obesity rates is from 2015, but it will be 
interesting to monitor any changes in the future. Despite the increased prevalence of 
overweight and obesity since the implementation of the PHPT, the average life 
expectancy for Hungarians increased by 1,7 years between 2009 and 2015, to 75,7 
years.178  
5 2 3 3 Impact on other policy objectives 
As discussed above, the PHPT was implemented among various other tax 
changes. Due to unrealistic budgetary expectations, numerous other tax changes 
were also implemented after PHPT, with a total of nine tax packages in 2012 alone. 
A number of these tax changes were not well structured, which worsened growth 
prospects. The need for budget adjustments led to hasty changes in legislation, 
which needed to be amended due to difficulties in implementation. The frequent 
amendments caused uncertainty to increase. Further, the changes in consumption 
tax rates increased inflation, and inflation expectations remained high, which in turn 
led to even higher inflation.179  
Similarly to Denmark, the increased administrative costs for Hungarian 
manufacturers during the period 2011 to 2013 led to the close of a number of small- 
to medium-sized businesses and the retrenchment of around 1000 employees.180 
Local manufacturers were affected more severely than multinational companies,181 
which could make use of the export exemption;182 local manufacturers that only 
manufactured PHPT products for the local market were thus affected the worst, as 
these were not able to compensate any of their losses from foreign markets. Apart 
from disadvantaging local manufacturers that only manufactured PHPT products for 
the local market, the export exemption also created complexities in the supply chain 
for local manufacturers that manufactured PHPT products for both the local market 
and for export. Because there is no incentive for local manufacturers to reformulate 
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their products for export, many of these manufacturers who reformulated their 
products, only used these new formulas for the Hungarian market.183 
5 2 4 Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the United Kingdom 
The importance of considering the responses of the food industry when food 
excise taxes are introduced has been highlighted in the case of the SDIL. Although 
the UK government has appealed to the food industry to reformulate their products, 
the manufacturers could respond in a number of ways. Briggs et al have modelled 
the potential effects on health and consumption from three different industry 
responses: reformulation; price increases; and changes in market share.184 These 
authors estimated that the average per capita SSB consumption could be reduced 
by 58,5 millilitres per day, where manufacturers reduce sugar content in high-sugar 
and medium-sugar SSBs by 30% and 15% respectively.185 It was estimated that 
such a reduction in sugar consumption would decrease the prevalence of obesity by 
0,9%, and the incidences of T2DM by 31,1 persons per 100 000.186 Further, Briggs 
et al estimated that: where manufacturers choose to increase their prices for 
medium- and high-sugar SSBs by 50% of the levy, the average per capita SSB 
consumption could be reduced by 32,7 millilitres per day; and where manufacturers 
engage in behaviours to increase the market share for low- and medium-sugar SSBs 
by 12%, and decrease the market share for high-sugar SSBs by 12%, the average 
per capita SSB consumption could be reduced by 36,6 millilitres per day.187 
However, if the market share for low-sugar SSBs is only increased by 3% at the 
expense of high-sugar SSBs, Briggs et al estimate that the average per capita SSB 
consumption would increase by 3,6 millilitres per day.188 This would lead to a 0,1% 
increase in the prevalence of obesity and the incidence of T2DM would increase by 2 
persons per 100 000. If manufacturers introduce new medium-sugar SSBs into the 
market, it is possible that consumers might substitute: away from high-sugar SSBs, 
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which would be in line with the health objective; or away from low-sugar SSBs, which 
would lead to an increase in sugar consumption and undermine the health objective. 
The most substantial health improvements could thus be achieved where SSB 
reformulation leads to 30% and 15% reductions in sugar content of high- and 
medium-sugar SSBs respectively. These health benefits could be supplemented 
where prices of high-sugar and medium-sugar SSBs are increased, and where the 
market share of low-sugar non-alcoholic beverages is increased.189 Where 
manufacturers have a portfolio consisting of both SSBs and artificially-sweetened 
beverages (“ASBs”) however, they may choose to spread the price increases across 
all of their products. This would obviously not be in line with the health objective, as 
low-sugar substitutes would not become relatively less expensive.190 
During the period 2015 to 2017, the market share for low-sugar SSBs increased 
by around 5,31%, and the market share for medium- and high-sugar SSBs 
decreased by around 1,32% and 3,98% respectively.191 A report by Public Health 
England done in May 2018 indicates that there was an 11% reduction in sugar 
content for the products subject to the SDIL. Further, this report estimates that there 
was a 6% reduction in calorie consumption from SSBs, and substitution towards low-
sugar SSBs.192 Further, there was a reduction in the sales weighted average from 
146 kilocalories per portion of high-sugar SSBs in 2015, to 135 kilocalories per 
portion in 2017. On average across all non-alcoholic beverages, there were 
reductions in the sales weighted average sugar content from 3,9 grams per 100 
millilitres to 3,4 grams per 100 millilitres, and in the sales weighted average energy 
content from 65 kilocalories per portion, to 61 kilocalories per portion.193 It should be 
noted, however, that these reformulations and changes in market share took place in 
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the period leading up to the introduction of the SDIL, and were influenced by 
voluntary reformulation initiatives.194 
It therefore appears that the SDIL has prompted food manufacturers to introduce 
new low-sugar SSBs and reformulate certain existing medium- and high-sugar SSBs 
to contain less than 5 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres. For example, Coca-Cola 
Enterprises introduced Monster Hydro energy drink, and Lucozade Ribena Suntory 
has reformulated most of its portfolio. Coca-Cola has over 40% of the volume market 
share of carbonated soft drinks in the UK, and 14% of these sales are the Classic 
Coca-Cola brand. Coca-Cola is reluctant to reformulate its Classic brand, and has 
instead reduced its portion sizes, and increased off-trade unit prices.195 Further, the 
price of a can of regular Coca-Cola has increased by £0,08, from £0,70 by 
December 2018, and a 1,75 litre bottle of Coca-Cola has increased from around 
£1,25 to £1,49. This amounts to a price increase around 19,2%. It therefore appears 
that, while SDIL encourages manufacturers to reformulate their products, the 
increased costs for certain products have been passed through to consumers in the 
form of increased prices. However, there has been a pre-existing trend towards low-
sugar SSBs. The SDIL will likely encourage this trend, but where manufacturers do 
not reformulate, consumption changes will be encouraged through increased prices 
or reduced portion sizes.196 
5 2 5 Flavoured Drinks Tax in Mexico 
The average pre-tax price for carbonated soft drinks was around MXN 10,10 per 
litre in 2013, and it was expected that the tax would increase their prices by around 
9,9%.197 During the period 2013 to 2014, there was an 11% increase in the prices of 
carbonated flavoured drinks, and a 3% increase in the prices of non-carbonated 
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drinks.198 Further, there was an increase in the prices of diet soda, but the prices of 
other untaxed beverages did not change significantly.199 Preliminary results from the 
first quarter of 2014 showed that there was a 10% decrease in sales of soft drinks.200 
Similarly to most other food excise taxes, there is limited evidence on the changes in 
consumption of flavoured drinks in Mexico after the implementation of the Flavoured 
Drinks Tax.201 From the studies that are available, there are differing conclusions as 
to the changes in consumption, which usually result from different interpretations of 
the relevant data.202 Colchero et al (2016) initially estimated that there was a 6% 
reduction in sales in 2014, and that this reduction increased to 12% by December 
2014.203 It was estimated that such a reduction translated to around 4,2 fewer litres 
per person per year.204 
 Aguilar et al estimated that there was a 6,7% reduction in sales of the taxed 
drinks in 2014.205 Many sources, including the WHO, reference Colchero et al 
(2017a), who estimate that there was a 5,5% reduction in sales of the taxed drinks in 
2014, and a 9,7% reduction in 2015.206 A later study by Colchero et al (2017b) 
estimates that the reduction in sales of the taxed drinks in 2014 was closer to 
6,3%.207 Of this 6,3% reduction, the largest reductions were observed for low income 
households, where it was estimated that the sales of taxed drinks decreased by 
10,3%. Further, a 6,9% reduction in sales was observed for urban areas, compared 
to a 3,9% reduction for rural areas. It has also been estimated that the sales of 
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untaxed bottled water increased by 16,2% in 2014, and that the sales of untaxed 
beverages in general increased by 5,3% in the same year.208 
The impact on health is very difficult to assess because the tax has been in 
operation for a relatively short period of time, and will depend on a broad range of 
complicated factors. Aguilar et al estimated that a 6,7% reduction in consumption of 
soft drinks would lead to a 6% decrease in calorie consumption from these drinks.209 
Grogger uses demand elasticities and estimates that a 12% to 14% increase in 
prices could lead to an average weight loss of 2,5 to 3,7 pounds.210 It is 
acknowledged that this weight loss is not substantial enough to eliminate overweight 
and obesity. However, according to a report done in the USA, a 1% to 5% reduction 
in Body Mass Index (“BMI”) for adults could lead to meaningful health improvements 
and reduce healthcare expenditure.211 Because Mexico and the USA have similar 
weight distributions, Grogger suggests that a 1% to 5% BMI reduction in Mexico 
could also be considered significant for health improvements. Grogger calculated 
that a 1% BMI reduction for adults in Mexico would be equivalent to a 1,6 pounds 
average weight loss.212 Because it has been estimated that the prices of the targeted 
drinks would increase by at least 12%, which would lead to a 2,5 pound weight loss, 
Grogger concludes that the flavoured drinks tax will have a meaningful impact on 
health.213  
Sassi argues that the 6% reduction in sales and the 4,2 litre reduction in 
consumption estimated by Colchero et al (2016) might be insufficient, because it is 
unclear what substitution effects resulted from reduced soda consumption.214 
Colchero et al (2016) provide that a 7,3% reduction in consumption of the targeted 
drinks could have a positive impact on health.215 However, the tax rate might be too 
modest, and more significant health gains could be achieved if the tax rate was 
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increased.216 Andalón and Gibson point out a number of flaws used in the 
calculations done by other authors, and emphasize the need to consider the 
changes in the quality, rather than just changes in the quantity of the drinks 
consumed.217 According to Andalón and Gibson, there is evidence that quality 
adjustments did take place. Despite the 17,7% price increases in cheaper cities, the 
expenditure on the targeted drinks in these cities only increased by less than half of 
this rate. This indicates that, as the prices increased, consumers substituted for 
cheaper alternatives.218  Because of these effects, the studies estimating the health 
impact of the tax may be less accurate. After accounting for the relevant errors in 
other studies, Andalón and Gibson estimate that this tax will only result in an 
average weight loss of 1 pound, which is not considered to have a meaningful impact 
on health.219  
The Final Response Document compares the 10% price increase in Mexico to the 
anticipated price increases in South Africa as a result of the Health Promotion Levy 
(“HPL”), so it is also important to note the differences between SSB consumption in 
Mexico and South Africa. In 2013, the average per capita consumption of carbonated 
soft drinks was around 154 litres per year in Mexico, and around 70 litres in South 
Africa. Further, the average per capita calorie consumption from SSBs was around 
160 kilocalories per day in Mexico, and around 80 kilocalories per day in South 
Africa in 2014.220 These differences are significant: all things being equal, a 10% 
increase in SSBs prices in South Africa would likely lead to much smaller changes in 
sales and average energy intakes. In the words of the Final Response Document, it 
appears that “consumption of sugary beverages did decrease” in Mexico after the 
Flavoured Drinks Tax was introduced, but it is arguable that not any decrease in 
consumption justifies the imposition of such a tax; the decrease in consumption 
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should lead to some level of health improvements that outweigh the negative 
effects.221 
It has been reported more recently that the prevalence of overweight and obese 
adults over the age of 20 increased by 1,8 percentage points to 73% during the 
period 2012 to 2018. The Mexican government has reported that, in the light of this 
increase, existing obesity measures should be strengthened. However, it was also 
noted that the prevalence of overweight and obese school-aged children has 
reduced by 4,8 percentage points, to 32,1% over the same period.222 While the 
reduction in childhood obesity is clearly an important and commendable outcome, it 
is not clear to what extent the Flavoured Drinks Tax contributed to this reduction, 
particularly in the light of the increased prevalence of overweight and obesity among 
adults. Further, the consumption changes in Mexico took place in the context of 
other policy measures. For example, according to Popkin and Hawkes, there was a 
decline in SSBs sales before the soft drinks tax was implemented, possibly because 
of a successful civil society organisation media campaign aimed at raising public 
awareness about SSBs and diabetes through popular Mexican culture.223 
Other measures outlined in the Mexican Strategy include measures aimed at: 
increasing fruit and vegetable consumption; improving decision-making through 
labelling requirements; reducing the marketing of unhealthy foods; and decreasing 
the consumption of sugar, sodium and saturated fats.’ Mandatory guidelines for food 
and beverages in schools have been used in Mexico since 2011. These guidelines 
make use of certain nutritional criteria, and prohibit food products that do not comply 
with these criteria. Further, these guidelines prohibit soda, restrict the availability of 
other unhealthy food products to two days per week, and encourage the 
consumption of healthy foods and water. In terms of the mandatory labelling 
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regulations implemented in Mexico since 2014, front-of-package (“FOP”) labels are 
required to be applied to many pre-packaged food products, including dressings, 
cereals, flavoured drinks, candy, chocolate and desserts. In terms of calories or 
kilocalories, and as a percentage proportion of the recommended daily intakes, 
these labels need to list the following nutrients contained in the product or per 
portion: saturated fat; other fats; total sugars; sodium; and energy.224 Further, 
Mexico also has marketing regulations in terms of which certain food products may 
not be advertised on TV for certain TV programmes and films during the period 2:30 
to 19:30 on weekdays, and during the period 07:00 to 19:30 on weekends. These 
restrictions make use of a NPM, and cover a number of food products, including 
SSBs, chocolate and confectionery products and potato chips.225 Although there is 
very little available evidence on the impact of the Junk Food Tax, the simultaneous 
introduction of both of these taxes is likely to have strengthened the signalling effect, 
in addition to the preceding public awareness campaigns. 
5 3 Health Promotion Levy in South Africa 
5 3 1 Impact on prices, product reformulation and consumption 
The Policy Paper provides that the objective of HPL is to decrease excessive 
sugar consumption, and thereby support the NDOH’s goal of reducing the 
prevalence of obesity and non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”).226 Further, the 
Final Response Document provides that the HPL will “reduce the consumption of 
sugary beverages and promote better health outcomes” through both channels of: 
reducing the demand and consumption of SSBs through increased prices to 
consumers; and reducing the sugar content in SSBs, through incentivising 
manufacturers to reformulate their products to contain less sugar.227 Although the 
Policy Paper does not provide for a measurable goal against which to evaluate the 
efficacy of the HPL, Manyema et al and Brownell et al are cited as studies that 
“suggest that a 10 to 20 per cent price increase of SSBs may be required to translate 
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into a meaningful impact on health outcomes” (emphasis added).228 Among others, 
Manyema et al rely on assumptions relating to: price elasticities; the pass on rate; 
the prevalence of obesity in South Africa; the estimates of consumption; and the 
estimates of the population.229 Based on these assumptions, the mathematical 
model used by Manyema et al projected that a 20% tax on SSBs would reduce 
average daily energy consumption by 30 kilojoules for all adults, which would lead to 
a 2,4% reduction in obesity for females, and a 3,8% reduction for males.230  These 
authors therefore regard a 20% SSB tax as an effective intervention, which could 
contribute around 25% of the NDOH’s goal to reduce the prevalence of obesity by 
10% by 2020.231 
However, these calculations are based on a 20% price increase with 100% pass-
through; where prices increase by 10% and the pass-through rate is 80%, then the 
prevalence of obesity would decrease by 1,1% and 1,9% for females and males 
respectively.232 It was estimated that South African adults consumed a daily average 
of 184 millilitres of SSBs, 200 millilitres of unsweetened 100% fruit juice and 204 
millilitres of milk per day in 2014.  Importantly, Manyema et al: assume that the tax 
would be fully passed through to consumers; and use price elasticities from other 
jurisdictions, assuming that the own-price elasticity of demand for SSBs was -
1,299.233 Using similar data, modelling studies done in 2015 and 2016 respectively 
projected that, over 20 years, a 20% SSB tax could reduce: the number of T2DM-
related deaths by 21 000 and T2DM healthcare costs by R10,3 billion;234 and the 
number of stroke incidences by around 86 000 and stroke-related healthcare costs 
by R5,1 billion.235 Where the tax rate is 10%, the T2DM-related healthcare savings 
would be adjusted to R6,2 billion.236 Further, the number of stroke incidences and 
stroke-related healthcare savings were adjusted: to around 50 000 and R3 billion 
where the SSB tax was 10%; to around 75 000 and R4,5 billion where the tax pass-
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through rate was 80%; and to around 32 000 and R1,8 billion where SSBs had a 
lower own-price elasticity of demand, of -0,85.237 
It is acknowledged that the lack of elasticity data specific to South Africa is a 
drawback in accurately predicting the effect of a 20% SSB tax in South Africa: if the 
own-price elasticity of SSBs in South Africa is lower than the one used in the 
calculations, then the tax would have a smaller impact on SSB consumption and 
obesity rates. The lack of elasticity data specific to South Africa also meant that no 
distinction was made between the differences in price elasticities of demand for 
carbonated SSBs, sweetened fruit juices and syrups and concentrates.238 However, 
these are important considerations, given that the own-price and cross-price 
elasticities of demand between SSBs and these potential substitute beverages will 
affect both consumers’ and manufacturers’ responses to the tax, and ultimately its 
overall influence on dietary quality and health outcomes. According to Marketline 
data, syrups or “squashes” represented 10,1% of the soft drinks market value in 
South Africa in 2017, while: carbonates represented 56,2%; energy drinks 
represented 8,9%; nectars represented 8,5%; packaged water represented 4,3%; 
and sports drinks represented 3,6%.239 
Among other criticisms, the narrow range of products targeted by the HPL has 
been criticised, because it is still possible for consumers to substitute other sugary 
products such as fruit juice and sugar-sweetened food products.240 As discussed 
above, because of the negligible own-price elasticity of 100% fruit juices, Stacey et al 
(2017) argue that their inclusion under the HPL would only “yield meaningful 
reductions in sugar intake from their consumption” if the food industry responds to 
the HPL by promoting these as substitutes for the targeted SSBs.241 After the HPL 
was implemented, Stacey et al (2019) found that there were no statistically 
significant price changes for bottled water, non-carbonated HPL products or 100% 
fruit juice.242 For 100% fruit juices in containers exceeding 1,2 litres, however, these 
                                            
237 Manyema et al (2016) BMC Public Health 7. 
238 6-7. 
239 Marketline Soft Drinks in South Africa September 2018 Marketline Industry Profile 0044-0802 
(2018) 11. Further, “other” soft drinks represented 8,4% of the market value in 2017. 
240 RSA National Treasury & SARS Final Response Document 6. 
241 Stacey et al (2017) 105 Prev. Med S29. As discussed above under heading “4 4 1 Taxes on all 
sugar or certain sugar-sweetened products” in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 




authors find a statistically significant reduction in price.243 This finding might indicate 
that, among other responses, the food industry has promoted 100% fruit juices as 
substitutes for the targeted SSBs. However, while fruit juice consumption contributes 
to obesity and obesity-related NCDs, they offer some additional nutritional value, and 
they contribute “to rural employment and incomes.”244  
Further, because product reformulation is more complicated for products that 
contain intrinsic sugars exclusively, and because other SSB taxes have not included 
100% fruit and vegetable juices, it is unclear how these should be treated.245 
Although this provision may need to be reconsidered in the future, it is submitted that 
the current exemption for 100% fruit and vegetable juices in terms of the HPL is 
appropriate until further research is conducted. The condition that no sugar or 
sweetening matter may be added to these juices is stricter than the SSB taxes in a 
number of other jurisdictions discussed above.246 Further, this exemption could 
provide incentive for manufacturers to reformulate products that would otherwise be 
exempt: the tax liability could be completely eliminated, and the administrative 
burden reduced where manufacturers reformulate fruit and vegetable juices that 
contain added sugar or other sweetening matter, which would otherwise be classified 
as 100% fruit and vegetable juices. Such an outcome is arguably in line with the 
health objective, because added sugar consumption may decrease, and only those 
juices that offer the most nutritional benefit are exempt. 
In addition to reconsidering the fruit juice exemption in the future, it was provided 
in the Final Response Document that other sugary food “products would also need to 
be addressed.”247 In response to a question about whether the HPL could potentially 
be extended to other sugary foods during a radio interview, the Chief Director of 
Health Promotion, Nutrition, Oral Health and Food Control, Lynn Moeng replied: 
 “We have to do one thing at a time... so at the moment, we are still managing the 
beverage tax... other countries have started taxing other foods, rather than just 
beverages. But for now, we said, “Let’s focus on one area,” and the evidence was 
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mostly pointing towards the liquid sugar. And we haven’t had the discussion on how to 
broaden the scope to other products, but it doesn’t mean it will never happen.”248 
As discussed above, most jurisdictions have limited these taxes to SSBs, 
because: other foods offer additional nutritional value; it is more administratively 
complicated to calculate the sugar content in food products; it is more difficult to 
reformulate these products; the scope of sugary food products is much broader than 
SSBs; the substitution effects are more complicated with foods than with beverages; 
and the regressive impact might be larger if all sugary food products were taxed.249 
Further, for jurisdictions that have targeted a broader range of unhealthy foods, it is 
unclear whether overall dietary quality improved. Although it is unclear what the 
status of the relevant health concerns would have been in the absence of these 
taxes, the prevalence of overweight and obese adults increased in both Mexico and 
Hungary.250 Because of the limited available evidence on the effectiveness of these 
taxes, it is submitted that the decision to limit the scope of the HPL to SSBs is 
reasonable. 
The Policy Paper originally proposed that a rate of 20% be imposed on SSBs, 
because studies have indicated that this is the most effective rate to have a 
significant impact on consumption and the relevant health outcomes.251 Based on 
the sugar content of one 330 millilitre tin of Coca-Cola, this rate of 20% would have 
translated to a charge of 2,29 cents per gram of sugar in SSBs.252 However, when 
HPL was implemented on 1 April 2018, the 4 grams per 100 millilitres tax-free 
threshold was also introduced, and the rate was lowered to 2,1 cents per gram of 
sugar in excess of this threshold.253 It was provided in the Final Response Document 
that the threshold was introduced and the tax rate was revised in order to mitigate 
job losses and the impact on the industry.254 While industry engagement may be 
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important, the WHO provides that food policies should be protected “from undue 
influence of commercial and other vested interests.”255 It is arguable that the original 
formulation of the HPL was better-suited for health promotion than this revised 
formulation, and less focus should have been given to these industry interests. It is 
argued that the tax-free threshold and the reduced rate will have a much weaker 
impact on health than the original rate of 2,29 cents per gram of sugar.256 
According to Van Walbeek, “the tax-free threshold could result in changes in the 
mixing instructions, that have no meaningful impact on sugar intake, but that reduces 
the impact of the tax.”257 There is evidence of this occurring in South Africa after the 
introduction of the HPL: before April 2018, the mixing instructions for Nesquik 
powder suggested that three teaspoons be diluted in 200 millilitres of low-fat milk; 
and after April 2018, the mixing instructions for the same Nesquik powder suggested 
that two teaspoons be diluted in 200 millilitres of low-fat milk.258 Further, Van 
Walbeek provides that: 
“Carbonates in SA showed partial pass-through for carbonates but no significant pass-
through for concentrates... Within carbonates, the price increases for non-sugar drinks 
were similar to that of sugary drinks... There were no significant increases in the price 
of untaxed beverages after the introduction of the Health Promotion levy... (as 
expected).”259 
However, Stacey et al (2019) provide that the average price increase for all 
carbonated soft drinks was R1,006 per litre, and the largest price increases were 
observed for the smallest containers.260 The price increases were similar for both 
HPL carbonates above (“high-sugar”) and below (“low-sugar”) the 4 grams per 100 
millilitres sugar content threshold. Further, for the smallest containers in the 
carbonates category, the prices for low-sugar products increased significantly more 
than the prices for high-sugar products. These authors find that the pass-through for 
high-sugar products in smaller containers was around 100%, and between 51% and 
56% for larger containers, with an overall pass-through rate of around 68%. Further, 
Stacey et al (2019) observed that a number of HPL products were reformulated to 
escape the 4 grams per 100 millilitres sugar threshold.261 Coca-Cola for example, 
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has reduced the sugar in their beverages by more than a quarter after the HPL was 
announced in 2016. Coca-Cola claims that these reductions were made in response 
to the global drive to “provide greater choice” to customers however, and not as a 
result of the impending tax.262 
According to Stacey et al (2019), the prices for reformulated products increased 
comparably to those for HPL products that were not reformulated, despite the 
eliminated tax liability.263 Therefore, while the prices of untaxed products, such as 
100% fruit juice and unsweetened, unflavoured still water did not increase, there 
were similar increases for all: the prices of high-sugar HPL products; pre-existing 
low-sugar HPL products; and low-sugar HPL products that were reformulated from 
high-sugar HPL products to contain less than 4 grams per 100 millilitres sugar. 
These authors provide that: 
“Conditional on demand price elasticities, it is possible out counter-intuitive findings 
of increased prices on lower sugar carbonates could be evidence of an intra-firm 
strategy to compensate for profits lost on higher sugar and therefore higher tax 
products by increasing margins on lower sugar products (particularly if demand for 
these products is less price sensitive).”264 
These authors conclude that, although HPL created an incentive for consumers to 
substitute HPL products with 100% fruit juices and bottled water, it has not resulted 
in price changes that encourage substitution away from high-sugar HPL products 
towards low-sugar HPL products. Lastly, Stacey et al (2019) comment that the use of 
multiple tiers or thresholds may not be necessary to incentivise product reformulation 
because “many brands with over 10 g of sugar per 100mL reformulated to well below 
5g of sugar per 10ml” (emphasis added).265 Further, certain SSBs have been 
reformulated to contain less sugar, but are still above the 4 gram per 100 millilitres 
threshold.266 This might indicate that it was not the tax-free threshold that 
encouraged product reformulation in South Africa, but rather the tax-per-gram 
component of the HPL’s tax rate. 
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Because the HPL has only been levied for a relatively short period of time, it is 
difficult at this stage to predict the effects that HPL might have on overall dietary 
quality. This is further complicated because food industry has not responded as 
anticipated. However, it could be argued that the pricing strategies observed by 
Stacey et al (2019) are not in line with the government’s objective of reducing sugar 
consumption.267 Conversely, it could be argued that some of the price changes are 
clearly in conflict with this objective. This is suggested through the observation that, 
for HPL products in the smallest containers, the price increases were actually larger 
for low-sugar products than for high-sugar products.268 Further, even though the 
consumption of low-sugar non-alcoholic beverages increased relative to high-sugar 
beverages, the substitution towards concentrates and syrups has not been 
examined. As pointed out by Van Walbeek, there is scope for tax avoidance in the 
case of these products, so the HPL might have not increased their prices, and the 
ultimate deterrent effect might not be as anticipated.269 
Without considering overall changes in dietary quality or the potentially negative 
health consequences from certain artificial sweeteners, the reformulation of certain 
HPL products could ultimately be in line with the goal of reducing obesity and other 
NCDs where: reformulation serves to change consumers’ tastes; and consumers 
replace high-sugar HPL products with low-sugar HPL products. It appears that the 
consumption of low-sugar HPL carbonated drinks as a proportion of all carbonated 
drink consumption has increased: from 6,9% of all carbonated drink consumption in 
2012 and 2013; and 8,7% of all carbonated drink consumption in 2017; to 12,1% of 
all carbonated drink consumption in 2018.270 A number of authors have explained 
the need for more extensive research on consumption patterns in South Africa for 
different groups of consumers, detailing elasticities and cross-price elasticities of 
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demand between SSB substitutes and various foods.271 Without such research, it is 
difficult to predict overall changes to dietary quality. Due to the lack of evidence, it is 
unclear what effects a higher effective tax rate would have on the food industry 
response and consumption. Bodker et al argue however, that in addition to 
increasing prices by at least 20%, these taxes need to form part of a comprehensive 
policy scheme in order to have a meaningful impact on public health.272 
5 3 2 Developments in the multiple-intervention approach 
As discussed above, the multiple-intervention approach was emphasized in the 
Final Response Document, which provides that the HPL “is not the only intervention 
being implemented but rather complements other interventions,” and the HPL forms 
part of the “comprehensive package of measures” identified in the Strategy, “and has 
not been put forward as the single policy response that will achieve the desired 
health outcomes.”273 Among others, the following measures have been 
implemented, which could have a positive impact on health outcomes in South 
Africa: the Food-Based Dietary Guidelines (“FBDGs”), which were revised in 
2012;274 the inclusion of nutrition education in the Life Orientation curriculum in 
schools;275 regulations requiring the provision of ingredients lists on labels of pre-
packaged food products;276 regulations restricting misleading claims on pre-
packaged food labels an in certain forms of food advertising;277 voluntary guidelines 
in terms of the National Guide for Healthy Meal Provisioning in the Workplace;278 
mandatory sodium and TFAs reformulation regulations;279 the NSNP, which aims to 
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ensure school children are fed nutritious meals;280 and the NNW, which aims to 
advance certain nutrition messages.281 
Overall however, there has been limited development in the multiple-intervention 
approach. In the South African Health Review report, the Health Systems Trust 
provides that “no new health-related primary legislation has been enacted” since 
2015, and summarizes the recent developments in this regard: 
“Three draft Bills have been published for comment, dealing with tobacco control, the 
National Health Insurance Fund, and proposed amendments to medical schemes 
legislation. Other public health-oriented targets have included the proposal to raise the 
age limit for alcohol consumption from 18 to 21 years, and the tax on sugar-sweetened 
beverages... Only a minor change to the labelling requirement for alcoholic beverages 
has been issued...”282  
Among others, the lack of development of a more effective food labelling system 
and mandatory marketing regulations could limit the HPL’s potential to improve 
health outcomes. Among other various responses discussed above, the food 
industry could increase marketing efforts in order to undermine the health objective 
of food taxes.283 In addition to offering insufficient protection to children from 
marketing practices, the limited regulation of marketing in South Africa does not 
prevent this undesirable response.284 This is inconsistent with the HPL’s health 
objective. In a radio interview from February 2019, Lynn Moeng provides that FOP 
labelling regulations are currently being researched, and are under consideration for 
2020: 
“For the major nutrients, the Department decided – like many other countries that have 
already started the process – to investigate what would have more meaning for 
consumers? What would they understand better? So the process... at the moment is at 
the research stage to understand what consumers would understand better so we can 
use that to engage industry people to say “this is what consumers interpret better as 
labels...” Our focus will not be on all the nutrients, it will be on just a few- your sugar, 
your salt, your fat... also creating awareness on other things which they are currently 
not aware on. So at the moment, we are trying to... take the process of the research. 
We have a research unit that’s doing the work for us.”285 
Evidence suggests that higher-income consumers are likely to benefit more from 
labelling regulations, so the use of a consistent FOP labelling system could help 
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consumers to interpret the relevant nutritional information, particularly where these 
consumers have limited nutrition education or literacy in the language in which the 
nutrition information is printed.286 Where FOP labelling systems are based on a 
NPM, they could also incentivise food manufacturers to improve the nutritional 
content of their products, in order to comply with the NPM’s “healthy” requirements 
where applicable.287 However, the lack of mandatory regulations requiring the 
provision of nutritional information is an obstacle to FOP labelling. While Draft 
Regulations 429 have been criticised for various reasons, it was implicitly 
acknowledged that mandatory nutritional information is necessary in order to classify 
foods in terms of an NPM for both marketing regulations and FOP labelling 
purposes.288 
The lack of mandatory labelling regulations requiring the provision of nutritional 
information could also: undermine the HPL’s objective of reducing sugar 
consumption due to relative price increases, because the provision for assumed 
sugar content for SSBs without this information leads to arbitrary price increases; 
and lead to wasted time and resources, as legislators need to revise the provisions 
for the HPL products that do not provide nutritional information. Although labelling 
regulations are not the most “cost-effective” intervention, the implementation of 
mandatory regulations requiring the provision of nutritional information would support 
the health objectives of these other interventions and reduce administrative 
complications for market-based interventions.289 
5 3 3 Challenges and sustainability 
Market-based interventions in other jurisdictions have been subject to a number of 
legal challenges, based on: jurisdictional issues and lack of authority to introduce 
taxes; incompatibility with international trade agreements; and constitutional 
challenges, including limiting consumer rights or other commercial rights.290 Section 
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2 of the Constitution provides that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid...”291 The Constitution provides 
for the rule of law as one of the founding values of the RSA as “one, sovereign, 
democratic state.”292 Flowing from this value is the standard of rationality for state 
actions. The Constitutional Court has provided that Parliament may not act arbitrarily 
or capriciously, and that there needs to be a “rational relationship between the 
scheme... and the achievement of a legitimate government purpose.”293  
The rationality test is objective, and the legislation in question does not need to be 
reasonable or appropriate.294 While it is possible for the HPL to reduce health 
inequalities in theory, it is unclear whether this is actually achieved in practice.295 
However, the Constitutional Court has provided that this rationality standard is not 
concerned with “whether there are other means that could have been used, but 
whether the means selected are rationally related to the objective sought to be 
achieved.”296 It could probably be argued convincingly that: the HPL is rationally 
connected to the legitimate government interests of health promotion and reducing 
government healthcare expenditure on obesity and NCDs. The HPL would therefore 
likely pass the rationality test and it is unlikely that it could be challenged on any of 
these grounds successfully.297  
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However, it should be noted that the HPL is not the first tax on soft drinks in South 
Africa. A tax on certain mineral water and soft drinks products was implemented from 
1993 until 2002. This tax was not repealed because of legal challenges, but due to 
economic and regressivity concerns. According to the Budget Review in 1999: 
“It is recognised that the scrapping of excise taxes could contribute to significant 
volume growth, benefiting primarily lower income groups... It is trusted that the 
manufacturers of soft drinks will honour their commitment to pass on the reduction in 
excises to consumers in the form of lower retail prices. Moreover, the Federation of 
Soft drink Manufacturers undertook to plough the secondary benefits back into the 
South African economy by providing direct support to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, particularly those with close links to the industry.”298 
This tax was also levied in terms of the Customs and Excise Act, but was 
implemented for revenue-raising purposes, and was not linked to a reprising 
objective. This previous tax was payable on a number of beverages, including 
bottled waters, flavoured mineral waters and non-alcoholic beverages with or without 
added sugars. However, fruit and vegetable juices were not subject to this tax. This 
tax was levied according to the volume of these specified beverages, regardless of 
their sugar content. The tax rate started at 10,36 cents per litre in 1993, and 
increased each year until its highest rate of 14,83 cents per litre in 1997 and 1998. 
The rate was then reduced to 12,00 cents per litre in 1999, and further reduced each 
year before it was repealed with effect from 1 April 2002.299 Regressivity concerns 
were cited in 2000 in the Budget Review, and it was provided that the “lower tax 
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burden should benefit consumers and contribute to growth and job creation in the 
downstream small enterprise sector.”300 According to the Policy Paper however, this 
tax “was phased out after lobby efforts by the industry.”301 
Among other reasons, SSB taxes are unpopular because they increase prices for 
consumers and threaten commercial interests. The HPL is no exception, and it is 
important to strengthen efforts to increase and maintain support for this intervention. 
Although the objective of the HPL is health promotion and not revenue generation, 
this does not ensure that it will be sustainable. For example, even after the 
introduction of the Saturated Fat Tax and the reformulation of the Danish Soda Tax 
according to the health objective, these taxes were repealed because of their impact 
on the economy, including the increase in cross-border trade, increased 
administrative costs for Danish companies and threatening Danish jobs.302 Another 
common criticism of these taxes is that their impact is regressive. In this regard, the 
earmarking of the tax revenue generated has been shown to increase support.303 It 
has been suggested that a portion of the revenue generated from the HPL could be 
used to mitigate the regressive impact of the tax.304 The Final Response Document 
and the Policy Paper argue that earmarking is not necessary, and that any 
regressive impact will be offset in terms of progressive health gains, because poorer 
consumers are disproportionately affected by obesity and NCDs.305 However, this 
argument is not convincing, because the out-of-pocked (“OOP”) payments as a 
proportion of healthcare costs are smaller for these consumers, and a relatively 
larger portion is funded through government healthcare expenditure.306  
According to Saxena et al, the average OOP payments as a proportion of 
healthcare costs in 2019 were: 82% for income quintile 5 (“Q5”); 56% for income 
quintile 4 (“Q4”); 41% for income quintile 3 (“Q3”); 18% for income quintile 2 (“Q2”); 
and 21% for income quintile 1 (“Q1”).307 It is therefore unlikely that the increased 
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prices of SSBs are equally offset in this context.308 However, because the burden on 
the healthcare system from the health issues associated with SSB consumption 
might decrease as a result of the HPL, it is possible that poorer consumers could 
receive larger healthcare benefits for other health issues.309 After the HPL was 
implemented, Saxena et al estimated that the 10% tax could lead to around 7900 
T2DM-related averted deaths, around R1,7 billion in government healthcare savings, 
and around R1,3 billion in healthcare savings in OOP payments over 20 years.310 
Further, it was estimated that HPL could increase annual tax revenues collected by 
R5,6 billion.311 These authors assumed 100% pass-through rate, and derived the 
own-price elasticities of demand for SSBs for different income quintiles.312 For both 
of these arguments against the regressivity criticism however, the tax’s impact on the 
relevant health issues and healthcare expenditure are important considerations.313 
However, the HPL’s impact on consumption and health is not clear, because of: the 
lack of available evidence on consumption patterns; and the limited developments 
within the multiple-intervention approach to counter-act undesirable responses to the 
tax.314 
Further, when considering regressivity, it is important to consider the tax and 
benefit system as a whole, instead of each individual tax.315 A full examination of the 
tax and benefit system is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a number of tax 
changes that were implemented alongside the adoption of the HPL have been 
described as regressive, including the increase in the VAT rate from 14% to 15%.316 
Although this development has been subject to criticism, the adoption of the National 
Health Insurance (“NHI”) could potentially improve redistribution objectives within the 
tax and benefit system.317 One criticism in this regard is that, despite the fact that the 
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NDOH has acknowledged that healthcare expenditure would need to increase 
significantly in order to provide quality healthcare: 
 “The 2019 Budget proposes a mere 6.6% nominal increase in spending on health. 
When average (CPI) inflation of 5.2% and population growth of 1.6% are taken into 
account, this represents a real per capita decline in health care funding... Moreover, 
the 2019 Budget proposes that R700 million less will be spent on health in 2019/20 
compared to the 2018 MTBPS estimate.”318 
The Final Response Document provided that “there is a commitment for 
budgetary support for health promotion programmes identified by the NDOH.”319 In 
this context, the National Treasury provided in the 2018 Budget Review that: 
 “Over the MTEF period, R368 is allocated to begin a public awareness campaign to 
complement the health promotion levy on sugary beverages and to establish a health 
technology assessment unit. The unit will analyse the cost effectiveness of various 
health interventions”320  
Stacey et al (2019) describe this allocated revenue as being “soft earmarked for 
health promotion activities,” but by “December 2018, revenue raised had exceeded 
forecasts and reached approximately 2 billion ZAR.”321 It was expected that the HPL 
would generate around R1,82 billion and R1,98 billion for the 2019/20 and 2020/21 
periods respectively.322 This thesis does not undertake to assess all budgetary 
allocations and tax changes, but R368 million over 3 years (the MTEF period) is a 
very small proportion of the revenue that is estimated to be collected from the HPL 
over the same period. Further, this R368 million is not solely allocated to NCD 
“prevention and health technology assessments,” but also includes the 
establishment of “the interim NHI Fund and related structures.”323 According to the 
Budget Justice Coalition, surveys indicate “citizens’ trust in Parliament and in 
government has waned over the past five years.”324 While governments should 
ideally be able to make political decisions independently from expenditure decisions, 
the popularity of these taxes could still be greatly improved where the expenditure is 
directly connected to the purpose of the tax.325 As mentioned above, taxpayers are 
                                            
318 Budget Justice Coalition Budgeting in an Era of Austerity and State Capture 40. 
319 RSA National Treasury & SARS Final Response Document 11. 
320 RSA National Treasury Budget Review (2018) 60. 
321 Stacey et al (2019) Soc Sci Med 2. 
322 RSA National Treasury Budget Review (2018) 195. 
323 RSA National Treasury Budget Review (2018) 55. 
324 Budget Justice Coalition Budgeting in an Era of Austerity and State Capture 5. 




more likely to support a tax where they benefit from the tax revenue collected.326 
According to Van Oordt, “it seems reasonable to expect people to be more willing to 
pay taxes to governments that are less corrupt” and “more effective.”327 Particularly 
where public confidence is limited, it might be favourable to earmark the revenue 
from these taxes.328 
5 4 Conclusion 
Most of the taxes discussed in this thesis have been implemented for health 
objectives, but these taxes also affect other taxation objectives.329 The impact that 
these taxes could have on other policy objectives is a very important consideration, 
because the Danish Soda Tax, the Saturated Fat Tax and South Africa’s old soft 
drinks tax were all repealed because of economic and regressivity concerns.330 
While taxing a broader scope of unhealthy foods and beverages could have a larger 
impact on health outcomes, they could also have a larger negative impact on these 
other policy objectives. Further, although it is unclear how these taxes may have 
mitigated the rise in the relevant health concerns in Hungary and Mexico, the 
prevalence of adult obesity in both of these jurisdictions has increased since the 
implementation of these broader food taxes.331 Further, it is difficult to predict health 
outcomes or attribute changes in consumption and health outcomes to these taxes, 
because there is a broad range of factors that could influence these, including: pre-
existing demand trends, as were observed in Denmark and the UK; the influence of 
other interventions, such as marketing regulations and school-based interventions in 
Hungary and Mexico; the food industry response, which could include product 
reformulation, increased marketing, strategic pricing, etc; and consumers’ 
substitution patterns, which affects the overall change in consumption. 
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While it is unlikely that the HPL could be subject to legal challenges, it is important 
to note that both market-based and non-market-based interventions have been 
repealed as a result of successful legal challenges. For example, the 2002 Mexican 
Sweetener Tax was challenged because it violated international trade agreements, 
and the Portion Cap Rule in NYC was challenged because the NYC Board of Health 
had violated the separation of powers doctrine.332 Where these interventions are 
repealed, their potential to pursue health objectives is clearly limited. Regardless of 
potential legal challenges, it is important to maintain public support for these 
interventions to be sustainable. It has been suggested that the earmarking of tax 
revenues collected from the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Product Tax (“SSBPT”) 
and the PBT increased public support in this regard.333 These revenues could be 
used to reinforce the health objective, or to mitigate the negative impact on other 
policy objectives.334 National Treasury and SARS are reluctant to earmark HPL 
revenues “as it will introduce rigidities in the budgeting process,” but a small portion 
of these revenues have been “soft earmarked” for certain health initiatives.335 
It is difficult to predict the effects that HPL might have on overall dietary quality 
because it has been in effect for a relatively short period of time, and there is limited 
research on consumption patterns in South Africa.336 However, while product 
reformulation has taken place after the implementation of the HPL, Stacey et al 
(2019) observed pricing strategies that were not in line with the health objective, 
where manufacturers mostly increased prices of lower-sugar and sugar-free 
beverages to the same extent as the prices for the original SSBs.337 Further, even 
though the consumption of low-sugar non-alcoholic beverages increased relative to 
high-sugar beverages, the substitution towards concentrates and syrups has not 
been examined. As pointed out by Van Walbeek, there is scope for tax avoidance in 
the case of these products, so the HPL might have not increased their prices to the 
same extent as ready-to-drink HPL products.338 
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While the use of tax-free thresholds appears to have encouraged product 
reformulation in Hungary and the UK, it appears that the HPL’s threshold was not the 
main driver for product reformulation because: a number of products were 
reformulated to “well below” the tax-free threshold; and certain SSBs were 
reformulated to contain less sugar, but still contain more than 4 grams of sugar per 
100 millilitres. It is submitted that the tax-per-gram component of the HPL’s rate was 
a larger influence in this regard, as well as other factors such as consumer tastes.339 
Because of the lack of evidence, it is unclear whether a tax-per-gram rate or higher 
effective tax rate would have influenced the food industry response or consumption. 
Bodker et al argue however, that in addition to increasing prices by at least 20%, 
these taxes need to form part of a comprehensive policy scheme in order to have a 
meaningful impact on public health.340 All of the comparative jurisdictions studied in 
this thesis have some form of mandatory regulations restricting the marketing of 
unhealthy foods and beverages to children, as well as mandatory nutritional 
information labelling regulations. It is submitted that the limited development of these 
two types of interventions in particular could frustrate the health objective of the HPL. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6 1 Overview of research 
The need for government intervention to address the increasing issues caused by 
dietary risk factors is identified in Chapter 1. This introductory chapter explains a 
number of criticisms against sugar-sweetened beverage (“SSB”) taxes, and 
discusses the policy context for the introduction of the Health Promotion Levy 
(“HPL”).  Chapter 2 expands the discussion on the policy context, and considers how 
a number of non-market-based interventions have been used in other jurisdictions. 
One of the “overarching questions” from Chapter 1 is considered: while it is possible 
for non-market-based interventions to achieve health objectives, none of the relevant 
interventions should be used in isolation, and these should be used to complement 
each other. The position of a number of these interventions is discussed in the South 
African context, and in particular, the lack of mandatory regulations requiring the 
provision of nutritional information on the labels of pre-packaged foodstuffs is 
highlighted as an obstacle for effective implementation of the HPL.  
Chapter 3 discusses SSB taxes in the light of a number of aspects of taxes in 
general, including taxation policy objectives. It is explained that there are a number 
of channels through which these taxes could pursue health objectives, and mention 
is made of how certain aspects of formulation could affect these channels. This 
Chapter explains how it could be useful for policymakers to consider the relevant 
channel, as well as how consumers and manufacturers could respond. Furthermore, 
it is considered how non-market-based interventions could be used to complement 
the health objective, and potentially minimise negative effects on other taxation 
objectives. Chapter 4 specifically considers how various aspects of formulation could 
influence the health impact of SSB taxes. Taxes on other unhealthy nutrients and on 
a broader range of sugary products are also discussed, and the formulation of the 
HPL is critically analysed in the light of the comparative study.  
Chapter 5 explains that in order for these taxes to effectively pursue health 
objectives, they need to be sustainable. Potential challenges to sustainability are 
identified, and these taxes’ impact on health and other policy objectives are 
considered for the comparative jurisdictions. This chapter answers the remaining 




consumption patterns; these taxes could have potentially negative effects on other 
policy objectives; and certain aspects of formulation, and the use of non-market-
based interventions could be used to complement the health objective of market-
based interventions, as well as to mitigate the potentially negative effects on other 
policy objectives. Potential legal challenges are considered with reference to the 
Philadelphia Beverage Tax (“PBT”) and the Portion Cap Rule, and other reasons for 
the repeal of these taxes are considered, with reference to Denmark and South 
Africa.  
The potential impact that these taxes have had on health outcomes is discussed, 
with reference to the relevant considerations from Chapters 3 and 4. While it is 
difficult to attribute consumption and health changes to these taxes, it appears that 
product reformulation has occurred, and consumption of the targeted products has 
decreased in Hungary, Mexico and the United Kingdom (“UK”). However, because 
there are a number of responses from consumers and manufacturers that could 
undermine the health objective, it is unclear whether these outcomes have an overall 
positive impact on health. It is difficult to determine how various factors have 
influenced health outcomes along with these taxes, but it appears that the 
prevalence of the relevant health concerns has not improved in jurisdictions where a 
broader range of foods were taxed in addition to SSBs.  
The current formulation of the HPL is then discussed in Chapter 5, with reference 
to findings from the limited available research on the impact of the HPL. The current 
approach to addressing obesity and non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”) in South 
Africa is considered, in the light of other developments in the “multiple-intervention 
approach.” The main research question is addressed, and it is concluded that, in the 
light of the comparative study, the HPL has not been formulated effectively in order 
to achieve its policy objectives. It is submitted that the scope of the HPL is suitable 
until more evidence becomes available on the effectiveness of broader food taxes in 
other jurisdictions, but that the tax-free threshold does not support the health 
objective. 
6 2 Recommendations 
Mandatory regulation on the provision of nutritional information on all pre-
packaged foodstuffs is an important foundation for nutrient-based taxes. Along with 




objective, these are an important foundation for other health interventions such as 
front-of-package (“FOP”) labelling systems. Other non-market-based interventions 
such as public awareness campaigns and marketing regulations should also be used 
to complement the health objectives of market-based interventions. These other 
measures could be funded through the revenues generated by the HPL. Particularly 
because public confidence is limited in South Africa, the dedication of these 
revenues to some health project or towards minimising any regressive impact could 
increase public support. 
The current scope of products subject to the HPL is suitable, given the lack of 
evidence on consumption patterns within South Africa as well as the lack of evidence 
that taxes on a broader range of food products improve health outcomes in other 
jurisdictions. While it might be necessary to reconsider the fruit juice exclusion in the 
future, the current exclusion of only unsweetened 100% fruit and vegetable juices is 
acceptable, given that other SSB taxes exclude fruit juices and it is unclear whether 
these should be taxed differently from other SSBs. The use of the tax-free threshold 
does not support the HPL’s health objective, and has not encouraged product 
reformulation. Rather, it is the tax-per-gram component of the HPL’s rate that has 
encouraged product reformulation, and the tax-free threshold mostly provides 
opportunity for tax avoidance in the case of syrups and concentrates. The removal of 
the tax-free threshold would support the objective of reducing sugar consumption, 
and there would no longer be a need for complicated calculations and different 
treatment of ready-to-drink SSBs and syrups and concentrates. Given that higher 
effective tax rates lead to greater consumption changes, it should also be considered 
whether the tax-per-gram rate should increase so that prices are effectively 
increased by at least 20%. 
6 3 Concluding remarks 
Prior to the introduction of the Danish Saturated Fat Tax in 2011, taxes on 
unhealthy foods and non-alcoholic beverages were not widely used, or were used 
primarily for revenue generation. The Saturated Fat Tax was abolished, but these 
interventions currently receive a lot of attention. While a limited number of these 




have implemented some form of SSB or soft drink tax.1 SSB and soft drinks taxes 
could pursue health objectives through the following channels: discouraging 
consumption through increased prices; incentivising product reformulation; 
generating revenue to be used for health programmes; and signalling to consumers 
and the food industry about the seriousness of the health issues caused by certain 
dietary risk factors. It is unclear to what extent these taxes influence health 
outcomes, but certain aspects of their formulation will probably enhance their 
potential to pursue health objectives, including: the type of tax used; the scope of 
possible substitute products included; the extent to which the tax increases prices; 
and the use of either tax-free thresholds for sugar content, or a specific tax rate 
levied per gram of sugar in the targeted products. For example, it is important for 
these taxes to target a broad range of SSBs so that undesirable substitution does 
not take place. Further, unless the desired channel is revenue generation, higher 
effective tax rates support consumption changes and product reformulation, because 
they have a larger deterrent effect.  
The signalling effect could be supported where the effective tax rate is high, as 
well as where non-market-based interventions are used to complement these taxes. 
It is submitted that the HPL has a weak signalling effect, and the current formulation 
is not optimal for discouraging consumption of SSBs. While it appears that the use of 
tax-free thresholds in other jurisdictions has encouraged product reformulation, it is 
submitted that the use of such a threshold does not support the HPL’s health 
objectives. Rather, it appears that product reformulation in South Africa has occurred 
as a result of the tax-per-gram component of the HPL’s tax rate, and the use of the 4 
grams per 100 millilitres has led to undesirable responses from the food industry. 
The removal of the tax-free threshold would not remove the incentive for 
manufacturers to reformulate their products. Rather, the use of a tax-per-gram of 
sugar rate, applied to both ready-to-drink SSBs and syrups and concentrates, would: 
more accurately target sugar consumption; and reduce the scope for manufacturers 
to avoid the tax, particularly in the case of syrups and concentrates. 
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However, the current lack of mandatory labelling regulations requiring the 
provision of nutritional information on all pre-packaged foodstuffs is an obstacle to 
any formulation of nutrient-based taxes. In order to target sugar consumption 
specifically, there is a need for development of such regulations. Such regulations 
would also serve to minimise administrative costs. Further, the current regulatory 
framework for food marketing is an obstacle for the HPL to change consumption, 
because it is still possible for the food industry to undermine the health objective 
through increased marketing, etc. While it could be possible for SSB taxes to 
improve health outcomes, the lack of development in the “multiple-intervention 
approach,” along with the low effective tax rate and reluctance to earmark a larger 
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Article Description Rate of Health 
Promotion Levy 
191.00 LEVY ON SUGARY BEVERAGES 
191.01 18.06 Chocolate and other food preparations containing 
cocoa: 
191.01 1806.10 Cocoa powder, containing added sugar or other 
sweetening matter: 
191.01.05 1806.10.05 Preparations for making 
beverages 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.02 19.01 Malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, 
meal, starch or mal extract, not containing cocoa 
or containing less than 40 per cent by mass of 
cocoa calculated on a totally defatted basis, not 
elsewhere specified or included; food preparations 
of goods of headings 04.01 to 04.04, not containing 
cocoa or containing less than 5 per cent by mass 
of cocoa calculated on a totally defatted basis, not 
elsewhere specified or included: 
191.02 1901.90 Other: 
191.02.05 1901.90.15 Preparations for making 
beverages (excluding those of 
tariff subheading 1901.90.20) 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.05 21.06 Food preparations not elsewhere specified or 
included: 
191.05 2106.90 Other: 
191.05.05 2106.90.20 Syrups and other concentrates or 
preparations for making 
beverages, not having a basis of 
fruit juice (excluding those of tariff 
subheading 2106.90.69) 
 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.05.10 2106.90.22 Syrups and other concentrates or 
preparations for making 
beverages, with a basis of fruit 
juice (excluding those of tariff 
subheading 2106.90.69) 
 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.05.15 2106.90.69 Drinking straws, containing 
flavouring preparations 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07 22.02 Waters, including mineral waters and aerated 
                                            




waters, containing added sugar or other 
sweetening matter or flavoured, and other non-
alcoholic beverages (excluding fruit or vegetable 
juices of heading 20.09) 
191.07 2202.10 Waters, including mineral waters and aerated 
waters, containing added sugar or other 
sweetening matter or flavoured: 
191.07.05 2202.10.10 In sealed containers holding 2,5li 
or less (excluding those in 
collapsible plastic tubes) 
 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07.10 2202.10.90 Other 2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07 2202.9 Other: 
191.07 2202.91 Non-alcoholic beer: 
191.07.15 2202.91.20 In sealed containers holding 2,5li 
or less (excluding those in 
collapsible plastic tubes and 
those with a basis of milk) 
 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07.20 2202.91.90 Other 2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07 2202.99 Other: 
191.07.25 2202.99.20 In sealed containers holding 2,5li 
or less (excluding those in 
collapsible plastic tubes and 
those with a basis of milk) 
 
2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
191.07.90 2202.99.90 Other 2,21c/gram of the 
sugar content that 
exceeds 4g/100ml 
Annex B: Nordic Keyhole Logo for front-of-package food labels3 
 
                                            




Annex C: Example of the “Traffic light” labelling in the United Kingdom4 
 
Annex D: Example of the “Nutri-Score” labelling system in France5 
 
Annex E: Minimum mandatory nutritional information6 
 Per 100 g/ml Per single serving 
Energy (kJ)   
Protein (g)   
Glycaemic Carbohydrate 
(g)  
of which total sugar (g) 
  
Total fat (g)   
of which Saturated fat (g)   
*   
**   
**   
***   
Dietary fibre# (g)   
Total Sodium (mg)   
                                            
4 British Nutrition Foundation “Healthy Living / Helping you eat well / Looking at labels”) British 
Nutrition Foundation. 
5 Van der Bend & Lissner (2019) Nutrients 7. 




• Any other nutrient 
or food component to be 
declared in accordance 
with these Regulations 
• in alphabetical 
order, in the order: 
vitamins, minerals, others. 
Indicated in grams (g), 
milligrams (mg), 
micrograms (mcg/μg), or 
appropriate unit of 
measurement) 
Indicated in grams (g), 
milligrams (mg), 
micrograms (mcg/μg), or 
appropriate unit of 
measurement) 
“Nutrient reference values (NRVs) for individuals 4 years and older expressed per 
single serving is optional 
Place the statements required by regulation 50(4) as appropriate here 
*place to insert trans fat 
**place for a subgroup nutrient, such as monounsaturated fat, polyunsaturated fat, 
omega-3 fatty acids et cetera 
***place to insert cholesterol when cholesterol information is given 
# Indicate method of analysis used to determine dietary fibre” 
Annex F: Soda Tax rates in Denmark7 
Tax rate change Tax rate 
1 January 1984 DKK 1,60/l 
1 July 1991 DKK 0,80/l 
1 January 1998 DKK 1,00/l 
1 January 2001 DKK 1,65/l 
1 October 2003 DKK 1,15/l 
Annex G: Denmark Chocolate and Confectionery Tax products and rates8 
Chapter 1: chocolate and sugar confectionery products Rate 
Chocolate and the like, cocoa paste, cocoa butter, and any other 
cocoa related goods 





DKK 22,08 for 
products whose 
added sugar 
content is less 
than 0,5g/100g 
Liquorice extract, liquorice, and liquorice of any kind such as 
liquorice root powder, and mixtures of ammonium and liquorice 
root and the like 
Products partially or completely consisting of almonds, nuts, any 
other type of seeds, or products containing these 
Confectionary, candies, sugar-coated goods, marshmallows, 
fondant, sugared cereals and the like with added essence or 
colour and any other sugar confectionary 
Chewing gum 
Candied fruits and fruit peel and other candied goods except from 
peel of citrus fruits 
Succade, jam and similar products when shaped like sheeds, 
rods, shapes and the like 
Wafers which are coated in or in any other way in contact with 
chocolate, marshmallows, or products partially or completely 
                                            
7 Skatteministeriet “Chapter 4. Sodavand” Skatteministeriet. 







consisting of almonds, nuts, or any other type of seeds- with 
certain exceptions 
Cakes, biscuits, and the like partially consisting of marshmallows, 
when baked good does not make up at least two thirds of the 
goods’ volume 
Any other goods which can be considered imitations or 
substitutes for any of the above mentioned goods when looking at 
the quality and the use and the way they are marketed 
Chapter 2: raw materials such as almonds, nuts, grains, etc.  
Unprocessed acacia nuts, unprocessed almonds, unprocessed 
apricot and peach kernels, and unprocessed cashew nuts 
DKK 14,57/kg 
Processed acacia nuts, processed almonds, processed apricot 
and peach kerns, and processed cashew nuts 
DKK 17,44/kg 
Processed and unprocessed Brazil nuts, processed and 
unprocessed walnuts, pistachio nuts, pecan nuts, unprocessed 
hazelnuts, cocoa shells, cocoa waste, residues from the 
extraction of oils from dutiable nuts and kernels, unless the good 
is not suitable for human consumption 
DKK 9,71/kg 
Processed hazelnuts DKK 11,65/kg 
Almonds in shell DKK 7,33/kg 
Hazelnuts in shell and peanuts without shell DKK 4,87/kg 
Processed peanuts DKK 5,8/kg 
Processed and unprocessed coconuts and peanuts in shell DKK 2,9/kg 
Chapter 3: imported goods containing taxable components, 
subject to the financial levy 
 
Coconut DKK 2,9/kg 
Processed peanuts DKK 5,8/kg 
Other nuts and seeds DKK 11,04/kg 





DKK 22,08/kg for 
products whose 
added sugar 
content is less 
than 0,5g/100g. 
Annex H: Standard rates for meat products in terms of the Saturated Fat Tax9 
Product Saturated fat/100g Tax rate 
Meat   
Cattle 5,2g DKK 0,83/kg 
Pig 6,5g DKK 1,04/kg 
Sheep and goats 6g DKK 0,96/kg 
Horses, mules, donkeys 4g DKK 0,64/kg 
                                            




Chickens 2,5g DKK 0,40/kg 
Ducks and geese 12,1g DKK 1,94/kg 
Turkeys 0g DKK 0,00/kg 
Rabbits and hares 0g DKK 0,00/kg 
Other wildlife (animals) 1,6g DKK 0,26/kg 
Other meat 4,2g DKK 0,7/kg 
Annex I: Saturated Fat Tax Foods10 
Saturated Fat Tax 
Taxable Food: 




0401: “Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added 
sugar or other sweetening matter” 
0402: “Milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar 
or other sweetening matter” 
0403: “Buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yoghurt, kephir and 
other fermented of acidified milk and cream, whether or not 
concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter or flavoured or containing added fruit, nuts or cocoa” 
0404: “Whey, whether or not concentrated or containing added 
sugar or other sweetening matter; products consisting of natural 
milk constituents, whether or not containing added sugar or 
other sweetening matter, not elsewhere specified or included”  
0405: “Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; dairy 
spreads” 
0406: “Cheese and curd” 
Animal fat under 
headings 1501-




1501: “Pig fat (including lard) and poultry fat, other than that of 
heading 0209 or 1503” 
1502: “Fats of bovine animals, sheep or goats, other than those 
of heading 1503” 
1503: “Lard stearin, lard oil, oleostearin, oleo-oil and tallow oil, 
not emulsified or mixed or otherwise prepared” 
1504: “Fats and oils, and other fractions, of fish or marine 
mammals, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified” 
1516: “Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, 
partly or wholly hydrogenated, inter-esterified, re-esterified or 
elaidinised, whether or not refined, but not further prepared” 
Food oils and fats 
under headings 
1507-1516: 
1507: “Soya-bean oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, 
but not chemically modified” 
1508: “Groundnut oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, 
but not chemically modified” 
1509: “Olive oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not 
chemically modified” 
1510: “Other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, 
whether or not refined, but not chemically modified, including 
                                            
10 Lov nr. 247 af 30.03.2011 om afgift af mættet fedt i visse fødevarer (fedtafgiftsloven) § 1; Chapters 
4, 15 & 21 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1101/2014 of the European Council of 16 October 
2014 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical 




blends of these oils or fractions with oils or fractions of heading 
1509” 
1511: “Palm oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not 
chemically modified” 
1512: “Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-seed oil and 
fractions thereof, whether or not refined, but not chemically 
modified” 
1513: “Coconut (copra), palm kernel or babassu oil and 
fractions thereof, whether or not refined, but not chemically 
modified” 
1514: “Rape, colza or mustard oil and fractions thereof, whether 
or not refined, but not chemically modified” 
1515: “Other fixed vegetable fats and oils (including jojoba oil) 
and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically 
modified” 
1516: “Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, 
partly or wholly hydrogenated, inter-esterified, re-esterified or 
elaidinised, whether or not refined, but not further prepared 
Margarine and 
other food of 
heading 1517: 
1517: “Margarine; edible mixtures or preparations of animal or 
vegetable fats or oils or of fractions of different fats or oils of this 





2106: “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included 
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